Satterfield v. Satterfield

• Citation: 448 S.W.2d 456
• Decision Date: 26 March 1969
• Docket Number: No. B--812,B--812
• Parties: Charles SATTERFIELD, Petitioner, v. Jess SATTERFIELD et al., Respondents.
• Court: Supreme Court of Texas

Page 456

448 S.W.2d 456

Charles SATTERFIELD, Petitioner, v. Jess SATTERFIELD et al., Respondents.

No. B--812.

Supreme Court of Texas.

March 26, 1969.

Rehearing Denied June 11, 1969.

Second Rehearing Denied July 9, 1969.

Hill, Paddock & Street, John G. Street, Jr., Fort Worth, for petitioner.

Richard U. Simon, Jr., Fort Worth, Michael H. Sebastian, Gardere, Porter & DeHay, Gordon H. Rowe, Jr., Dallas, Byrd, Davis, Eisenberg & Clark, Tom H. Davis and Don L. Davis, Austin, for respondents.

SMITH, Justice.

This is an action for damages for personal injuries growing out of a collision between two automobiles on a public highway in this state. Jess Satterfield filed this suit against his son, Charles Satterfield, who was driving his (Jess Satterfield's) automobile, which was involved in the collision; the owner of the Other automobile, United Auto Supply, Inc.; and Billy John Marshall, the driver of the United Auto Supply automobile. The case was submitted to a jury on special issues, resulting in findings of (1) negligence and proximate cause against Billy John Marshall, the driver of the other automobile; (2) negligence and proximate cause against Charles Satterfield, the driver of plaintiff's, Jess Satterfield, automobile; and (3) damages in the sum of $7,337.54.'

The trial court found that, as a matter of law, Jess and Charles Satterfield were engaged in a joint enterprise. In view of the jury findings that the negligent acts of both Charles Satterfield and Billy John Marshall were proximate causes of the injuries sustained by Jess Satterfield, the plaintiff was denied a judgment for damages against Billy John Marshall and United Auto Supply. This finding was based on the theory that the negligence of Charles is imputed to Jess. Charles Satterfield was denied a judgment against Billy John Marshall on his plea for contribution. However, based upon the jury findings that Charles Satterfield's negligence proximately caused the collision in question, the trial court entered judgment that Jess Satterfield recover of and from the defendant, Charles Satterfield, the sum of $7,337.54, as found by the jury. The judgment in favor of United Auto Supply became final in the trial court when no appeal was perfected from the trial court judgment in its favor. On appeal, Jess Satterfield complained of the take nothing judgment in favor of Billy John Marshall. Charles Satterfield complained of the judgment in favor of Jess Satterfield as well as the judgment denying to him contribution from the defendant, Billy John Marshall. The Court of Civil Appeals for the Second Supreme Judicial District of Texas affirmed the judgment of the trial court. Satterfield v. United Auto Supply, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 40. We affirm.

For convenience, Jess Satterfield shall hereinafter be designated as plaintiff; Charles Satterfield shall be designated as defendant.

Since the plaintiff did not file a motion for rehearing in the Court of Civil Appeals and has not filed an application for writ of error to this Court, we are concerned only with the questions raised in the defendant's application for writ of error. This is a case of first impression in Texas so far as the principal question is concerned. That question is: Did the plaintiff become a 'guest' within the meaning of Article 6701b, Vernon's Annotated Civil Statutes, while riding in, but not operating, his own automobile? We answer that he did not.

The only Texas decisions have been those which dealt with a situation where a passenger brought suit against an owner-operator. However, before proceeding with an analysis of these cases, we point out the following undisputed facts:

On November 8, 1964, according to the testimony, the Satterfields decided to go to Burleson, Texas, and from there to church. The plaintiff requested the defendant to drive the automobile so he, the plaintiff, could sit in the back seat and entertain the defendant's little daughter, who was about fourteen months old. The defendant's wife, Sherry, was sitting in the front seat with her husband at the time of the collision. Plaintiff and defendant each had a car available for the trip. The reason for the son driving the father's car was explained by the plaintiff as follows: The father, Jess, when asked why his son, Charles, was driving, testified, 'Well, because my little granddaughter wanted to ride in 'Paw-Paw's' car. And, it was out in front, and so I said, 'Let's go in mine,' and I wanted to be with her and sat in the back seat to play with her.' Before going to church, the party went to visit some 'in-laws' in Burleson, arriving there about 6:30, 'pretty close to 7:00' in the evening. They left there (Charles still driving) 'about 7:15, I think, or 7:30.' It was dark at that time. The special reason for going to church on this occasion was, 'my daughter-in-law's mother was going to be bapitzed that night.' The plaintiff had bought the gasoline for his automobile. The defendant received no money or other tangible benefit for his services in driving the automobile.

