Satterfield v. Com.

• Decision Date: 09 June 1992
• Docket Number: No. 1202-89-2,1202-89-2
• Citation: 14 Va.App. 630,420 S.E.2d 228
• Parties: Dean Mason SATTERFIELD v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia. Record
• Court: Virginia Court of Appeals

Page 228

420 S.E.2d 228

14 Va.App. 630

Dean Mason SATTERFIELD v. COMMONWEALTH of Virginia.

Record No. 1202-89-2.

Court of Appeals of Virginia.

June 9, 1992.

Charles C. Cosby, Jr. (Andrea C. Long, Boone, Beale, Carpenter & Cosby, on brief), Richmond, for appellant.

Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen. (Mary Sue Terry, Atty. Gen., on brief), for appellee.

Present: KOONTZ, C.J., and BARROW, BENTON, COLEMAN, DUFF, MOON, WILLIS, ELDER and BRAY, JJ.

UPON REHEARING EN BANC

MOON, Judge.

We granted an en banc rehearing to the Commonwealth from a panel decision, Satterfield v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.App. 24, 401 S.E.2d 887 (1991), which reversed Dean Mason Satterfield's conviction of possession of cocaine with the intent to distribute. We hold that the trial court did not err in allowing the Commonwealth to introduce into evidence Satterfield's entire statement to the police in which he admitted that, not only did he purchase the cocaine in question for the purpose of distribution, he also previously had purchased drugs from the same individual and resold it at a profit. For this reason, we affirm the conviction.

Satterfield's statement responded to the inquiry about the cocaine he possessed and was his way of explaining that he intended to distribute the cocaine he was charged with possessing. Satterfield was explaining, in effect, that he had acquired and was holding this cocaine for sale just as he had on other occasions. Although Satterfield's statement referred to prior drug offenses, the reference was highly relevant because it tended to prove the element of intent for this crime. Additionally, Satterfield's voluntary statement pertaining to where he obtained the drugs was such an integral part of the Commonwealth's proof that it could not be excised without changing the nature and character and probative value of the statement. The "other crimes" aspect of the statement is inextricably part of the probative value of the evidence because it tended to prove an essential element of the offense. Because Satterfield contended the officer's account of his statement was untrue or inaccurate, the fact that the officer could provide additional relevant details which Satterfield included in the statement is probative of whether the officer's testimony was believable, reliable, and accurate in recounting what Satterfield said.

On December 2, 1988, Investigators L.K. Roark, R.D. Loftis, Jr., and Officer Fowler

were in South Hill, Virginia when they received information from a confidential informant that Satterfield would be dealing cocaine later that night near the Hardee's Restaurant in South Boston. Satterfield was reported to be driving a gray Thunderbird.

The officers proceeded to the location of the restaurant and observed Satterfield driving a gray Thunderbird. The officers stopped his vehicle and searched him, at which time they recovered from him three foil packets containing cocaine in a cigarette package. The cocaine weighed .78 gram.

The officers arrested Satterfield and advised him of his Miranda rights at the police station. After he executed a waiver of rights form, Satterfield made an oral statement to three police officers. After making the statements, he invoked his right to an attorney and the interrogation ceased. None of the officers wrote down what Satterfield said until December 6, 1988, four days after the arrest.

The officer who wrote down Satterfield's statement, R.D. Loftis, and another officer, L.K. Roark, testified to it as follows:

We ask him (Satterfield) about where he was getting the drugs from and he stated he was getting the drugs from a black male but he didn't know the name. And he stated that he had gotten three-quarter grams for $20 each and was going to sell them for $25 each, and also that he spent a lot of money with his supplier in the past several months.

The most he had purchased at any one time within the past two months was $500 worth which he resold for $1,000.

At trial, Satterfield's strategy was to convince the jury that he was not a drug "distributor," but was himself a victim of drug addiction who merely used drugs or, at most, was forced to sell small amounts of cocaine to acquire drugs to satisfy his addiction. He presented evidence to show that the officers misunderstood or were confused about his admission that he intended to sell the drugs in his possession. ¹

On cross-examination of the police officers, defense counsel sought to impeachtheir testimony by showing that they had not electronically recorded Satterfield's statement, that it was four days after arrest when Loftis wrote it down, that the officers were merely relying upon their best recollection, and that their testimony concerning the statement was not a verbatim account of what they had been told. Defense counsel suggested to one officer that Satterfield had told the officer "that he was addicted to cocaine," which the officer admitted he had not included as a part of his notes concerning the statement. Counsel further brought out the fact that Satterfield told the police officer he was using about one gram of cocaine each day and he bought and resold it to help support his habit.

