Savannah T. & I. H. Ry. of Savannah v. Mayor, Etc., of Savannah

• Decision Date: 26 November 1900
• Citation: 37 S.E. 393,112 Ga. 164
• Parties: SAVANNAH, T. & I. H. RY. OF SAVANNAH v. MAYOR, ETC., OF SAVANNAH.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

37 S.E. 393

112 Ga. 164

SAVANNAH, T. & I. H. RY. OF SAVANNAH v. MAYOR, ETC., OF SAVANNAH.

Supreme Court of Georgia

November 26, 1900

Syllabus by the Court.

The municipal authorities of the city of Savannah had power under the charter of the city and the second proviso of section 2180 of the Civil Code, to levy and collect an occupation or business tax from street-railroad companies for the use and occupation of the city streets by their tracks and cars, when such companies' principal business was the transportation of passengers from points within the city limits to other like points. (a) The facts of this case differ from those of the case of City Council of Augusta v. Central Railroad, 78 Ga. 119.

Error from superior court, Chatham county; R. Falligant, Judge.

Petition by the Savannah, Thunderbolt & Isle of Hope Railway of Savannah, Ga., against the mayor and aldermen of the city of Savannah. Judgment for defendants, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.

Barrow & Barrow and Jos. B. Cumming, for plaintiff in error.

Saml. B. Adams, for defendants in error.

SIMMONS C.J.

The municipal authorities of the city of Savannah, by a proper ordinance, levied a business or privilege tax upon street-railroad companies doing business within the limits of the city. The plaintiff below, being such a company, filed an equitable petition against the municipal authorities alleging that the city had no power or authority to levy such taxes, and that the same were therefore illegal and void. Upon the hearing the judge refused the injunction, and the petitioner excepted.

The charter of the city of Savannah contains the following clause: "They [the municipal authorities] are also hereby vested with full power and authority to make such assessments and lay such taxes on the inhabitants of said city, *** and those who transact or offer to transact business therein, as said corporate authorities may deem expedient for the safety, benefit, convenience and advantage of said city, and may enforce the payment of such assessments and taxes in such manner as said mayor and aldermen may prescribe." Code 1882,§ 4847. This is about as broad a power as the English language can express to tax businesses and occupations. There can be no doubt of the intention of the legislature to confer this power, and there can be no doubt that the city authorities had the power to impose the tax here complained of, unless the decision in the case of City Council of Augusta v. Central Railroad, 78 Ga 119, rules to the contrary. It is claimed by the plaintiff in error that as street railroads were, by the act of 1889 (Acts 1889, p. 36), put under the same tax act as steam and commercial railroads, they are brought within the construction put upon the tax act of 1874 in the Augusta Case. It is claimed that, under that case, the municipal authorities had no power to levy or collect an occupation tax upon street-railroad companies; that the charter of the city of Augusta contained substantially the same provisions as to the taxation of occupations as does that of the city of Savannah; and that, when this court decided that the municipal authorities of Augusta had no authority to levy a business tax upon the Central Railroad and the other two railroad companies involved in that case, the question was closed so far as concerns the right of the city to impose an occupation tax upon the railroad company. We do not agree with this contention. The opinion in the Augusta Case, which is the decision of the court, shows that the ruling made applied only to what may be termed a "commercial railroad company,"--one whose general business is not carried on within the city. The state, by the act of 1874 reserved the exclusive right to collect taxes from railroad companies on the property owned and used in connection with their business, and a city had no authority to impose a tax upon such property. Nor could a city, under the case just cited, impose a business or occupation tax on a railroad company which under authority of its charter merely transported freight and passengers to and from the city; for such a tax could be used to work a practical repeal of the charter of the company. Where, however, a street-railroad company does not transport freight or passengers to and from the city as the beginning or end of the route, but engages in transportation from one point within the city to another point within the city, it enters into a general business within the city, and is properly taxable by the municipality. And so, if a street-railroad company combine the two businesses, as was done by the company in the present case, so as to...