Savant v. Terminals
| Decision Date | 05 December 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–20572.,13–20572. |
| Citation | 776 F.3d 285 |
| Parties | Floyd L. SAVANT, Plaintiff–Appellant, v. APM TERMINALS, Defendant–Appellee. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Stephen Joseph Schechter, Stephen J. Schechter, P.C., Boerne, TX, for Plaintiff–Appellant.
Teri L. Danish, McGuireWoods, L.L.P., Houston, TX, Matthew C. Kane, McGuirewoods, L.L.P., Los Angeles, CA, for Defendant–Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas, USDC No. 4:11–CV–1980.
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, CLEMENT, and HIGGINSON, Circuit Judges.
Floyd L. Savant appeals the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of his employer, Universal Maritime Service Corp. (“Universal Maritime”),1 dismissing his claim under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (“ADEA”), 29 U.S.C. § 621 et seq. For the following reasons, we AFFIRM.
Until October 2009, Savant worked as a yard tractor2 operator at one of Universal Maritime's port terminal facilities. Universal Maritime is a member of the West Gulf Maritime Association (“West Gulf”), a multi-employer trade association that negotiates and administers multi-employer collective bargaining agreements with the International Longshoremen's Association (“ILA” or the “Union”) and its affiliated local unions. Savant, who was born in 1934, has been a member of the ILA Local No. 24 for over twenty years.
A collective bargaining agreement (“CBA”) governed Savant's employment at Universal Maritime. The South Atlantic and Gulf Coast District (“SAGC District”) had negotiated this agreement with West Gulf on behalf of the Union. The CBA states that its grievance procedure and arbitration “shall be the exclusive remedy with respect to any and all disputes arising between the Union or any person working under the Agreement ... and the Association or any company acting under the Agreement.” In addition to the CBA, the SAGC District and West Gulf also negotiated a Memorandum of Understanding (“MOU”) to supplement the CBA's terms. The MOU states that “[a]ny complaint that there has been a violation of any employment law, such as ... [the] ADEA, ... shall be resolved solely by the grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.” The MOU also states that its procedure “shall be a worker's sole remedy for a violation of any antidiscrimination or employment law.”
In October 2009, while Savant was operating a yard tractor, he was involved in an accident with an over-the-road driver who ran through a stop sign. Both vehicles were damaged. As required under the applicable Occupational Safety and Health Administration (“OSHA”) regulations and an OSHA industry settlement agreement, Universal Maritime referred Savant to a refresher training and evaluation for operating powered industrial trucks (“PITs”). See 29 C.F.R. § 1910.178(l )(4)(ii)(B). A PIT operator who does not pass this evaluation will not be recertified and will not be permitted to operate PIT equipment until he successfully completes the PIT refresher training. Under West Gulf's training policies, a PIT operator who fails the evaluation three times in one year must wait one year before he will be permitted to attend the training again.
Savant attended PIT refresher training three times during the year following the October 2009 accident, and Universal Maritime contends that he failed the evaluation each time. As a result, he is no longer allowed to operate PIT equipment at Universal Maritime. Savant has nevertheless continued working at Universal Maritime's facilities in different job classifications, earning the same hourly rate that he made as a PIT operator. Instead of filing a grievance through the Union challenging his evaluation results, Savant filed this lawsuit in federal court, alleging age discrimination in violation of the ADEA.
In the district court, Universal Maritime filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that Savant lacked standing because he failed to exhaust the CBA and MOU's grievance and arbitration procedures.3 The district court granted the motion for lack of standing and entered judgment in favor of Universal Maritime. This appeal timely followed.
