Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc.

• Decision Date: 27 April 1994
• Docket Number: No. 93-1985,93-1985
• Citation: 23 F.3d 174
• Parties: Connie M. TOLLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CARROLL TOUCH, INC., Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Seventh Circuit

Page 174

23 F.3d 174

28 Fed.R.Serv.3d 1347

Connie M. TOLLE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. CARROLL TOUCH, INC., Defendant-Appellee.

No. 93-1985.

United States Court of Appeals, Seventh Circuit.

Argued Feb. 7, 1994.

Decided April 27, 1994.

Evan A. Strawn (argued), Bloomington, IL, for plaintiff-appellant.

Ray E. Alexander, Requa & Alexander, Springfield, IL, Vincent Candiello (argued), Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Harrisburg, PA, for defendant-appellee.

Before CUDAHY and COFFEY, Circuit Judges, and NORGLE, District Judge. ^*

NORGLE, District Judge.

This case concerns the district court's orders denying plaintiff-appellant Connie M. Tolle's ("Tolle") motion to voluntarily dismiss the action pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2), and granting defendant-appellee Carroll Touch, Inc.'s ("CTI") motion for summary judgment pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The issues on appeal are whether the district court abused its discretion in denying Tolle's motion to voluntarily dismiss the action in order to proceed in state court, and whether the district court erred in granting CTI's motion for summary judgment on Tolle's claims asserted under Secs. 502(a)(1)(B) and 503 of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C. Sec. 1001, et seq. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

Having issued a prior opinion in this matter, Tolle v. Carroll Touch, Inc., 977 F.2d 1129 (7th Cir.1992), we will discuss only the facts relevant to the disposition of this appeal. On September 29, 1989, Tolle filed a complaint against CTI in the United States District Court for the Central District of Illinois, Springfield Division seeking ERISA benefits. On October 31, 1989, Tolle amended her complaint. After extensive discovery was completed by the litigants, CTI filed a summary judgment motion on April 5, 1991. On May 20, 1991, the district court granted the motion holding that Tolle's state law claims against CTI were preempted by ERISA and that Tolle's claims under Sec. 510 of ERISA were time-barred by the applicable statute of limitations. Tolle subsequently appealed the judgment of the district court. We affirmed the district court's dismissal of both claims. Id. at 1133. The case was, however, remanded to the district court for further proceedings on claims for relief under Secs. 502(a)(1)(B) and 503 of ERISA, 29 U.S.C. Secs. 1132(a)(1)(B), 1133, which were neither clearly presented to nor addressed by the district court. Id. at 1142.

In accordance with our remand order of October 20, 1992, the district court issued an order on December 11, 1992 instructing the parties to file cross-motions for summary judgment by January 4, 1993 on the issues of whether Tolle's claims under Secs. 502(a)(1)(B) and 503 of ERISA were time-barred and whether Tolle was entitled to relief under those claims. On December 18, 1993, Tolle filed a motion to voluntarily dismiss the action pursuant to Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. According to the motion, Tolle sought to dismiss the action so that she may pursue the ERISA claims in a pending state action against CTI. On January 4, 1993, however, Tolle filed her motion for summary judgment, without a supporting memorandum of law, in partial compliance ¹ with the district court's December 11, 1993 order. In response to Tolle's motion to dismiss, CTI filed its objections on January 5, 1993.

On January 27, 1993, the district court denied Tolle's motion to voluntarily dismiss and permitted her to file a memorandum of law in support of her motion for summary On February 16, 1993, the court denied Tolle's motion for reconsideration and her motion for summary judgment, and granted CTI's motion for summary judgment 813 F.Supp. 1368. Subsequently, on February 26, 1993, Tolle filed a motion to vacate the judgment of the district court and its opinion of February 16, 1993. On March 23, 1993, the district court denied Tolle's motion to vacate. On April 6, 1993, Tolle filed a motion for reconsideration in response to the denial of her motion to vacate. The reconsideration motion was likewise denied. Tolle filed a timely appeal of the district court's decisions and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. Sec. 1291.

                judgment by February 8, 1993.  The order further directed CTI to file both its response to Tolle's summary judgment motion, and its cross-motion for summary judgment and supporting memorandum of law by February 8, 1993.  On February 4, 1993, CTI filed its motion for summary judgment and a memorandum in opposition to Tolle's motion for summary judgment.  On February 8, 1993, Tolle timely filed a memorandum of law in support of her motion for summary judgment, but addressing only the issue of statute of limitations.  Tolle failed to present any argument with respect to the substantive issues. 2  In addition to the supporting memorandum, Tolle contemporaneously filed a motion for reconsideration of the district court's denial of her motion to voluntarily dismiss
                