Satterfield put on a police officer to testify that the value of the cocaine in Satterfield's possession was only $50 to $100 a gram, three-quarters of a gram being worth about $75. Angela Throckmorton, Satterfield's girlfriend, testified that Satterfield was addicted to the drug and used it each day.

Satterfield moved to suppress that part of the statement admitting that he had purchased the drugs in question from the same supplier that he had purchased other quantities of drugs for sale in the past two months. He relied upon Boyd v. Commonwealth, 213 Va. 52, 189 S.E.2d 359 (1972), Eccles v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 20, 197 S.E.2d 332 (1973), and Donahue v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 145, 300 S.E.2d 768 (1983), to support his position. In response, the Commonwealth argued that the objectionable portion of the statement was closely connected to the offense charged and that the statement in its entirety should be admitted in evidence. The Commonwealth maintained that Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 323 S.E.2d 572 (1984), controlled, not Boyd, Eccles and Donahue, since the latter three cases involved separate drug offenses unrelated in any way to the offenses charged.

Boyd and Donahue, relied upon by Satterfield, are cases in which the prior, unrelated drug sales were transactions separate and apart from the charged offense. The prior drug activity had no relevance to any issue in those cases. They were cases where the Commonwealth put on separate, independent evidence of prior acts of drug distribution and the prior acts were unrelated to the charged offenses. Eccles, also relied on by appellant, involved the admission of testimony as to the defendant's prior criminal acts of smoking marijuana. The Court in Eccles found the admission of the evidence to be error and reversed. Id. 214 Va. at 22-23, 197 S.E.2d at 333. All three cases cited by Satterfield are distinguishable from his case, where the proof of the prior distribution was included in an admission, was explanatory of the offense charged and was relevant to prove an essential element of the charged crime.

Frequently, evidence that is inadmissible under a general rule of evidence is admissible under an exception to the general rule or under another rule. See Upchurch v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 408, 410, 258 S.E.2d 506, 507-08 (1979). The general rule against proving prior criminal conduct of a defendant does not operate to prohibit such evidence when it is offered to prove relevant facts.

When a tension exists between one rule of evidence and another, or a general rule and an exception, because of the prejudicial nature of the evidence, the question of admissibility lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and that decision will not be reversed on appeal absent an abuse of discretion. See Blain v. Commonwealth, 7 Va.App. 10, 16, 371 S.E.2d 838, 842 (1988).

We hold the admissibility of this evidence is controlled by the holding in Scott v. Commonwealth, wherein the Supreme Court stated:

Where a course of criminal conduct is continuous and interwoven, consisting of a series of related crimes, the perpetrator has no right to have the evidence "sanitized" so as to deny the jury knowledge of all but the immediate crime for which he is on trial. The fact-finder is entitled to all of the relevant and connected facts, including those which followed the commission of the crime on trial, as well as those which preceded it; even though they may show the defendant guilty of other offenses. Evidence of such connected criminal conduct is often relevant to show motive, method, and intent. Indeed, it may be the only way in which such matters may be shown, as was the case here. Even where another crime is not inextricably linked with the offense on trial, it may nevertheless be proved if it shows the conduct and feeling of the accused toward his victim, his motive, intent, plan or scheme, or any other relevant element of the offense on trial.

228 Va. at 526-27, 323 S.E.2d at 577 (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Satterfield argues that the police officer misunderstood the import of his statement. However, the portion of the statement to which Satterfield objected explained the import of that part of the statement to which he did not object. The objectionable portion of the statement informed the jury of the context in which the statement was made. Satterfield attempted to persuade the jury that the police officer misunderstood him when the police officer heard him say that he was going to sell the drugs that he had. Satterfield, in order to minimize his references to distribution, wanted to emphasize to the jury that he had talked to the officers about his drug addiction and daily drug use. Without the admission of that portion of his statement...