Saunders v. Saunders, G-340
| Decision Date | 08 February 1966 |
| Docket Number | No. G-340,G-340 |
| Parties | Martin G. SAUNDERS, Appellant, v. Jewell J. SAUNDERS, Appellee. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
Barne J. Morain, Pensacola, for appellant .
Jones & Sims, Pensacola, for appellee.
Plaintiff husband has appealed a final decree rendered in a proceeding instituted by him in which his prayer for divorce was denied and he was adjudged to be in contempt of the court for his failure or refusal to pay the amount of temporary alimony, court costs and attorneys fees awarded his defendant wife by an interlocutory order of the court.
Two primary points have been raised by appellant which we consider pertinent to a disposition of this appeal.
The complaint filed by appellant charged appellee with desertion. Appellee answered denying the material allegations of the complaint and in turn asserting a counterclaim seeking a divorce on the ground of cruelty. Appellee thereafter filed in the cause a petition praying for an order requiring appellant to pay to her a reasonable sum of money to be used in defraying the cost of this litigation. Appellee also filed her affidavit on faculties by which she averred her need for temporary alimony, suit money and attorneys fees, and appellant's ability to pay such reasonable amount as may be found necessary for these purposes. She prayed for an order making an allowance to her for the sums requested by her affidavit and petition. At a hearing before the court at which no further proof or testimony was offered by either party, the court entered an order awarding appellee temporary alimony in the sum of $200.00 a month, temporary attorneys fees in the sum of $200.00, and court costs in the sum of $50.00.
Some months later, upon petition and rule to show cause, an order was entered by the chancellor adjudging appellant to be in contempt of the court for his failure to comply with the requirements of the order hereinabove mentioned. Without specifying the amount owed by appellant as a result of his default, the order directed that appellant be confined to the county jail for a period not exceeding ninety days or until he should purge himself of contempt by complying with the terms of the order awarding temporary alimony, court costs and attorneys fees.
Appellant contends, and we think correctly so, that the foregoing order adjudging him to be in contempt of court was vague, indefinite, and therefore unenforceable under the decisions rendered by this court in the case of State v. Anderson, 1 and by the Third District Court of Appeal in Dykes v. Dykes 2 and Ginsberg v . Ginsberg. 3 The cases last cited all stand for the proposition that if a party is adjudged to be in contempt of the court for noncompliance with the provisions of an order, judgment or decree requiring the payment of alimony, child support, attorneys fees or litigation costs, the judgment must fix with specificity the amount of money for nonpayment of which the accused is in default, and the period for which he shall be imprisoned unless he earlier purges himself by payment of the amount of default found to be due.
Our conclusion as stated above does not render the judgment of contempt void, but merely defective to such an extent as to require that it be amended to comply with the foregoing announced principles of law. It is not necessary, however, that the final decree appealed herein be reversed because of the deficiencies in the judgment of contempt as noted above. Appellant was never arrested nor committed to the county jail under the judgment of contempt of which he now complains. The cause proceeded to final hearing and culminated in the final decree which forms the basis of this appeal. As stated at the outset, the decree denied appellant's prayer for a divorce, and dismissed his complaint. The decree further found and adjudged appellant to be in contempt of the court for failure to comply fully with the interlocutory order by which appellee was awarded temporary alimony, attorneys fees and court costs. The final decree specifically found the exact amount of money owed to appellee as temporary alimony, and to her attorneys for their compensation, and for court costs, for the payment of which appellant continued to be in default. Jurisdiction of the cause has been retained by the chancellor for the purpose of enforcing all of the monetary provisions of the final decree. It...
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Beers v. Public Health Trust of Dade County, 84-780
...an award of temporary alimony is completely barred. 108 So. at 898-99. The court in Novack relied on the decision of Saunders v. Saunders, 183 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966), for its ruling. Saunders, however, is arguably distinguishable in that the parties there waived the issue of abandonm......
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Novack v. Novack, s. 66--460
...chancellor to have awarded a temporary cash allowance to the wife herein, even though these charges were pending. See Saunders v. Saunders, Fla.App.1966, 183 So.2d 239. We hold that the chancellor abused his discretion in taking judicial notice of the record in a prior separate divorce suit......
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Bajcar v. Bajcar
...and will be released upon compliance with the court's order. Pugliese v. Pugliese, 347 So.2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1977) ; Saunders v. Saunders, 183 So.2d 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). By contrast, criminal contempt is a sanction for past conduct, intended "to vindicate the authority of a court and to ......
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Bajcar v. Bajcar, 3D17-2726
...and will be released upon compliance with the court's order. Pugliese v. Pugliese, 347 So. 2d 422, 424 (Fla. 1977); Saunders v. Saunders, 183 So. 2d 239 (Fla. 1st DCA 1966). By contrast, criminal contempt is a sanction for past conduct, intended "to vindicate the authority of a court and to......