Article 6701b provides that '(n)o person transported over the public highways of this state by the owner or operator of a motor vehicle As his guest without payment for such transportation, shall have a cause of action for damages against such owner or operator for injuries, death or loss, in case of accident, unless such accident shall have been intentional on the part of said owner or operator, or caused by his heedlessness or his reckless disregard of the rights of others.' (Emphasis added.)

The defendant pleaded, as a defense, that the plaintiff was a guest within the meaning of this statute. In his motion for instructed verdict and in his motion for judgment non obstante veredicto, the contention was made that the Article applied, and since the plaintiff failed to allege and prove gross negligence on the part of the defendant, recovery should be denied. The defendant takes the position that even though the plaintiff was the owner of the automobile which the defendant was driving at the time of the collision, the facts show that the plaintiff had relegated himself to the status of a 'guest.'

The defendant contends that under the test laid down in Raub v. Rowe, 119 S.W.2d 190 (Tex.Civ.App.--El Paso 1938, writ ref'd), the plaintiff was clearly a Quest without payment for his transportation. The Raub case was cited with approval by this Court in Burt v. Lochausen, 151 Tex. 289, 249 S.W.2d 194, 198 (1952). This latter case announces the rule that to remove a case from the provisions of the guest statute a definite relationship must be established and a definite tangible benefit to the operator must be shown to have been the motivating influence for furnishing the transportation. In relying upon these cases, the defendant apparently believes that they stand for the proposition that in every instance of this character a tangible benefit to the operator of a motor vehicle must be shown in order to relieve a passenger from the status of a guest. In making this contention, the defendant disregards the first requirement of the guest statute that a host-guest relationship must exist, and only gives emphasis to his view that since a special tangible benefit was not the motivating influence for furnishing the transportation, the guest statute has no application. In taking such position the defendant overlooks the fact that the Raub and Lochausen cases, as well as other similar cases upon which he relies, pertain only to whether an occupant has paid for his transportation within the meaning of the statute. See Bonney v. San Antonio Transit Company, 160 Tex. 11, 325 S.W.2d 117, 120 (1959). Those cases have no logical relationship to the question we have here, i.e., whether a host-guest relationship exists between the operator and occupant of the vehicle. The rule pronounced in those cases evolved from a factual situation where a passenger was seeking damages against the owner-operator of a vehicle. The question of whether or not a host-guest relationship existed in these cases was not at issue. The test laid down in those cases does not purport to encompass All of the circumstances under which the guest statute may be invoked by the operator of the vehicle. In reaching this conclusion, we deem it important to determine the sense in which the Legislature used the term 'guest' and the phrase 'his guest without payment.' While Texas follows the rule that statutes in derogation of the common law are not to be strictly construed, it is recognized that if a statute creates a liability unknown to the common law, or deprives a person of a common law right, the statute will be strictly construed in the sense that it will not be extended beyond its plain meaning or applied to cases not clearly within its purview. Hickman v. Finlay, 392 S.W.2d 147 (Tex.Civ.App.--Austin 1965, writ ref'd). Since the Legislature did not specifically define the word 'guest' or the phrase 'his guest without payment,' we will apply to the word and the phrase their ordinary meaning. Words in common use, when used by the Legislature in a statute, therefore, are to be interpreted as intending to express the meaning in which they are ordinarily understood. In solving the particular question now under consideration, we believe the phrase 'his guest without payment' is susceptible to the interpretation that a person does not come within the purview of the statute unless he is a guest And a guest Without payment for his transportation. In almost every instance, however, the determination that the occupant is a 'guest' will also answer the issue of whether he is a 'guest without payment.' The word 'guest', apart from its usage in signifying the patron of a hotel, et cetera, is commonly understood to presuppose the absence of any Payment for hospitality received.

The word 'guest' has been defined as denoting 'one whom the owner or possessor of a motor car or other vehicle invites or permits to...