Save the Pine Bush, Inc. v. City of Albany

• Decision Date: 22 May 1986
• Parties: In the Matter of SAVE THE PINE BUSH, INC., et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF ALBANY et al., Appellants.
• Court: New York Supreme Court — Appellate Division

Page 540

502 N.Y.S.2d 540

117 A.D.2d 267

In the Matter of SAVE THE PINE BUSH, INC., et al., Respondents, v. CITY OF ALBANY et al., Appellants.

Supreme Court, Appellate Division,

Third Department.

May 22, 1986.

Vincent J. McArdle, Corp. Counsel (Gary F. Stiglmeier, Jr., of counsel), Albany, for City of Albany, appellant.

Rutnik & Rutnik (Peter A. Lynch, of counsel), Albany, for Willard T. Anderson, appellant.

Oliver & Oliver (Lewis B. Oliver, Jr., of counsel), Albany, for respondents.

Before MAIN, J.P. and CASEY, MIKOLL, and YESAWICH, JJ.

CASEY, Justice.

Petitioners challenge three ordinances enacted by respondent City of Albany pertaining to land use within the area of the City known as the Pine Bush. One of the challenged ordinances created a new zoning classification, Commercial Pine Bush, but did not designate any property as subject to the new classification. The second ordinance established a site plan review process applicable to certain proposed land uses within the City, and specifically created a Pine Bush Site Plan Review District encompassing some 550 acres of undeveloped land in the Pine Bush. The third ordinance granted the application of respondent Willard T. Anderson to change the zoning classification of certain property in the Pine Bush from Residential to Commercial Pine Bush in order to enable him to construct a proposed office complex on the property. Special Term declared all three ordinances invalid due to violations of the State Environmental Quality Review Act (SEQRA).

Respondents contend that, as to the ordinances creating the new zoning classification and establishing the site review process, petitioners' challenges based upon alleged SEQRA violations are untimely since this proceeding was commenced more than four months after the ordinances were enacted. We agree that the four-month period of limitations applicable to CPLR article 78 proceedings generally governs proceedings to review SEQRA determinations (Weinberg, Practice Commentary, McKinney's Cons. Laws of N.Y., Book 17 1/2, ECL C8-0109:6, p. 79). Governmental bodies making such determinations are acting in a plenary administrative capacity (see, Matter of Save the Pine Bush v. Planning Bd. of City of Albany, 83 A.D.2d 741, 442 N.Y.S.2d 602) and, therefore, proceedings to challenge such determinations, including declaratory judgment actions, are subject to the four-month Statute of Limitations of CPLR 217 (see, Solnick v. Whalen, 49 N.Y.2d 224, 425 N.Y.S.2d 68, 401 N.E.2d 190). Since SEQRA determinations are ordinarily considered to be preliminary steps in the decision-making process, they are not ripe for judicial review, and the Statute of Limitations does not begin to run, until that decision-making process has been completed (Matter of Town of Yorktown v. New York State Dept. of Mental Hygiene, 92 A.D.2d 897, 898, 459 N.Y.S.2d 891, affd. 59 N.Y.2d 999, 466 N.Y.S.2d 965, 453 N.E.2d 1254).

Respondents contend that the decision-making process was completed upon enactment of the ordinances. As to the ordinance creating the new zoning classification, however, we are of the view that the matter was not ripe for judicial review, and the Statute of Limitations did not begin to run, until the new classification was actually applied to a particular piece of property. As to the ordinance creating the site plan review process, we reach a contrary conclusion, for the ordinance itself created a Pine Bush Site Plan Review District and specified the property to be included in that district, which was subject to certain requirements to be followed in approving site plans. Upon enactment, therefore, the ordinance had an immediate impact upon petitioners' interest in the Pine Bush, and the four-month limitations period began to run as to their claimed SEQRA violations. Accordingly, respondents' motion to dismiss should have been granted as to that portion of the proceeding seeking to invalidate the site plan review ordinance.

On the merits, Special Term declared invalid the ordinance granting a zoning change for respondent Anderson's property, based upon the governmental respondents' failure to consider the potential cumulative environmental impact of all of the proposed projects in the Pine Bush pending at the time of the determination of no significant environmental impact for respondent Anderson's proposal. Respondents contend that Special Term erroneously substituted its judgment for that of the governmental body responsible for making the determination. We disagree. In reviewing determinations of environmental nonsignificance for substantive compliance with SEQRA, this court has applied the "hard look" standard set forth in H.O.M.E.S. v. New York State Urban Dev. Corp. 69 A.D.2d 222, 232, 418 N.Y.S.2d 827 (see, e.g., Matter of Save the Pine Bush v. Planning Bd. of City of...