Savannah, F. & W. Ry. Co. v. Harris

• Citation: 7 So. 544,26 Fla. 148
• Parties: SAVANNAH, F. & RY. CO. v. HARRIS.
• Decision Date: 19 May 1890
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Florida

7 So. 544

26 Fla. 148

SAVANNAH, F. & RY. CO. v. HARRIS.

Florida Supreme Court

May 19, 1890

Appeal from circuit court, Duval county: JAMES M. BAKER, Judge.

Syllabus by the Court

SYLLABUS

1. In transportation of goods over connecting lines of railroad when there is no special contract, each road is only liable to the extent of its own line and for safe carriage and delivery to the next road.

2. In an action against a railroad company for goods lost by it as a common carrier, the burden of proof is, first, on the plaintiff to show delivery and acceptance of the goods, and next the loss and value thereof. This shown, the burden is upon defendant to relieve itself of liability by showing legal contract exemption, or that the loss was occasioned by a public enemy, or by the act of God, or that the goods had in themselves elements of destruction which occasioned the loss.

3. Where goods to be transported by several carriers are lost or injured, and the last carrier is sued, it will be held liable, if it does not show that the loss or injury occurred on some preceding line, on the presumption that the goods delivered to the first carrier were also delivered to the last, and in the same condition in which they were started.

4. The plaintiff in this case delivered goods to a road in New York which were put in a car, and were to be transported in the car over several roads to a point in Florida. The car was received by the defendant, and taken over its road to Jacksonville, an intermediate point, and there unloaded by defendant. When the next and last carrier made delivery at the point of destination, some of the goods were missing, and others injured. The evidence does not show that the lost goods were in the car when it was unloaded, or that defendant delivered them to the next carrier, but does show that some of the goods were injured when taken out. Held, that the presumption which applies to a last carrier, that the goods were delivered to it as they were started, applies to intermediate carriers, and to defendant in this case, and that, defendant having failed to show delivery of the lost goods to the next carrier, and that those injured were in the condition in which it received them, it is liable.

COUNSEL Fleming & Daniel, for appellant.

A. W Cockrell & Son, for appellee.

OPINION

MAXWELL J.

The action is by appellee against appellant for damages occasioned by the loss of goods, and injury to goods, while being transported from Charlotte, N. Y., to Buffalo Bluff Fla. The bill of lading given by the New York Central & Hudson River Railroad was for one car of household goods and building material received from George L. Harris, with destination to him at 'Buffalo Bluff, Fla., via Palatka, without transfer.' It is unnecessary to consider the matters connected with the first count of the declaration, and the first, second, and third pleas, intended as defenses to that count. These relate to the claim of plaintiff that defendant became responsible for the loss and damage because it did not deliver the car to the next succeeding road running to Palatka, as the bill of lading required; and it is apparent from the record that the verdict of the jury in favor of plaintiff could not have been founded on that count, as this would have been directly against the evidence, under the charge of the court for defendant,--that, unless defendant had knowledge of that clause of the bill, it was not bound thereby. Whether that charge was correct is a question not involved in this appear. But it was shown by the evidence that defendant was not informed of the directions of the bill of lading, and that it forwarded the goods to Buffalo Bluff, by a connecting line of steamers, from the terminus of its road to that point, in accordance with the way-bill from an intermediate road, which did not contain the words 'via Palatka, without transfer.' Under the charge of the court, therefore, the jury could not have found for the plaintiff on the issues made from the first count, and the three pleas thereto.

The second count, resting somewhat on the bill of lading, we also pass by, as we think the real merits of the case are to be determined on the issues made under the third count, which is, substantially, as follows: That defendant received the carload of goods, undertaking to safely keep, transport, and deliver the same, but, not regarding its duty as a common carrier, acted so carelessly and negligently that by reason thereof the said goods and property of plaintiff were as to part wholly lost, and as to other part greatly damaged. One plea is that defendant safely carried the goods over its line, and delivered the same to the next carrier in the same condition as they were received; and another plea is that whatever injury and damage there was to said goods was caused by the careless and negligent packing of the same by the plaintiff. Issue was joined on these pleas; and the questions now to be considered are those which arose during the trial on the evidence, and the charges of the court connected with this part of the controversy. The evidence shows that the goods were delivered to the initial carrier in apparent good order, and that the car in which they were stored for transportation was received by defendant to be transported over its road without other contract than such as attached to one of the intermediate carriers between the initial and last carriers, and that the goods unladen from the car by defendant at Jacksonville, Fla., were forwarded to the point of destination as mentioned in the erroneous way-bill from another intermediate carrier. Some of the goods were lost, and others were damaged; and the recompense awarded by the jury to plaintiff for his loss and damage was $866.75, $87 of which was remitted by plaintiff. But the evidence does not disclose where the loss or damage occurred, except as to damage to building material, estimated at $60; and some of that damage the plaintiff himself attributes to the People's Line of boats, to which defendant delivered the material to be carried to Buffalo Bluff. It appears, however, from the testimony of plaintiff, that, in an itemized estimate of his loss and damage, the aggregate amount is even greater than the amount of the verdict. So that the verdict may not have included this $60, or the remittitur may have been intended to cover it, along with other items that made up the $87. At any rate the record does not inform us otherwise; and, upon scrutinizing all the other items, we see none less likely to have entered into the verdict, or more likely to have entered into the remittitur.

In the absence of evidence to show where all other loss and damage occurred, we must resort to the rules which govern in such cases. The contract with the initial road, as shown by the bill of lading, was that it was 'not to transport the goods beyond the limit or terminus of its own road.' Hence its liability would be discharged upon delivering the car to the next connecting road with the contents in as good condition as when received, and each succeeding road in the series over which the transportation was to be made would be discharged upon like delivery. As expressed by Justice FIELD in Myrick v. Railroad Co., 107 U.S 107, 1 S.Ct. 425: 'The general doctrine, then, as to transportation by connecting lines, approved by this court, and also by a majority of the state courts, amounts to this: that each road, confining itself to its common-law liability, is only bound, in the absence of a special contract, to safely carry over its own route, and safely to deliver to the next connecting carrier, but that any one of the companies may agree that over the whole route its liability shall extend. In the absence of a special agreement to that effect, such liability will not attach.' The same court had previously said, in Railroad Co. v. Manufacturing Co., 16 Wall. 318, that the 'rule that holds the carrier only liable to the extent of its own route, and for the safe storage and delivery to the next carrier, is in itself so just and reasonable that we do not hesitate to give it our sanction.' See, also, Knight v. Railroad Co., 9 Amer....