Sawczyn v. Bmo Harris Bank Nat'Lass'N

• Citation: 8 F.Supp.3d 1108
• Decision Date: 19 March 2014
• Docket Number: Civ. No. 13–2309 (RHK/SER).
• Parties: Steve SAWCZYN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. BMO HARRIS BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Minnesota

8 F.Supp.3d 1108

Steve SAWCZYN, individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff,

v.BMO HARRIS BANK NATIONAL ASSOCIATION, Defendant.

Civ. No. 13–2309 (RHK/SER).

United States District Court, D. Minnesota.

Signed March 19, 2014

Motion denied. Stephanie K. Goldin, Carlos R. Diaz, Jamisen A. Etzel, Carlson Lynch Ltd., Pittsburgh, PA, Thomas J. Lyons, Lyons Law Firm, P.A., Vadnais Heights, MN, for Plaintiff.

Lucia Nale, Andrew S. Rosenman, Richard E. Nowak, Mayer Brown LLP, Chicago, IL, John L. Krenn, Kelly W. Hoversten, Gray Plant Mooty Mooty & Bennett, P.A., Minneapolis, MN, for Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

RICHARD H. KYLE, District Judge.

INTRODUCTION

In this action, Plaintiff Steve Sawczyn alleges the automated teller machines (“ATMs”) of Defendant BMO Harris Bank National Association (“BMO”) were not accessible to him as a legally blind individual, in violation of Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”) and its implementing regulations. BMO now moves to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, asserting Sawczyn lacks standing and the action is moot. For the reasons set forth below, the Court will deny BMO's Motion.

When, as here, a plaintiff seeks injunctive relief, he must demonstrate a “real and immediate threat of future injury by the defendant.” City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 101–02, 103 S.Ct. 1660, 75 L.Ed.2d 675 (1983). In the context of the ADA, a plaintiff may demonstrate an “injury in fact” by establishing his intent to return to the noncompliant public accommodation.² Sawczyn alleges (1) he has visited the noncompliant ATMs in the past, (2) the ATMs are located approximately three and eleven miles from his home (Am.Compl.¶ 10), and (3) he “will continue to attempt to use the Subject ATMs because he wants to identify convenient accessible ATM options within the zone that he typically travels as part of his regular activities, and [because] he wants to increase ATM accessibility for the blind community, generally” ( id. ¶ 52). Of these allegations, BMO challenges only Sawczyn's intent to use the ATMs in the future.

While there is no definitive test in the Eighth Circuit for determining whether a plaintiff intends to return to a noncompliant accommodation, see Miller v. Ataractic Inv. Co., Civ. No. 11–3509, 2012 WL 2862883, at *3 (W.D.Mo. July 11, 2012), courts often consider factors such as (1) the plaintiff's proximity to the accommodation; (2) the frequency of plaintiff's nearby travel; (3) the plaintiff's past patronage; and (4) the definiteness of plaintiff's plans to return. E.g., Steelman v. Rib Crib No. 18, Civ. Nos. 11–3433, et al., 2012 WL 4026686, at *2 (W.D.Mo. Sept. 12, 2012). Accordingly, the Court will use these factors to guide its analysis.

Sawczyn's proximity to the BMO ATMs and his frequency of nearby travel both weigh in favor of standing. He alleges the ATMs are located only three and eleven miles from his home and BMO's investigation confirms this estimate. ( See Nowak Decl. ¶ 4 (averring the ATMs are located 3.8 and 11.5 miles from his home address).) He also alleges they lie within the zone he “typically travels as part of his regular activities.” ( Id. ¶ 10.) More specifically, he frequents Edina (where the France Avenue ATM is located) to visit restaurants and shop and he travels to Saint Paul (where the Snelling Avenue ATM is located) to visit friends and attend outreach events. ( Id. ¶ 11.)

Contrary to BMO's argument, Sawczyn need not establish BMO's ATM is the nearest ATM to his home nor the most convenient. Rather, he need only allege that the ATMs he visited are near enough and convenient enough that he might reasonably be expected to visit them again. Therefore the statistics BMO painstakingly compiled regarding how many other ATMs are as close or closer to Sawczyn's home ( see Def.'s Mem. at 11–13) are ultimately beside the point. Sawczyn lives less than twelve miles from the ATMs and frequents the surrounding areas, both of which lend credence to his allegation that he will return to use them in the future. Cf., e.g., Houston v. Marod Supermarkets, Inc., 733 F.3d 1323, 1340 (11th Cir.2013) (finding standing where plaintiff lived 30 miles from accommodation and frequently visited his attorney's office nearby); Daniels v. Arcade, L.P., 477 Fed.Appx. 125, 129–30 (4th Cir.2012) (finding standing where plaintiff alleged he “lives near the Market, had visited the Market before the filing of the amended complaint,” and “ ‘intends to continue to visit the [Market] in the future for his shopping needs' ”).

