Savage v. Emery

• Decision Date: 01 November 1967
• Citation: 255 Cal.App.2d 603,63 Cal.Rptr. 566
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: Angela T. SAVAGE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Francis D. EMERY, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 807.

Page 566

63 Cal.Rptr. 566

255 Cal.App.2d 603

Angela T. SAVAGE, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Francis D. EMERY, Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. 807.

Court of Appeal, Fifth District, California.

Nov. 1, 1967.

Benjamin D. Frantz, Sacramento, for appellant.

Douglas B. McDonald and Eugene W. Saeltzer, Sacramento, for respondent.

STONE, Associate Justice.

This is an appeal from a judgment entered pursuant to a demurrer sustained without leave to amend.

Appellant was injured when her automobile was struck by a vehicle driven by respondent's minor daughter but owned by a third person. In her first action, appellant sued the minor and the owner of the car but did not join respondent, who had signed his minor daughter's application for a driver's license. Before trial, however, appellant filed against respondent a second and separate action based on the same accident, predicating his liability upon Vehicle Code section 17707. The first case was tried to a jury that brought in a verdict of $4,000 against the minor and the owner of the car. A judgment entered pursuant to the verdict was satisfied in full.

Respondent pleaded the satisfaction of judgment in the first action to which he was not a party, and the trial court held that payment of the judgment satisfied appellant's cause of action against respondent.

Appellant asserts that she should be permitted to press the present action to recover damages suffered after June 23, 1966. Her theory is that the testimony in the first trial reflected that at most she would suffer from her injuries for another four to six months, and her judgment covered only such damages, while in fact she suffered damages for a much longer period.

Appellant argues, first, that since respondent's liability under Vehicle Code section 17707 is several, an action against him alone is perfectly proper. This statement, correct as far as it goes, overlooks the complete nature of respondent's liability. By signing his minor daughter's application for a driver's license, respondent subjected himself to the vicarious liability imposed by Vehicle Code section 17707, which is a joint and several liability for any damages proximately resulting from the negligence or wilful misconduct of the minor in driving a motor vehicle. Respondent's liability, although several under section 17707 which permits a separate action against him, was at the same time a joint liability.

Therefore the classic rule that a cause of action is satisfied as to all joint tort feasors once the injured party is paid for his injury by one joint tort feasor is applicable. The principle involved and its purpose are explicated by the Supreme Court in Lamoreux v. San Diego etc. Railway Co., 48 Cal.2d 617, 624, 311 P.2d 1, 5, as follows:

'The rule that the release of one joint tort feasor releases all the others is intended to prevent double recovery for the injury and is based on the theory that there can be but one compensation for the joint wrong, that each joint tort feasor is responsible for the whole damage, that the cause of action is satisfied once the injured party is paid for his injury by one of the joint tort feasors, and that the receipt by the injured party of any sum, if accepted as payment in satisfaction of the cause of action against one joint tort...