Saucedo v. Rheem Mfg. Co.

Decision Date18 March 1998
Docket NumberNo. 04-96-00335-CV,04-96-00335-CV
Citation974 S.W.2d 117
PartiesJose SAUCEDO, Appellant, v. RHEEM MANUFACTURING COMPANY and Jaime Loera, Appellees.
CourtTexas Court of Appeals

C.M. Zaffirini, Zaffirini & Castillo, Laredo, for appellant.

Xavier Rodriguez, W. Wendell Hall, Renee A. Forinash, Fulbright & Jaworski, L.L.P., San Antonio, Horace C. Hall, III, Hall, Quintanilla & Alarcon, L.C., Laredo, for appellee.

Before RICKHOFF, GREEN and JOHN G. HILL, 1 JJ.

OPINION

JOHN G. HILL, Justice (Assigned).

Jose Saucedo appeals from a summary judgment that he take nothing in his claims against Rheem Manufacturing Company and Jaime Loera, the appellees. His cause of action was for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, fraud, defamation, and intentional infliction of emotional distress. He contends in a single point of error that the trial court erred by granting summary judgment.

We affirm in part and reverse and remand in part because we hold that the trial court erred in part by granting summary judgment for Rheem with respect to Saucedo's breach of contract claim but did not err in granting summary judgment that Saucedo take nothing as to Rheem and Loera with respect to Saucedo's other claims.

Factual and Procedural Background

Saucedo alleged that he was working as a maintenance manager for a company when he was hired by Rheem for the position of maintenance superintendent of its plant in Nuevo Laredo. He stated that he worked for Rheem from 1991 until Rheem terminated him in 1994. All of the causes of action alleged relate to that termination.

Loera asserts in his motion for summary judgment that: (1) Saucedo's claim against him for breach of contract must fail because there was no contract between him and Saucedo; (2) Saucedo's claim against him for promissory estoppel must fail because Saucedo, in response to interrogatories, states that the basis for his claim were promises made to him by someone else before he was hired to work for Rheem, whereas Loera was not employed by Rheem until a year after Saucedo had been working for Rheem; (3) Saucedo's claim against him for fraud must fail because the promises upon which the fraud claim are based were made by someone else; (4) Saucedo's claim against him for defamation for making the statement to Ms. Jo Staneland that Saucedo had been employed by Rheem as a "chief mechanic" rather than a "maintenance superintendent" must fail because there was no publication, because there are no special damages plead or provable, and because the alleged statement is not capable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law.

In its original motion for summary judgment, Rheem asserts that: (1) Saucedo's claims for breach of contract, promissory estoppel, and fraud must fail because any promise relied upon by Saucedo was for employment for greater than one year and was not reduced to writing, in violation of the Texas Statute of Frauds, TEX. BUS. & COMM.CODE § 26.01 and (2) Saucedo's claim for defamation must fail because (a) there was no publication; (b) there are no special damages plead or provable; and (c) the statement upon which Saucedo bases his claim is not capable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law.

In a second motion for summary judgment, Rheem contends that: (1) Saucedo's claims for breach of contract, fraud, and promissory estoppel are barred because of resume fraud on his part; (2) Saucedo's damages are limited to a one-year period, less mitigation, for any alleged breach of contract; and (3) Saucedo fails to establish two essential elements of his claims for fraud and promissory estoppel, (a) that any promise was not kept, or (b) that Saucedo relied to his detriment on any such promise.

Finally, in a third joint motion for summary judgment, Loera and Rheem urge that Saucedo fails to establish all the necessary elements of his claim for intentional infliction of emotional distress in that any behavior on the part of Loera or any other employee of Rheem was not extreme and outrageous conduct and that Saucedo fails to establish, as a matter of law, that he suffered severe distress.

In his response to Rheem's first motion for summary judgment, Saucedo asserts that his written employment agreement provided for an annual salary and that when he continued to be employed at the end of the first year, the contract extended for an additional year, so that his contract did not expire until July 15, 1995; and that the facts show that he met the elements of a claim for promissory estoppel and fraud. With respect to the defamation claim, Saucedo replied that "subsequent to the reference checks, Plaintiff has learned from Ms. Juliana Rodriguez, receptionist at Rheem's plant in Nuevo Laredo, that Mr. Loera gave her strict orders to refer all requests for references on Jose Saucedo to him."

