Saucier v. Kremer

• Citation: 249 S.W. 640,297 Mo. 461
• Decision Date: 05 March 1923
• Docket Number: No. 23129.,23129.
• Parties: SAUCIER et al. v. KREMER.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Missouri

249 S.W. 640

297 Mo. 461

SAUCIER et al. v. KREMER.

No. 23129.

Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. 1.

March 5, 1923.

Appeal from St. Louis Circuit Court; Charles B. Davis, Judge.

Suit to quiet title by Rose E. Saucier and others against Maria Kremer. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiffs appeal. Affirmed.

Harmon J. Bliss and Walter F. Schelp, both of St. Louis, for appellants.

A. G. Eberle and William McNamee, both of St. Louis, for respondent.

SMALL, C. I.

Appeal from the circuit court of the city of St. Louis.

Suit to quiet title to about 14 acres of land in said city.

Plaintiffs set out in detail their chain of title in their petition. It, in substance, alleges, that on the 6th day of December, 1796, the government of Spain granted to Gabriel Constant a concession of 200 arpents of land on the north bank of the River Des Peres and that the land sued for was included in this grant; that said concession was afterwards duly recorded in the United States Land Office and confirmed by the Act of Congress of June 13, 1812 (2 Stat. 748); that said Gabriel Constant died intestate and left as his only heir Gabriel Constant, Jr., who died about October 10, 1831, leaving a last will and testament by which he devised the land to his four daughters, Marie Louise, Constance, Lucile, and Julie Constant, to be divided equally between them; that plaintiffs claimed to own said property as the heirs, devisees, and grantees cf.' said four daughters of Gabriel Constant, Jr.

The petition further states that the, defendant, Maria Kremer, claims title adversely to plaintiffs in said land by virtue of mesne conveyances from said Marie Louise and Constance, but plaintiffs have not sufficient knowledge to state the nature and extent of said claim.

The prayer is in conventional form for the court to define the estate of the parties and by its decree to adjudge the respective titles of plaintiffs and defendant; and, if the court finds the plaintiffs are the sole owners, that a decree be entered forever barring the defendant from setting up any title or claim to said land.

Defendant's answer admits she claims title and avers she is the owner in fee of the land described in the petition and denies each and every other allegation in the petition. Further answering, the answer alleges that by Act of Congress of June 13, 1812, the land in question was confirmed by the government of the United States to the town of Carondelet in the state of Missouri, and that through mesne conveyances she acquired and now owns whatever estate said town of Carondelet had in said land; that on or about the 17th of November, 1851, Marie Louise Franklin (née Constant) and Constance Schults (née Constant), as the legal representatives of Gabriel Constant, Sr., for themselves and their sisters, Julie Constant and Lucile Constant Le Blond, on or about the 17th of November, 1851, effected a compromise with the city of Carondelet, whereby they, In consideration of receiving a conveyance from said city of a certain parcel of land, conveyed by quitclaim deed whatever interest, they might have had in said land mentioned in the petition to said city of CarondeIet; that said Julie Constant and Lucile Constant Le Blond accepted the fruits of said compromise with the city, and that they and their heirs and ail persons claiming under them are estopped from asserting title to said property; that through a long series of conveyances the defendant by warranty deed from one S. J. Fisher recorded on May 29, 1906, acquired whatever title said city of Carondelet previously had in said property, and that she is still the owner of said property.

The answer further sets up adverse possession under the 10-year, 24-year, and 30-year statutes of limitation. It concludes with a prayer for the court to try, determine, and settle the respective rights and titles of the parties, and if the court finds the defendant is the sole owner, to enter a decree barring the plaintiffs and all persons claiming under them.

