Saugatuck Dunes Coastal All. v. Saugatuck Twp.
| Docket Number | 160358,160359 |
| Decision Date | 22 July 2022 |
| Parties | SAUGATUCK DUNES COASTAL ALLIANCE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. SAUGATUCK TOWNSHIP, SAUGATUCK TOWNSHIP ZONING BOARD OF APPEALS, and NORTH SHORES OF SAUGATUCK, LLC, Defendants-Appellees. |
| Court | Michigan Supreme Court |
Argued on application for leave to appeal October 7, 2021.
Chief Justice: Bridget M. McCormack Brian K. Zahra David F. Viviano Richard H. Bernstein Elizabeth T. Clement Megan K. Cavanagh Elizabeth M. Welch Judge.
Appellant Saugatuck Dunes Coastal Alliance, brought two separate actions in the Allegan Circuit Court against Saugatuck Township, the Saugatuck Township Zoning Board of Appeals (the ZBA), and North Shores of Saugatuck, LLC, appealing the ZBA's decision that appellant lacked standing to appeal the zoning decision of the Saugatuck Township Planning Commission (the Commission) concerning a proposed residential site condominium project on property owned by North Shores. North Shores applied for approval of a planned unit development that would include condominium units with a private marina, which required special use approval. The Commission granted conditional, preliminary approval, and appellant appealed the approval to the ZBA, invoking Saugatuck Township Ordinance, § 40-72 and the Michigan Zoning Enabling Act (the MZEA), MCL 125.3101 et seq. Appellant attached affidavits from some of its members to establish standing to appeal under MCL 125.3604(1) of the MZEA, claiming that the members would be uniquely harmed by the approved development. On October 11, 2017, the ZBA held a public hearing and decided that appellant lacked standing to appeal the Commission's decision. The ZBA framed the allegations raised by appellant's members as complaints that might be true of any proposed development in the area and found that appellant had not demonstrated any special damages-environmental, economic, or otherwise-that would be different from those sustained by the general public. Appellant appealed the ZBA's decision in the Allegan Circuit Court and added two original claims: one for declaratory and injunctive relief and another seeking abatement of an alleged nuisance. While the first appeal was pending, North Shores obtained various state and federal approvals and applied to the Commission for final approval of the planned unit development, which included the marina. The Commission granted final approval, and appellant appealed the decision to the ZBA. After another public hearing on April 9 2018, the ZBA adopted a resolution that largely mirrored the prior resolution and denied standing to appellant. Appellant also appealed this decision in the Allegan Circuit Court. On February 6, 2018, the circuit court, Wesley J. Nykamp, J affirmed the ZBA's October 11, 2017 decision and dismissed the appeal; the court did not, however, address the original claims that appellant had raised. On November 14 2018, the circuit court, Roberts A. Kengis, J., affirmed the ZBA's April 9, 2018 decision and dismissed the appeal. Appellant appealed both circuit court decisions in the Court of Appeals, and the Court of Appeals consolidated the cases. After determining that it had jurisdiction, the Court of Appeals, Gadola, P.J., and Markey and Ronayne Krause, JJ affirmed the circuit court's and the ZBA's decisions in an unpublished per curiam opinion issued August 29, 2019 (Docket Nos. 342588 and 346677), holding that appellant lacked standing to appeal because appellant was not a "party aggrieved" by the approvals. The panel relied on Olsen v Chikaming Twp, 325 Mich.App. 170 (2018), and MCL 125.3605. However, the panel remanded Docket No. 342588 to the circuit court for plenary consideration of the original claims that appellant had raised in that case. Appellant sought leave to appeal in the Supreme Court, and the Supreme Court ordered oral argument on the application, directing the parties to address three issues: (1) whether the "party aggrieved" standard of MCL 125.3605 requires a party to show some special damages not common to other property owners similarly situated; (2) whether the meaning of "person aggrieved" in MCL 125.3604(1) differs from that of "party aggrieved" in MCL 125.3605 and, if so, which standard applies to this case; and (3) whether the Court of Appeals erred by affirming the circuit court's dismissal of appellant's appeals. 505 Mich. 1056 (2020).