In his response to Defendant Loera's motion for summary judgment, Saucedo notes that he has amended his petition so as to assert only claims for defamation and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Loera. He asserts that the defamation was made not only to Ms. Jo Staneland, but also to Margie Mitchell, Aero Box, RM Personnel, and anyone else who called in to request information about him.

In response to Rheem's second motion for summary judgment, Saucedo alleges that Rheem has admitted that he was terminated without cause and that it cannot later justify his termination on grounds that were not made the basis of termination at the time of the discharge. He also indicates that Rheem did not rely on the alleged misrepresentations, that they were not material, and that it waived any complaints to the alleged misrepresentations.

With respect to the allegations of breach of contract, Saucedo alleges in his response to Rheem's second motion that his damages for the breach are his salary and benefits for the remainder of the year, less his earnings. He reiterates his assertion that he has established all of the elements of his claims for fraud and promissory estoppel.

In his response to the appellees' joint third motion for summary judgment, Saucedo contends that certain conduct by Loera did constitute outrageous conduct, or at least raises a fact question as to whether it constituted outrageous conduct. He also refers to certain testimony establishing that he suffers from a decompensating schizophrenic disorder or borderline personality disorder as a result of his problems with Rheem and Loera.

As previously noted, the trial court granted the appellees' summary judgment with respect to all of Saucedo's claims.

Discussion

The movant for summary judgment has the burden of showing that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548 (Tex.1985). In deciding whether there is a disputed material fact issue precluding summary judgment, evidence favorable to the non-movant will be taken as true; and every reasonable inference must be indulged in favor of the non-movant and any doubts resolved in its favor. Id. at 548-49. Inasmuch as this motion for summary judgment was filed prior to September 1, 1997, it is governed by Rule 166a of the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure prior to its amendment effective on September 1, 1997. Texas Supreme Court, Final Approval of Revisions to the Texas Rules of Civil Procedure, Misc. Docket No. 97-9139, (August 15, 1997).

1. Defamation

We will first consider whether Loera and Rheem have established their claim that the summary judgment evidence establishes that Saucedo has no claim for defamation. Saucedo alleged in his petition that Rheem and Loera gave strict orders to Rheem employees that all inquiries regarding him were to be referred to Loera, who was to inform prospective employees that Saucedo was a "chief mechanic" instead of "maintenance supervisor," and that they could not give any information regarding Saucedo, leading the listener to believe there was something that they were unable to discuss or unwilling to tell the listener about Saucedo that the listener had to know.

As we have previously noted, both Rheem and Loera contend that Saucedo has no claim for defamation because there was no publication, because there are no special damages plead or provable, and because the alleged statement is not capable of a defamatory meaning as a matter of law. We have also noted that Saucedo responds that he had learned from Rheem's receptionist that Mr. Loera had given strict orders that all requests for references were to be referred to him. In construing Saucedo's responses as a whole, we construe this to mean that all requests for references were to be referred to Loera. He also asserts in his response that the defamation was not only made to Ms. Jo Staneland, but also to Margie Mitchell, Aero Box, RM Personnel, and anyone else who called in to request information concerning him.

The summary judgment evidence reflects that Margie Mitchell, a recruiter for Aero Box and Tom Garcia, testified in her deposition that when she called and talked to Rheem's personnel manager in Nuevo Laredo, he told her that they had been told not to give any information about Saucedo. He did not say that was company policy as to all job inquiries. She said that if there is no lawsuit pending and she calls for a reference and is told that the party she is calling has been told not to say anything about that person, it probably would leave a question in her mind as to that person's qualifications or background and would therefore hurt the applicant.

Saucedo presented the affidavit of Jo Staneland in opposition to the motions for summary judgment. Attached to Staneland's affidavit is her statement concerning a conversation she had with Loera, Rheem's plant manager. She says that Saucedo had asked her to conduct a reference check on himself...

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