BMO contends the last two factors—his past patronage and the definiteness of his plans to return—undercut Sawczyn's standing, but the Court disagrees. These two factors are largely inapplicable to Sawczyn's case and therefore carry little to no weight in the Court's analysis. See Daniels, 477 Fed.Appx. at 129–30 (declining to require a “more specific” allegation of when the plaintiff intended to return to the noncompliant accommodation and concluding plaintiff's litigation history was irrelevant).

Sawczyn's past patronage is admittedly thin. He is not a BMO customer and he alleges that he visited each ATM only once. As he has not returned to the ATMs since his first visit, BMO contends he never will. But requiring a history of patronage is incongruous in an ADA case like this one. While Sawczyn certainly could have returned to BMO's ATMs—knowing he was unable to use them—in order to manufacture standing, it would be poor policy to require him to. Plaintiffs are not required to make futile attempts at using noncompliant public accommodations in order to sue under the ADA, 42 U.S.C. § 12188(a)(1), nor should they be required to do so for standing purposes, see Pickern v. Holiday Quality Foods Inc., 293 F.3d 1133, 1138 (9th Cir.2002); Steger v. Franco, Inc., 228 F.3d 889, 892 (8th Cir.2000). Accordingly, the Court will not hold Sawczyn's failure to revisit the noncompliant ATMs against him in its analysis.

The final factor is the definitiveness of Sawczyn's plans to return. Insofar as courts have interpreted this to require a plaintiff to plead particulars of when he will return, the Court finds this factor equally inappropriate to Sawczyn's case. In Lujan, the Supreme Court announced that general “some day” intentions to return were insufficient allegations of future injury for the purpose of standing. 504 U.S. at 564, 112 S.Ct. 2130. It explained: “such ‘some day’ intentions [to return]—without any description of concrete plans, or indeed even any specification of when the some day will be—do not support a finding of the ‘actual or imminent’ injury that our cases require.” Id. But in Lujan, the plaintiffs needed to travel halfway across the globe on a mission to observe endangered species in order to suffer the “imminent” future injury they alleged. Id. at 563–64, 112 S.Ct. 2130. A trip of that sort requires scheduling, coordination, and preparation—in other words, it requires concrete and advanced plans. Visiting a nearby ATM, on the other hand, does not. Given the spontaneous nature of ATM visits, Sawczyn need not allege when specifically he will return to use BMO's ATMs in order for the Court to consider his professed intent to return credible and definite. Cf. Parr v. L & L Drive–Inn Rest., 96 F.Supp.2d 1065, 1079 (D.Haw.2000) (where noncompliant public accommodation is fast-food restaurant, “specification as to a date and time” of return visit is “impossible” due to the “spur of the moment” nature of fast-food visits). Therefore, this final factor weighs little in the Court's analysis.

Overall, based on the pleadings and limited record before it, the Court concludes Sawczyn's alleged past use of BMO's local ATMs and his intent to use them again are sufficient to create a concrete, imminent threat of future harm and Sawczyn therefore has standing to pursue his claim.

II. Mootness

A plaintiff must have standing throughout the life of a case, not just at the beginning, in order for it to constitute a justiciable “case or controversy” under Article III. See U.S. Parole Comm'n v. Geraghty, 445 U.S. 388, 397, 100 S.Ct. 1202, 63 L.Ed.2d 479 (1980). Otherwise, the case becomes moot. Stated differently, “mootness [is] the doctrine of standing in a time frame. The requisite personal interest that must exist at the commencement of the litigation (standing) must continue throughout its existence (mootness).” Id. (quotation and citation omitted). BMO asserts this case is moot because its alleged ADA violations have been rectified, leaving Sawczyn with nothing to gain from his requested injunctive relief.

“It is well settled that a defendant's voluntary cessation of a challenged practice does not deprive a federal court of its power to determine the legality of the practice. If it did, the courts would be compelled to leave the defendant free to return to his old ways.” Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs. (TOC), Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 189, 120 S.Ct. 693, 145 L.Ed.2d 610 (2000) (quotations, citation, and alterations omitted). The defendant carries a “heavy burden” of demonstrating not only that it has voluntarily ceased the offending conduct but also that it is “absolutely clear” the offending conduct “could not reasonably be expected to recur.” Id. Thus, BMO must establish that its ATMs are ADA-compliant and that they will remain compliant. Based on the record before it, the Court cannot conclude as a matter of law that BMO has satisfied this “heavy burden.”

First, despite BMO's assertion, the evidence does not conclusively show that BMO's ATMs are currently ADA compliant. BMO relies on the declaration of its Vice President, Brenda Pino, to establish its compliance. Pino avers that BMO investigated the France and Snelling Avenue ATMs on September 4, 2103, after Sawczyn commenced the instant suit and found they lacked functioning headphone...