Save-A-Lot Food Stores v. Amos

Decision Date25 March 2015
Docket NumberNo. A14A1633.,A14A1633.
Citation331 Ga.App. 517,771 S.E.2d 192
PartiesSAVE–A–LOT FOOD STORES et al. v. AMOS.
CourtGeorgia Court of Appeals

John G. Blackmon Jr., Christopher Kelley Gifford, Atlanta, for Appellant.

Neal B. Graham, Macon, for Appellee.

Opinion

McFADDEN, Judge.

This appeal is by an employer from a superior court order reversing an administrative denial of workers' compensation benefits to an employee. Although the superior court ruled that the State Board of Workers' Compensation held the employee to an unfairly heightened standard of proof, a review of the decisions of the appellate division and the administrative law judge shows otherwise. Accordingly, we reverse.

1. Facts and procedural posture.
On appeal from an award of the Appellate Division of the State Board of Workers' Compensation, this [c]ourt examines the record to see if there is competent evidence to support the award and construes the evidence in a light most favorable to the prevailing party. It is axiomatic that the findings of the State Board of Workers' Compensation, when supported by any evidence, are conclusive and binding, and that neither the superior court nor this [c]ourt has any authority to substitute itself as a fact finding body in lieu of the [b]oard. However, erroneous applications of law to undisputed facts, as well as decisions based on erroneous theories of law, are subject to the de novo standard of review.
Bonner–Hill v. Southland Waste Systems, 330 Ga.App. 151, 153, 767 S.E.2d 803 (2014) (citations and punctuation omitted).

The record shows that James Amos sought workers' compensation benefits, claiming that he was disabled as the result of a work-related stroke. His employer, Save–A–Lot Food Stores, and its workers' compensation carrier, Old Republic Insurance Company (collectively, “Save–A–Lot”), controverted the claim. A hearing on Amos' claim was held before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”).

At the hearing, Amos testified that on August 5, 2011, he was at work when he became dizzy and flushed while unloading pallets of meat weighing between 15 and 60 pounds. He took a short break and then continued working, but found himself miscounting items, losing his balance and becoming confused. He had a severe headache, water was dripping from his right eye, and the left side of his body felt weak. Amos was driven to the hospital, where he was admitted for three days.

Amos' family doctor, Melanie Shorter, opined that Amos had suffered a stroke

and that job-related stress was a contributing factor that led to it. She also identified Amos' tobacco use, uncontrolled diabetes, hypoadenia, inactivity, and family history as other possible factors. Dr. Michael Frankel, a neurologist who specializes in strokes and is the director of a hospital stroke and neuroscience center, testified that Amos' magnetic resonance imaging (MRI) testing and other medical records showed no evidence of a stroke. Dr. Frankel further testified that it is not clear whether stress is a real factor for stroke and that Amos had most of the other known significant risk factors for stroke, including diabetes, family history and smoking. Another neurologist, Dr. Abdul Qadir, who had treated Amos, found no objective evidence that he had suffered a stroke and that the etiology of his symptoms was unclear. Dr. Qadir further noted that Amos' MRI did not demonstrate any stroke and he questioned whether the incident had been initiated by a “vascular or hypoglycemic event[.]

Following the hearing, the ALJ entered an order denying Amos' request for benefits. The ALJ found that Amos had not shown that he suffered a stroke, and that even if he had, the stroke was not caused by work stress. Accordingly, the ALJ concluded that Amos was not entitled to workers' compensation benefits because he had “failed to prove by a preponderance of competent and credible evidence that he suffered a stroke arising out of, and in the course of, his employment with [Save–A–Lot] on or about 8/5/2011.”

Amos appealed to the state board's appellate division, complaining that the ALJ had unfairly held him to a heightened standard of proof. Amos pointed to the following portion of the ALJ's order:

Employee has the burden of proof and must show that he sustained an injury which arose out of and in the course of his employment and that disability resulted from the injury. The standard of proof on all factual questions is by a preponderance of the credible evidence. Employee is required to meet a higher standard of proof to establish that his alleged stroke is compensable. That proof must also be supported by medical evidence. (Citations omitted, emphasis supplied.)

The appellate division affirmed the decision of the ALJ, finding that the preponderance of competent and credible evidence showed that Amos had not suffered a compensable injury. With respect to the “higher standard of proof” language emphasized above, the appellate division ruled as follows:

To the extent that the administrative law judge referenced in paragraph 13 of the award that the Employee is required to meet a higher standard of proof to establish that his alleged stroke is compensable in this case, we find he so erred. As such, based upon the foregoing, the third sentence of paragraph 13 of the findings of fact and conclusions of law is stricken. (Citations omitted.)

Amos then appealed to the superior court, which reversed the appellate division. The court ruled that the ALJ's “higher standard of proof” language was erroneous and that the appellate division had recognized the error but had failed to correct it. The court noted that the appellate division referred to “the wrong page and paragraph of the original Award” and improperly adopted the ALJ's factual findings. Accordingly, the superior court reversed the appellate division's award and remanded the case to the state board “with instructions to conduct a new trial and issue new and complete findings of fact and conclusions of law.”

Save–A–Lot filed an application for discretionary review of the superior court's order.

This court granted the application, and Save–A–Lot then filed a timely notice of appeal.

2. Burden of proof.

OCGA § 34–9–1(4) provides that a...

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3 cases
1 books & journal articles
  • Workers' Compensation
    • United States
    • Mercer University School of Law Mercer Law Reviews No. 67-1, September 2015
    • Invalid date
    ...S.E.2d at 833-34, 834.76. Id. at 665-66, 768 S.E.2d at 834.77. Id. at 666, 768 S.E.2d at 834-35.78. Id. at 667, 768 S.E.2d at 835. 79. 331 Ga. App. 517, 771 S.E.2d 192 (2015).80. Id. at 518-19, 771 S.E.2d at 193, 194.81. Id. at 519, 771 S.E.2d at 194.82. Id. at 517, 771 S.E.2d at 193.83. O.......

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