Satterfield v. State
Decision Date | 20 September 1984 |
Docket Number | No. 1-1283A397,1-1283A397 |
Citation | 468 N.E.2d 571 |
Parties | Wendell SATTERFIELD, Defendant-Appellant, v. STATE of Indiana, Plaintiff-Appellee. |
Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Forrest Bowman, Jr., Indianapolis, for defendant-appellant.
Linley E. Pearson, Atty. Gen., Latriealle Wheat, Deputy Atty. Gen., Indianapolis, for plaintiff-appellee.
Defendant-appellant, Wendell Satterfield (Satterfield) was convicted by a Pike Circuit Court jury of possession of two bombs in violation of IND.CODE 35-23-3-1, a Class C felony. On appeal he assigns six errors; however, because of our reversal of the case on the basis of Issue I regarding the sufficiency of the evidence, we will not address the other issues.
The facts necessary for this opinion are undisputed. On July 10, 1982, at 7:00 p.m., law enforcement officers executed a search warrant issued for a search for suspected guns and ammunition in connection with an unrelated offense in a residence owned and occupied by only Satterfield and his wife, Ann M. Satterfield. In a drawer of a desk in a room characterized by the officers as a den, two home-made black gun powder bombs were found. The bombs formed the basis for the charge here. Also seen, but not confiscated, was a book called the Anarchist Cook Book, which described how bombs are made. No one was home at the time of the search, and the officers gained entrance to the residence by breaking down a door. Conviction rested upon the above evidence, and there was no further evidence as to the origin of the bombs or the ownership or control of them by Satterfield.
The statute upon which conviction rests, IND.CODE 35-23-3-1, reads as follows:
At the onset, it is emphasized that the words customarily employed in criminal statutes, "knowingly or intentionally", are not included in the above statute. Satterfield argues that the facts recited in the statement of facts are not sufficient to establish his constructive possession of the bombs.
It is firmly established by Indiana cases construing possession under the controlled substance acts that conviction of possession of controlled substances can be supported by proof of either actual or constructive possession. Where the contraband is found in a premises exclusively controlled by the defendant, an inference is permitted that he had constructive possession of any drugs found therein. The element of knowledge can reasonably be inferred from the exclusive control of the premises. However, when the possession and control of the premises is non-exclusive, the inference is not permitted; it may not be inferred that the defendant knew of the presence of the drug and had control of it unless there is a showing of other circumstances or statements tending to buttress such an inference. There must be some additional evidentiary link apart from the non-exclusive control of the premises to permit the inference of knowledge. Martin v. State, (1978) 175 Ind.App. 503, 372 N.E.2d 1194; Greely v. State, (1973) 158 Ind.App. 212, 301 N.E.2d 850; Edwards v. State, (1979) 179 Ind.App. 363, 385 N.E.2d 496; Pier v. State, (1980) Ind.App., 400 N.E.2d 209. Greely added:
Greely, supra, 301 N.E.2d at 851-52.
The non-exclusive possession concept has been applied to brothers (Edwards ), husband and wife (Martin ), and defendant and girlfriend (Pier ).
The State does not, however, challenge these authorities, but attempts a different tactic. It argues that the above cases were decided on the basis of a controlled substance statute, IND.CODE 35-48-4-6, which uses the words "knowingly or intentionally" in proscribing the conduct. IND.CODE 35-23-3-1 fails to include the words "knowingly or intentionally"; therefore, proof of intent is not necessary, because the statutory provision does not so require. The State cites Roberts v. State, (1979) Ind.App., 395 N.E.2d 802, in support of its argument. Roberts involved the violation of the driving with a suspended license statute. The State contends that where, as in Roberts, the offense is merely malum prohibitum and not malum in se, proof of intent or mens rea is not required. Gregory v. State, (1973) 259 Ind. 652, 291 N.E.2d 67. Therefore, it concludes, the above-cited cases, Martin et al, are not applicable here.
The State also cites subsection (b) of IND.CODE 35-41-2-1. The entire section reads as follows:
It then contends that the burden of proof, or at least the burden of going forward with the evidence, rests upon Satterfield to show that he was unaware of the presence of the bombs. Since he did not carry his burden, he cannot now complain of his conviction. For its proposition, the State cites only Jackson v. State, (1982) Ind.App. 441 N.E.2d 29 which casts upon the defendant the burden of going forward with evidence of the defense of entrapment.
Absence of the word "intent" from the statute is not conclusive. In Gregory v. State, the court said:
Gregory, supra, 259 Ind. at 655, 291 N.E.2d 67.
In Malich v. State, (1929) 201 Ind. 587, 169 N.E. 531, our supreme court analyzed a prohibition statute which, like the instant statute, did not contain the words "knowingly and intentionally": "it shall be unlawful for any person to ... possess ... any intoxicating liquor." The court construed the elements of the offense in regard to the requirement of knowledge:
"Appellant correctly maintains that a person cannot be guilty of the crime of possessing intoxicating liquor unless he knows or is conscious thereof." (Emphasis supplied).
Malich, supra, at 588, 169 N.E. 531.
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