Satterfield v. Tate

• Decision Date: 27 February 1909
• Citation: 64 S.E. 60,132 Ga. 256
• Parties: SATTERFIELD et al. v. TATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

64 S.E. 60

132 Ga. 256

SATTERFIELD et al. v. TATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

February 27, 1909

Syllabus by the Court.

A power given in a will to the executor to sell any such portion of the lands devised as may become necessary by reason of some cause unforeseen to the testator, and then for the executor to sell such portion only with the consent of named devisees was not validly executed by a parol agreement to sell entered into, when no necessity for a sale had arisen between the executor and one desiring to purchase, consented to and concurred in by such devisees, and the execution by such devisees to such person, at the instance and direction of the executor and for the purpose of carrying out such parol agreement, of an ordinary warranty deed, without any reference whatever to the power; the grantee in the deed paying a valuable consideration to the grantors. and all the parties understanding and believing at the time such transaction to be an effectual execution of the power in accordance with the terms of the will.

(a) Where such purchaser had notice, at the time of the transaction above stated, of the limitations upon the executor's power to sell, he took, under the deed executed by such devisees to him, only such estate in the land as the devisees had.

(b) While generally a court of equity will aid the defective execution of a power when the defect relates to matter of form in the execution, it will not render its aid where the exercise of the power is invalid for the reason that the donee at the time was not authorized to execute it.

[Ed Note.-For other cases, see Executors and Administrators Cent. Dig. §§ 560-566, 569-575; Dec. Dig. §§ 138, 148; ^[*] Powers, Cent. Dig. §§ 99-103; Dec. Dig. § 31. ^[*]]

A will which devised lands to Lina and Amanda for the life of Lina, with remainder to Amanda, but, if they should both die without leaving child or grandchild, then all property not disposed of by the executor, in accordance with the power referred to in the preceding headnote, should revert to such persons as would be the testator's heirs at law at his death had he made no will, gave a joint life estate to Lina and Amanda during the life of Lina, and a defeasible vested remainder to Amanda, subject to be divested upon her dying without child or grandchild during the life of Lina; and, where Amanda's remainder has been so divested, the land, at the death of Lina, without child or grandchild, will go to such executory devisees.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Wills, Cent. Dig. §§ 1171-1176; Dec. Dig. § 545. ^[*]]

One to whom Lina and Amanda executed a warranty deed to the lands so devised, and in accordance with the transaction set forth in the first headnote, took the respective estates Lina and Amanda had in the lands, as stated in the second headnote, and upon the death of Amanda, without child or grandchild, during the life of Lina, no prescription could arise during the life of Lina in favor of the grantee in such deed against such executory devisees.

[Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Life Estates, Cent. Dig. §§ 24-28; Dec. Dig. § 8. (FN*)]

Error from Superior Court, Lumpkin County; J. J. Kimsey, Judge.

Equitable petition by William B. Tate against Barilla D. Satterfield and others. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendants bring error. Reversed.

A will devising lands to L. and A. for the life of L. with remainder to A., but, if they should both die without a child or grandchild, then the property not disposed of by the executor under a power to revert to such persons as would be testator's heirs at law had he made no will, gave a joint life estate to L. and A. during the life of L., and a defeasible vested remainder to A., subject to being divested upon her dying without a child or grandchild during the life of L., and, where A.'s remainder has been so divested, the lands at the death of L. without a child or grandchild go to testator's heirs.

William B. Tate filed an equitable petition in the superior court of Lumpkin county against Barilla D. Satterfield of that county and 74 other persons, some of whom resided in Lumpkin county, others elsewhere in this state, and still others beyond the limits of the state. The substance of the petition, so far as now material, was: Stephen Griffeth, late of Pickens county, Ga., died November 11, 1873, testate, seised and possessed of lots of land 109 and 110 in the Fourth district and Second section of that county. His will was duly probated, and William Tate, the named executor, qualified thereunder.