The reply specifically denies the allegations of the answer, and alleges that at the time said compromise was made said Constant and Lucile Constant were minors, and their sisters Marie Louise Franklin and Constance Schults were not authorized to convey said land for said minors, and their deed to the city of Carondelet in no way affected the rights of said minors; but that said city of Carondelet by ordinance authorizing said compromise recognized the ownership of the heirs and devisees of Gabriel Constant, Jr., to said land, and the validity of the concession of December 6, 1796, to Gabriel Constant, Sr., by the government of Spain; that on account of such recognition the city of Carondelet and the defendant, by claiming under it, became estopped to claim any title in said land adverse to plaintiffs; that if defendant acquired title through the city of Carondelet, defendant became and now is a tenant in common with plaintiffs in said land. The reply then denies all the allegations of the answer relating to the title claimed by the defendant by adverse possession under the statutes of limitation and concludes with a prayer for the court to try and determine the respective rights and titles of the parties.

Much testimony with reference to the validity of the Spanish grant and confirmation thereof to plaintiffs' ancestor, Gabriel Constant; was introduced in evidence. But, in the view we take of the case, it is not necessary to consider this evidence because, as we find the record under the judgment of the circuit court appealed from, the plaintiffs are barred by the statute of limitation, assuming said Spanish grant was valid.

At the outset of the trial, the plaintiffs admitted that the half interest of Marie Louise Franklin and Constance Schults in said land was well vested in the defendant, and that plaintiffs only claimed collectively an undivided half of said land.

Plaintiffs' evidence tended to prove that they were the heirs and devisees and grantees of the devisees of said Lucile and Julie Constant. The compromise ordinance of the city of Carondelet, put in evidence by plaintiffs, recited that it was enacted for the purpose of compromising wih the legal representatives of Gabriel Constant, Sr., deceased, to wit, Marie Louise Franklin and Constance Schults, who claimed the land in question by virtue of said concession of 200 arpents dated December 6, 1796 to Gabriel Constant; that said 200 arpents had all been leased out and disposed of by the town of Carondelet to divers persons, and said legal representatives are willing by way of compromise to take in lieu of said tract a certain other tract of land, describing it, which was authorized by said ordinance.

Plaintiffs further offered evidence tending to prove that Lucile Constant (Mrs. Le Blond-Maxon) lived in a house on the property about 45 years before the trial; that she then moved away, renting the house to a negro family. The house was still there in 1890, but was vacant. Mrs. Maxon told a witness, while she lived on the property, that she built the house to hold her heirship, because it was her property. Mrs. Maxon lived in the city of St. Louis after leaving the property, and died 10 years before this suit was tried, at the age of 95 years.

Defendant's evidence consisted of a regular chain of conveyances, starting with a quitclaim deed dated November 17, 1851, from Marie Louise Franklin and husband and Constance Schults and husband to the city of Carondelet; then a quitclaim deed dated. August 17, 1857, from the city of Carondelet to Daniel D. Page; then conveyances as follows, Daniel D. Page, by warranty deed, dated August 4, 1857, to Samuel T. Glover et al.; afterwards, a decree in Partition allotted the property to James L. Glover; March 22, 1892, James L. Glover, warranty deed to Thomas Dunn; August 2, 1894, warranty deed by Thomas Dunn to Charles A. Bucholz; same day Bucholz conveyed property in fee to Thomas Dunn, trustee, to secure certain notes; September 11, 1897, trustee sold property at foreclosure and made trustee's deed to Philip Key, who on same day made deed of trust to secure certain note, and on November 7, 1900, deed of trust was foreclosed and property purchased by James M. Graves at trustee's sale, who obtained trustee's deed therefor; December 20, loco, James hi. Graves, by general warranty deed conveyed to Sylvester J. Fisher; May 17, 1906, Sylvester J. Fisher and wife by general warranty deed purported to convey the entire fee to said property to defendant Maria Kremer. All of the deeds the defendant's chain of title were properly acknowledged and duly recorded shortly after they were dated, and purported to convey the entire property. Said defendant, Maria Kremer, executed a deed of trust dated May 2, 1906, and recorded May 29, 1906 to Mr. Schitts, trustee, in which she purported to convey the fee to the entire property in trust to secure the payment of certain notes given by her, and she made another deed of trust conveying the fee dated September 30, 1908, and duly recorded, to secure the payment of certain other notes.

Defendant, Maria Kremer, testified: That when she purchased the...