Save Our Sycamore v. Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit Authority, Dekalb County, Ga., s. 76-1978

• Decision Date: 12 July 1978
• Docket Number: 76-2712,Nos. 76-1978,s. 76-1978
• Citation: 576 F.2d 573
• Parties: 8 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,611 SAVE OUR SYCAMORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY, DeKALB COUNTY, GEORGIA, and William T. Coleman, Secretary of Transportation, U. S. Department of Transportation, Defendants-Appellees. INMAN PARK RESTORATION, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The URBAN TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

Page 573

576 F.2d 573

8 Envtl. L. Rep. 20,611

SAVE OUR SYCAMORE, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. METROPOLITAN ATLANTA RAPID TRANSIT AUTHORITY, DeKALB COUNTY,

GEORGIA, and William T. Coleman, Secretary of

Transportation, U. S. Department of

Transportation, Defendants-Appellees.

INMAN PARK RESTORATION, INC., et al., Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The URBAN TRANSPORTATION ADMINISTRATION et al., Defendants-Appellees.

Nos. 76-1978, 76-2712.

United States Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit.

July 12, 1978.

Richard N. Hubert, Robert L. Schwind, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiff-appellant in No. 76-1978.

Anne S. Emanuel, W. Stell Huie, Betty W. Driver, Atlanta, Ga., for Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid.

Wendell Willard, Decatur, Ga., for DeKalb Co. and Metropolitan Atlanta Rapid Transit, etc.

Robert W. Batchelder, Urban Mass Trans. Adm., Washington, D. C., for Reynoldstown Civic Improve.

John R. Myer, Atlanta, Ga., for plaintiffs-appellants in No. 76-2712.

John W. Stokes, U. S. Atty., William D. Mallard, Jr., Asst. U. S. Atty., Atlanta, Ga., for Secretary of Transportation and federal defendants.

Charles E. Biblowit, Atty., Land & Nat. Resources Div., App. Sec., George R. Hyde, Atty., Peter R. Taft, Asst. Atty. Gen., U. S. Dept. of Justice, Washington, D. C., for federal defendants.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Georgia.

Before GOLDBERG, GODBOLD and SIMPSON, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM:

These cases concern compliance of the Metropolitan Area Rapid Transit Authority (MARTA) with federal statutes in approving, financing and constructing a rapid transit system for the metropolitan Atlanta region.

Plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive relief from defendants' alleged failure to comply with requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. § 4331 et seq. (1970), of section 4(f) of the Department of Transportation Act (DOTA), 49 U.S.C. § 1653(f) (1970), of section 14(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Assistance Act of 1970 (UMTA), 49 U.S.C. § 1610(c) (1970), and of section 106 of the National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA), 16 U.S.C. § 470f (1976). On the basis of the district court opinion, ¹ we affirm the denial of plaintiffs' DOTA, UMTA and NHPA claims. We also affirm the denial of plaintiffs' NEPA claims but have concluded that resolution of the NEPA issue required supplementary discussion.

Simply stated, the NEPA issue is whether the environmental impact statement (EIS) was sufficiently detailed to satisfy the requirements of the Act. ² Plaintiffs argue that the EIS discussion of the location and construction of two rapid transit stations and of a 2500-foot radius of track was not sufficiently detailed. The district court disagreed reasoning on the facts before it that NEPA requires that the scope of the EIS encompass the entire rapid transit system. Concluding that the systemwide EIS was satisfactory, the court noted that the preparation of an EIS encompassing less than the entire system or encompassing individual rapid transit stations would not have satisfied the requirements of NEPA.

The record reflects that at the time the final EIS was prepared the proposed rapid transit system included 50 miles of rail lines. Thirty-seven rapid transit stations are to be located along these lines. Federal authorities had authorized the expenditure of $800 million toward completion of the system.

We agree with the district court that in this case NEPA requires an EIS of systemwide scope. The considerations that support this conclusion, explained fully in the district court opinion, are the purpose of the rapid transit system, Sierra Club v. Callaway, 499 F.2d 982 (CA5, 1974), the fact that isolated transit stations or sections of rail have no independent function, id., and the fact that the interrelatedness of project subsections renders impracticable the required consideration of alternatives on other than a systemwide level. Named Individual Members of the San Antonio Conservation Soc'y v. Texas Highway Dept., 446 F.2d 1013 (CA5, 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 933, 92 S.Ct. 1775, 32 L.Ed.2d 136 (1972).

The determination that the scope of an EIS is proper is important to the required determination whether the agency in good faith objectivity has taken a hard look at the environmental consequences of a proposed action and at alternatives to that action. Kleppe v. Sierra Club, 427 U.S. 390, 96 S.Ct. 2718, 49 L.Ed.2d 576 (1976); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123 (CA5, 1974); Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Morton, 148 U.S.App.D.C. 5, 458 F.2d 827 (1972). Also relevant to the required determination are subsidiary determinations whether the EIS provides detail sufficient to enable those who did not have a part in its compilation to understand and consider meaningfully the pertinent environmental influences involved, Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Corps of Engineers, 492 F.2d 1123, 1136 (CA5, 1974), and whether the EIS explication of alternatives, judged against a rule of reason, Sierra Club v. Lynn, 502 F.2d 43, 62 (CA5, 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 994, 95 S.Ct. 2001, 44 L.Ed.2d 484 (1975), is sufficient to permit a reasoned choice among different courses of action.

These formulations, individually or in gross, do not establish a bright-line test of the adequacy of an EIS. Rather they express an aggregate of factors implicit in the decision whether a "hard look" has been taken "in good faith objectivity." In the instant case the district court properly emphasized and correctly analyzed the propriety of the systemwide scope of the...