This court reviews a district court's grant of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as the district court. Rogers v. Bromac Title Servs., L.L.C., 755 F.3d 347, 350 (5th Cir.2014). Summary judgment is appropriate “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists if “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In deciding whether a fact issue exists, courts must view the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 378, 127 S.Ct. 1769, 167 L.Ed.2d 686 (2007). This court is “not limited to the district court's reasons for its grant of summary judgment and may affirm the district court's summary judgment on any ground raised below and supported by the record.” Rogers, 755 F.3d at 350 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The district court held that Savant lacked standing to bring his ADEA claim in federal court because he had failed to exhaust the grievance and arbitration remedies under the CBA and MOU. A plaintiff is ordinarily “required to attempt to exhaust any grievance or arbitration remedies provided in [a] collective bargaining agreement” before seeking relief in federal court. See DelCostello v. Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151, 163, 103 S.Ct. 2281, 76 L.Ed.2d 476 (1983) ; Harris v. Chem. Leaman Tank Lines, Inc., 437 F.2d 167, 170 & n. 3 (5th Cir.1971). This principle applies even when a plaintiff is alleging employment discrimination in violation of a federal statute. In 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. Pyett, the Supreme Court clarified that, in the absence of statutory language to the contrary, a union may agree with an employer to submit employees' statutory claims exclusively to arbitration or another non-judicial grievance procedure. 556 U.S. 247, 256–58, 274, 129 S.Ct. 1456, 173 L.Ed.2d 398 (2009). For that agreement to be enforceable, however, the CBA must “clearly and unmistakably require[ ] union members to arbitrate.” Id. at 274, 129 S.Ct. 1456. In Penn Plaza, the Court held that this “clear and unmistakable” standard was satisfied when an anti-discrimination provision explicitly referenced the ADEA and stated that “[a]ll such claims shall be subject to the grievance and arbitration procedures ... as the sole and exclusive remedy for violations.” Id. at 252, 260, 129 S.Ct. 1456.
This court applied Penn Plaza's test in Ibarra v. United Parcel Service, 695 F.3d 354 (5th Cir.2012). The court agreed with other circuits that have concluded that, “for a waiver of an employee's right to a judicial forum for statutory discrimination claims to be clear and unmistakable, the CBA must, at the very least, identify the specific statutes the agreement purports to incorporate or include an arbitration clause that explicitly refers to statutory claims.” Id. at 359–60. In Ibarra, the court concluded that the CBA did not require an employee to submit her Title VII claim to the grievance process because the CBA only stated generally that “any controversy, complaint, misunderstanding or dispute arising as to interpretation, application or observance of any of the provisions of this Agreement” must be submitted to the grievance process. Id. at 356–57.
This dispute therefore turns on whether the district court properly concluded that there was no genuine issue of fact as to whether the MOU and the CBA, when read together, clearly and unmistakably waived union members' right to a judicial forum for ADEA and other statutory discrimination claims. When interpreting a collective bargaining agreement, federal law governs. See Int'l Ass'n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Masonite Corp., 122 F.3d 228, 231 (5th Cir.1997) ; see also Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala., 353 U.S. 448, 456–57, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972 (1957). Nevertheless, “courts may draw upon state rules of contractual interpretation to the extent that those rules are consistent with federal labor policies.”Nichols v. Alcatel USA, Inc., 532 F.3d 364, 377 (5th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). “However, the construction and application of a collective bargaining agreement's terms cannot be strictly confined by ordinary principles of contract law.” United Paperworkers Int'l Union v. Champion Int'l Corp., 908 F.2d 1252, 1256 (5th Cir.1990). “The provisions of a labor contract may be more readily expanded by implication than those of contracts memorializing other transactions.” Id. Moreover, “[w]hen several documents represent one agreement, all must be construed together in an attempt to discern the intent of the parties, and the court should attempt to give effect to every contractual provision.” Id.
Like the CBA in Ibarra, the CBA governing Savant's employment does not specifically identify the ADEA, and it does not state that statutory discrimination claims are subject to its grievance and arbitration procedures. Therefore, the CBA alone cannot bar Savant from filing suit under the ADEA.
The MOU, however, is clear and unmistakable. It states: “Any complaint that there has been a violation of any...
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