Satterlee v. Kobbe

• Decision Date: 06 January 1903
• Citation: 173 N.Y. 91,65 N.E. 952
• Parties: SATTERLEE v. KOBBE et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

173 N.Y. 91

65 N.E. 952

SATTERLEE

v.KOBBE et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Jan. 6, 1903.

Appeal from supreme court, appellate division, Fourth department.

Action by Edward R. Satterlee against Alice L. Kobbe and others. From the judgment of the appellate division (72 N. Y. Supp. 675) affirming a judgment in favor of defendants entered on a dismissal of the complaint, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Elon R. Brown, for appellant.

Watson M. Rogers and Horace E. Morse, for respondents.

O'BRIEN, J.

The complaint in this case states a good cause of action for the partition of lands. The lands sought to be partitioned consist of a large number of islands in the St. Lawrence river, within the limits of the county of Jefferson. Most of these islands are wild and unoccupied land. According to the allegations of the complaint, the plaintiff and certain of the defendants named are the owners of all the islands as joint tenants or tenants in common. Some 30 different persons have been made defendants in the action. As to several of the defendants, the complaint states that they claim some right or interest in particular islands adverse to the plaintiff and his co-tenants, but that the right or interest so claimed by these defendants is unknown to the plaintiff. The complaint does not allege that these defendants are tenants in common with the plaintiff, but, in substance, states that they are not, and are either in possession of certain islands, or make some claim to them in hostility to the plaintiff. All the defendants so affected suffered default, except four, who answered and put in issue most, if not all, the material allegations of the complaint, and, in addition, pleaded that they were in possession under claim of title hostile to the plaintiff, and that they or their grantors had been so in possession for more than 20 years prior to the commencement of the action. The four defendants who contest the title as to certain islands have set forth in their respective answers the grounds and nature of their claims with considerable detail, but the pleadings have been sufficiently described to show the nature of the issues presented for trial.

The case having been noticed for trial at the special term, the counsel for the four defendants answering moved to dismiss the complaint as to them on various grounds stated by way of argument, which, in substance, presented the objection that the complaint did not state a cause of action against the defendants who had tendered the issue with respect to the plaintiff's title. Inasmuch as the motion was made upon all the pleadings, it fairly covered the defendants' contention that they were not proper parties defendant in the action, and that the issues presented by the pleadings could not be tried in that form of action. The court granted the motion to dismiss as to the four answering defendants, and the plaintiff's counsel excepted. This exception presents the only question of law involved in the case. So far as we can know from the record, all the other defendants suffered default, and therefore we are not concerned with the rights of any of the defendants except the four that have answered. The precise question presented in their behalf is whether they were proper parties defendant, and whether their rights and interests can be determined in the action.

It is doubtless true that during a long period in the history of our jurisprudence, while partition actions were regarded as peculiarly within the domain of equity jurisdiction, whenever it appeared that the title or right of possession of the plaintiff was disputed, or that he had been actually ousted by his cotenants, courts of equity would withhold relief, and remit the parties to their action at law. The principal reason for this was that there was no adequate provision for a jury trial of issues involving questions of title, but this reason has been removed by legislation embraced within the provisions of the present Code. Considering these enactments in their fair scope and meaning, they seem to permit the retention within the jurisdiction of equity of partition actions, even where the question of adverse possession is involved. The statute prescribes in great detail the persons who must be made defendants (Code, § 1538), and further on the persons who may be made defendants at the election of the plaintiff. Among the latter class is mentioned a ‘creditor or other person having a lien or interest which attaches to the entire property.’ Section 1540. If the share, right, or interest of a party is unknown to the plaintiff, that fact must be stated in the complaint. Section 1542. This last provision seems to contain the clear implication that the plaintiff may join as defendants in the action persons in possession, or who claim some interest the nature and character of which is unknown. It is broad enough to include intruders, trespassers, or persons claiming title or some right adverse and hostile to the plaintiff. It would seem to be plain that it was intended to permit the plaintiff to join as defendants parties claiming some interest in the property, although these persons might not in any legal sense be co-tenants, but claiming adversely. The title or interest of any party may be put in issue by pleading, and the issue tried by a jury. Section 1543, 1544. Thus we see that all the obstacles to the full and complete jurisdiction of equity in actions for partition have been swept away. In this case it has, however, been held by the learned court below that the answering defendants, claiming title adverse to the plaintiff, are not comprehended within the scope and meaning of the statute, and were not proper parties defendant. The argument is that these defendants are entitled to have their rights determined in an action of ejectment, where they could have two jury trials, instead of one. The right to successive jury trials is not an absolute one, but is a matter of procedure, subject to change by the legislature, and the question is whether it has not been changed so far as these defendants are concerned.