The following are the material parts thereof:

"Item 3d. I give and bequeath and devise to Lina and my daughter, Amanda Griffeth, persons of color, who were formerly my faithful domestic servants, lots of land number one hundred and nine (109), one hundred and ten (110), and the east half of one hundred and twelve (112), all of said lots of land situate, lying and being in the fourth (4th) district and second (2nd) section of said Pickens county, each lot containing one hundred and sixty acres, more or less, known as my home place, together with all the appurtenances belonging to the same, and also all of my personal property. ***

"Item 4th. I desire and direct my executor, *** to hold the lands named in item three until the death of Lina, unless from some unseen cause to me it should become necessary to sell some portion of it, in which event he is to sell only such portion of it as Lina and Amanda may consent to, and at her, Lina's, death the land together with all the property not otherwise disposed of, of every description, during Lina's lifetime, named in said third item, to go to and vest in my daughter, Amanda Griffeth, daughter of Lina. But I desire and direct that my executor not to rent or control the lands, nor other property given in the above items, only to keep and sell such as may be necessary by and with the advice of Amanda and Lina. It being my desire and wish that the lands be a home for Amanda and Lina to control, rent, and enjoy the profits or together with all other property during Lina's lifetime, and at her death I direct my executor to turn over the land, together with all other property, to my said daughter, Amanda unreservedly, to do as she may think proper with."

"Item 6th. I desire and direct that all the property given in this will to my said daughter, Amanda Griffeth, is given to her free from contracts, control, and sale of any husband that she marries, but is to be her sole and separate property; and if Lina and Amanda both die leaving no child or children nor grandchildren, then in that event the property not disposed of in their lifetime reverts to those who now by law would be entitled to the same if I had made no will.

"Item 7th. I desire and direct that my executor, *** not to have any appraisement of my estate nor to make annual returns to the ordinary, *** and that he make all sales by the advice and consent of Lina and Amanda, without order of the ordinary and at private sale, that may become necessary and after paying expenses, etc., to pay over the proceeds to Lina and Amanda, and to the other if one be dead. ***"

On May 27, 1887, Lina and Amanda conveyed lots 109 and 110 to the petitioner by an ordinary warranty deed, making no reference therein to the will of Stephen Griffeth, to the executor thereof, or to the power given by it to the executor to sell the land. Since the date of such deed petitioner has been in the open, notorious, continuous, and peaceable possession of such lots of land under claim of right. The executor was fully cognizant of and consented to the sale of the lands conveyed to petitioner by said deed, and petitioner purchased said lands from the executor, who acted in the premises on the authority of and by and with the consent and advice of said Lina and Amanda; said sale being made in pursuance of and in conformity with the provisions of said will. Lina and Amanda, as the lawful owners of said lands, had a right in and of themselves to convey the same, and said deed conveyed a full title to your petitioner; but the defendants named claimed to own an interest in said lands by virtue of the sixth item of the will. Lina Griffeth had no child living then, save Amanda, and has had no children since, and possibility of further issue of the said Lina is extinct, she being now more than 80 years old, and since the execution of the deed to petitioner Amanda had died without issue; and the said sixth item of the will could have application only to property devised to Amanda and Lina which was not disposed of by them in manner and form hereinbefore stated. The claim of defendants operates as a cloud upon the title of petitioner and, while without foundation, operates to his prejudice and embarrassment in the perfect ownership of the land. The prayers were that the defendants be required to set up in the proceeding their claim to the land in question, if they have any, that a decree be granted forever quieting and establishing the title of petitioner to such lands, and declaring him to be the owner thereof in fee simple, for injunction, general relief, and process. Some of the defendants failed to appear. The others demurred to the petition, and filed answers. Among the grounds of demurrer were that the petition showed no title to the fee of the land in the petitioner, and that no equitable right against the defendants was set forth. There was also a special ground of demurrer, in response to which the plaintiff amended as follows: The purchase of said lands was by a parol agreement with the executor consented to and concurred in by Lina and Amanda Griffeth, and the deed from Lina and Amanda was executed at the instance and direction of the executor in fulfillment of the parol purchase. The...