DISCUSSION

We affirm the decisions of the district court denying Tolle's motion to voluntarily dismiss and granting CTI's motion for summary judgment as to claims raised under Secs. 502(a)(1)(B) and 503 of ERISA. Rule 41(a)(2) provides in relevant part that:

Except as provided in paragraph (1) of this subdivision of this rule, an action shall not be dismissed at the plaintiff's instance save upon order of the court and upon such terms and conditions as the court deems proper.

Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). Permitting a plaintiff to voluntarily dismiss an action without prejudice, under Rule 41(a)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, is within the sound discretion of the district court. FDIC v. Knostman, 966 F.2d 1133, 1142 (7th Cir.1992). Inversely, the district court has the discretionary power to deny a plaintiff's request to voluntarily dismiss a claim without prejudice. Kapoulas v. Williams Ins. Agency, Inc., 11 F.3d 1380, 1383 (7th Cir.1993). Thus, we apply the abuse of discretion standard in reviewing the district court's decision denying Tolle's motion to dismiss.

In the instant action, the district court did not abuse its discretion. At the time of Tolle's motion to voluntarily dismiss, filed January 11, 1993, the case had been pending since 1989, discovery had been completed for approximately twenty-two months, the district court had limited the contested issues in the matter by granting a partial summary judgment, we had remanded the case so that the district court could address the remaining issues regarding the claims raised under Secs. 502(a)(1)(B) and 503, and the district court had issued specific directives instructing the parties to file cross-motions for summary judgment to address the matter expeditiously. Additionally, CTI objected to the voluntary dismissal of the claims without prejudice. Under these circumstances, the district judge, who was thoroughly familiar with the case, did not abuse his discretion in denying Tolle's Rule 41(a)(2) motion.

Tolle's argument that the district court erred in denying the motion to dismiss lacks support in the Seventh Circuit. Tolle contends that the district court should have granted the motion to dismiss because CTI utterly failed to establish its burden that CTI will suffer prejudice if the court allows Tolle to voluntarily dismiss the action without prejudice. We reject this contention. Rule 41(a)(2) requires the plaintiff to persuade the district court and to establish that voluntary dismissal without prejudice is warranted. Fed.R.Civ.P. 41(a)(2). Without such demonstration Moreover, we find Tolle's reason for the request to voluntarily dismiss the action unconvincing. Tolle sought to voluntarily dismiss the action pending before the district court "in the interest of judicial economy and the conservation of economic and human resources, and to avoid unnecessary confusion of issues...." Appellant's App. 45. We cannot say that the district court abused its discretion in determining that the interests of justice would be better served by continuing to proceed with the nearly four-year old case in the federal court. At the time Tolle filed her Rule 41(a)(2) motion, discovery had been concluded and the contested issues narrowed. The district judge reasonably determined that Tolle had made no showing that judicial economy, conservation of resources, or unnecessary confusion of issues would result from the dismissal in the district court with litigation to continue in the state court. Unfavorable rulings by the district court is not an acceptable basis to grant Tolle's voluntary dismissal or to facilitate the search for a perceivably more favorable state judicial climate.

an action shall not be dismissed at the request of a plaintiff. Id.

Tolle further argues that the district court's order "deprives her of the opportunity to litigate the issues in the forum of her choice." Appellant's Brief at 16. We find the argument lacks merit. On September 29, 1989, Tolle initiated the instant federal action against CTI. On October 16, 1989, Tolle filed a complaint in the Circuit Court of McLean County, Illinois, against UNUM Life Insurance Company of America ("UNUM"), the underwriter of CTI's employee life insurance benefit plan. When Tolle filed the state action against UNUM, Tolle did not dismiss the federal action against CTI to proceed with the case in the state forum by amending the state complaint. Rather, on February 14, 1992, two years and four months after filing the state action, Tolle named CTI as additional party defendant to the state litigation. During that time, this appeal was pending before this Court.

Tolle's choice of forum to litigate the ERISA claims against CTI has been the federal court since 1989. Tolle's choice of forum changed only after receiving an adverse ruling from Judge Mills on CTI's motion for partial summary judgment which we affirmed in the earlier appeal. Accordingly, the district judge did not abuse his discretion in denying Tolle's motion to voluntarily...