On this question, and, indeed, upon the whole question in this case, we feel concluded by the doctrine of Weston v. Stoddard, 137 N. Y. 119, 33 N. E. 62,20 L. R. A. 624, 33 Am. St. Rep. 697. In principle, the doctrine of that case covers the whole controversy here. The discussion in that case points out the obstacles which originally existed to complete jurisdiction in equity of actions of partition where the question of adverse title was involved, and the legislation which from time to time was intended to remove these obstacles, and a complete review of the meaning, scope, and purpose of the several provisions of the present Code. We think, in principle, that case holds that the trial court in this case had jurisdiction to hear and determine the issues presented by the answer of the defendants. It is true that in that case the parties were originally tenants in common, but it was not claimed that at the time of the commencement of the action they occupied that relation to each other. Indeed, one or more of the parties claimed by adverse title arising from the fact that they had been in undisputed and hostile possession of the premises for more than 20 years. Prescription and adverse possession is in and of itself a method of obtaining title to real property. Baker v. Oakwood, 123 N. Y. 16, 25 N. E. 312,10 L. R. A. 387. When a person originally a tenant in common renounces and throws off that relation, and assumes that of an owner by adverse possession or prescription, he assumes the attitude of a stranger to the original owners. He takes the position that his possession and right of possession is under and by virtue of a hostile title acquired by himself through lapse of time. No good reason is apparent why the rights of such a person may be determined in a partition action, while the rights and interests of an intruder and trespasser cannot be, but must be remanded to a court of law, to the end that he may have two or more jury trials. It should also be observed that the doctrine of Weston v. Stoddard, supra, has since been applied by the supreme court and by this court to cases which in their facts are not distinguishable from the case at bar. Best v. Zeh, 82 Hun, 232, 31 N. Y. Supp. 230, affirmed on opinion below in 146 N. Y. 363, 41 N. E. 88;Ellerson v. Westcott, 148 N. Y. 149, 42 N. E. 540;Biglow v. Biglow, 39 App. Div. 103,56 N. Y. Supp. 794;Holder v. Holder, 40 App. Div. 255,59 N. Y. Supp. 204;Bender v. Terwilliger, 48 App. Div. 371,63 N. Y. Supp. 269;Drake v. Drake, 61 App. Div. 1,70 N. Y. Supp. 163. A court of equity, having once obtained jurisdiction of the parties and the subject-matter of the action, will retain it, and adapt the relief to the exigencies of the case. It may order a sum of money to be paid to the plaintiff, and give him a personal judgment therefor, when that form of relief becomes necessary in order to prevent a failure of justice, and when it is for any reason impracticable to grant the specific relief demanded. Valentine v. Richardt, 126 N. Y. 272, 27 N. E. 255. The prevention of a multiplicity of suits is also a ground for the exercise of equity jurisdiction. It seems to us, therefore, that upon principle, as well as upon authority, the plaintiff was entitled to have the questions touching the title, possession, or right of possession of the land sought to be partitioned determined in the action which he brought for that purpose.

The main argument against this view is that the defendants who have answered are thus deprived of their right to have their interests in the islands which they claim determined in a particular form of action; that is to say, in an action of ejectment, or, as it is now called, an action for the recovery of real property. It is said that in such an action they would be entitled, if defeated on the first trial, to a second trial by jury, and, in...