In an opinion by Justice Welch, joined by Chief Justice McCormack and Justices Bernstein, Clement, and Cavanagh, the Supreme Court, in lieu of granting leave to appeal, held:
The MZEA does not require an appealing party to own real property and to demonstrate special damages only by comparison to similarly situated real-property owners; Olsen, 325 Mich.App. 170, Joseph v Grand Blanc Twp, 5 Mich.App. 566 (1967), and related Court of Appeals decisions were overruled to the limited extent that they required (1) real-property ownership as a prerequisite to being "aggrieved" by a zoning decision under the MZEA and (2) special damages to be shown only by comparison to similarly situated real-property owners. Additionally, "aggrieved" has the same meaning in MCL 125.3604(1) and MCL 125.3605, and appellant in this case met the definition of a "person," MCL 125.3604(1), and a "party," MCL 125.3605.
1. MCL 125.3604(1) provides, in relevant part, that an appeal to the ZBA may be taken by a person aggrieved or by an officer, department, board, or bureau of this state or the local unit of government. MCL 125.3605 provides, in pertinent part, that a party aggrieved by the decision of the ZBA may appeal to the circuit court for the county in which the property is located as provided under MCL 125.3606. MCL 125.3606(1) provides, in pertinent part, that any party aggrieved by a decision of the ZBA may appeal to the circuit court for the county in which the property is located. Zoning statutes in Michigan have a long history of making the ability to appeal an administrative zoning decision contingent on establishing that one was "aggrieved" by the decision, but the Legislature has never defined what it means to be aggrieved by a zoning decision. Joseph, an original action challenging a rezoning ordinance, had been repeatedly cited for the proposition that to be "aggrieved" by a zoning decision for purposes of an appeal, a comparison to similarly situated property owners was required, which implicitly required the complaining party to be a property owner, but there was no discussion about why property ownership was itself key to one's ability to contest a zoning decision or how that requirement could be derived from any of Michigan's zoning statutes that were then in effect. In Unger, the Court of Appeals applied the Joseph property-ownership formulation in the context of zoning appeals. In this case, the Court of Appeals relied on Olsen, which reaffirmed Joseph's primary holding without analyzing the procedural differences or the minimal source material relied on in Joseph. Over time, the term "aggrieved" in the MZEA became inappropriately intertwined with real-property ownership to a point where judicial decisions began to suggest that only real-property owners had the ability to appeal a zoning decision. But there is no indication in the text of the MZEA that the Legislature intended to grant the right to appellate review of zoning decisions only to real-property owners.
Neither the MZEA nor any of Michigan's previous zoning statutes explicitly require one to own real property in order to be "aggrieved" by local land-use decisions or to prove "aggrieved" status by comparison to other property owners who are similarly situated. By requiring one to be a "party aggrieved" by a zoning decision under MCL 125.3605 and MCL 125.3606, the Legislature implicitly rejected the idea that standing can be based on mere proximity to a development. The Legislature omitted mention of ownership or occupancy status when describing the class of individuals or entities that are entitled to appeal a decision under MCL 125.3605 or MCL 125.3606. Instead, the Legislature used the broader phrase "party aggrieved" without mandating that the party own any property within the relevant jurisdiction or that the required harm be shown by comparison to other property owners. That choice of words established a class of potential appellants broader than real-property owners, with the focus being on whether the decision at issue "aggrieved" the complaining party.
2. To be a "party aggrieved" under MCL 125.3605 and MCL 125.3606, the appellant must meet three criteria: (1) the appellant must have participated in the challenged proceedings by taking a position on the contested decision such as through a letter or oral public comment; (2) the appellant must claim some legally protected interest or protected personal, pecuniary, or property right that is likely to be affected by the challenged decision; and (3) the appellant must provide some evidence of special damages arising from the challenged decision in the form of an actual or likely injury to or burden on their asserted interest or right that is different in kind or more significant in degree than the effects on others in the local community. The phrase "others in the local community" refers to persons or entities in the community who suffer no injury or whose injury is merely an incidental inconvenience and excludes those who stand to suffer damage or injury to their protected interest or real property that derogates from their reasonable use and enjoyment of it. Factors that can be relevant to this final element of special damages include but are not limited to: (1) the type and scope of the change or activity proposed, approved, or denied; (2) the nature and importance of the protected right or interest asserted; (3) the...
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