Saunders v. City of New York
| Decision Date | 15 December 2008 |
| Docket Number | No. 07 Civ. 830(SAS).,07 Civ. 830(SAS). |
| Citation | 594 F.Supp.2d 346 |
| Parties | Cynthia SAUNDERS, et al., Plaintiffs, v. The CITY OF NEW YORK and the Department of Education of the City of New York, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York |
Leonard Donald Polletta, Joseph William Barrett, District Council 37, AFSCME (Office of The General Counsel), Ivan D. Smith, Maureen Maria Stampp, Lewis Brisbois Bisgaard & Smith LLP, New York, NY, for Plaintiffs.
Diana Goell Voigt, Michele Ann Molfetta, NYC Law Department, Office of the Corporation Counsel, New York, NY for Defendants.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plaintiffs, approximately 194 current and former municipal employees, filed this collective action against defendants, the City of New York ("City") and the New York City Department of Education ("DoE"), pursuant to the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA").1 Plaintiffs assert that defendants systematically violated their overtime rights under the FLSA and have brought the following claims: (1) defendants failed to pay them at the rate of time-and-one-half for hours worked over forty in a workweek (the "overtime claim"); (2) defendants failed to pay them for hours worked between thirty-five and forty in a workweek (the "failure to pay claim"); and (3) defendants wrongfully converted their compensatory time to sick leave after ninety days or otherwise prevented them from using it (the "denial of use claim"). With regard to each of these damages claims, plaintiffs assert that the statute of limitations should be equitably tolled because defendants interfered with their ability to seek relief in a timely manner by failing to post required notices and by misinforming them concerning their statutory rights.
The parties now cross-move for partial summary judgment. Plaintiffs request partial summary judgment on the overtime claim on three separate grounds: (1) defendants failed to pay overtime in cash; (2) defendants failed to provide payment for all hours worked over forty in a workweek; and (3) defendants paid at straight time instead of time-and-one-half for hours worked over forty in a workweek. Finally, plaintiffs seek equitable tolling of the statute of limitations as a matter of law on two separate grounds: (1) defendants failed to post the required Department of Labor FLSA notices; and (2) defendants willfully violated the FLSA.
Defendants also seek partial summary judgment on the following grounds: 1) the payment of compensatory time as overtime compensation did not violate the FLSA; 2) defendants permitted use of accrued compensatory time in accordance with statutory requirements; and 3) there is no evidence of an "actual practice" to pay plaintiffs at straight time instead of time and one half for hours worked over forty in a workweek.
For the reasons stated below, plaintiffs' motion is granted in part and denied in part, while defendants' motion is denied in full. In addition, the Court grants summary judgment sua sponte in favor of defendants concerning the failure to pay claim.
II. BACKGROUND2
Plaintiffs are Parent Coordinators ("PC") and Parent Support Officers ("PSO") employed by the New York City Department of Education.3 These positions were created in 2003 under DoE's Children First Reform Agenda to support and enhance parental involvement.4 There are approximately 1,400 PCs and eighty PSOs.5
Each New York public school is assigned one PC, who works under the supervision of the principal.6 The specific duties of PCs include: "engag[ing] parents in their children's education, addressing parent and school community concerns, convening and attending parent meetings, working with the school's parent association, serving as a liaison to DoE central and regional parent support staff, and maintaining contact with community organizations."7 PSOs serve individual DoE regions, with the number of districts within each region determining the allocation of PSOs.8 They support PCs and present professional development workshops, although they have no supervisory authority over PCs.9
The terms and conditions of plaintiffs' employment are established in the collective bargaining agreement ("CBA") between the DoE and Local 372, District Council 37, American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFLCIO ("AFSCME"), who are plaintiffs' bargaining representatives.10 PCs and PSOs serve year round and are required to work thirty-five hours per work week.11 Their positions are intended to be flexibly scheduled in order to accommodate "the needs of parents, including early mornings, evenings and weekends."12 The CBA is silent concerning overtime compensation, specifically whether PCs and PSOs working overtime may be compensated with compensatory time off rather than cash.13
The issue of overtime compensation is addressed separately in an information manual, the "Parent Coordinator Human Resources Guide" ("PC HR Guide"), which DoE's Division of Human Resources ("HR Division") distributed to its staff, school principals, and school secretaries.14 The PC HR Guide provides in relevant part:
With the prior approval of the principal, parent coordinators may work an additional five hours per week and receive compensatory time. Compensatory time is strictly limited to time worked between thirty-five and forty hours in a week and results in a straight time credit for each additional hour of work. Time above forty hours is credited as time and one-half and must be compensated for in cash through the payroll system. There is no provision to credit time worked above forty hours in any given week as compensatory time. The Verification of Compensatory Time or Paid Overtime Performed by the Parent Coordinator form in the appendix to this guide should be used to recover and approve compensatory time and overtime.15 The PC HR Guide explains that principals may use discretionary funds in their budgets to pay cash overtime to PCs.16
The DoE's overtime policy concerning PCs and PSOs was also detailed in a supplement entitled, "Rules and Regulations Governing Non-Pedagogical Administrative Employees" ("Admin Rules").17 Section 7 of the Admin Rules concerns overtime, and provides in relevant part:
7.3. Eligible employees who work overtime in excess of the number of hours in their regular workweek but less than forty hours are paid at their basic hourly rate for overtime. Monetary payments shall be made at the rate of one and onehalf times the employee's basic hourly rate for overtime worked in excess of forty hours in the employee's regular workweek.
7.5. No credit shall be recorded for unauthorized overtime ....
7.6. Employees for whom cash payment for overtime is not permitted, and for whom the granting of compensatory time for overtime is permitted will receive compensatory time in an hour for hour basis for overtime worked up to a forty hour week and time and one-half for overtime worked in excess of a forty hour week.18
It is the normal practice of the DoE either to post copies of its employment policies on its website, or to send them to AFSCME.19 DoE did not post FLSA notices in schools.20
Additionally, when PCs were first hired in 2003, DoE conducted several orientation sessions to familiarize PCs with their positions and to explain accompanying benefits.21 These meetings were attended either by Lawrence Becker, Chief Executive Officer of DoE's HR Division, or his representative, as well as AFSCME representatives.22 Among the topics addressed were salary range, hours and scheduling, and annual leave and vacation.23
Follow-up meetings clarifying professional development and work rules, as well as issues related to plaintiffs' schedules, were offered monthly or bimonthly.24 In at least some regions, the meetings addressed the dearth of money available for overtime, and regional directors suggested that PCs and PSOs should avoid working more than thirty-five hours in a week.25
Despite its written policy specifying that overtime above forty hours would be paid in cash, DoE changed its practice in light of the limited funds in schools' discretionary budgets and provided compensatory time instead.26 AFSCME never filed a grievance on behalf of plaintiffs to challenge the form of overtime payment, although it had the ability to do so pursuant to both CBA and New York Public Employment Relations Board grievance procedures.27
III. LEGAL STANDARD
Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law."28 An issue of fact is genuine "`if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.'"29 A fact is material when it "`might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law.'"30 "It is the movant's burden to show that no genuine factual dispute exists."31
In turn, to defeat a motion for summary judgment, the non-moving party must raise a genuine issue of material fact. "Summary judgment is properly granted when the non-moving party `fails to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial.'"32 To do so, the non-moving party must do more than show that there is "`some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts,'"33 and it "`may not rely on conclusory allegations or unsubstantiated speculation.'"34 However, "`all that is required [from a nonmoving party] is that sufficient evidence supporting the claimed factual dispute be shown to require a jury or judge to resolve the parties' differing versions of the truth at trial.'"35
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