Sawyer v. Inhabitants of Naples

• Decision Date: 05 October 1876
• Citation: 66 Me. 453
• Parties: IRA C. SAWYER v. INHABITANTS OF NAPLES. 1876.
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

66 Me. 453

IRA C. SAWYER v. INHABITANTS OF NAPLES.

1876.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

October 5, 1876

ON EXCEPTIONS from the superior court.

CASE for damages, for injuries received, through a defect in a highway, February 26, 1875.

On the point of notice required by c. 215, of the acts of 1874, the plaintiff testified that on March 24, 1875, he went into the store of Mr. Bray, one of the selectmen, and said to him " I shall claim damages of the town for injuries received in the back on the Sylvester Paul road. He asked me how much. I told him I did not know; we would wait and see how I got over it. He said they would object on the ground I was not in the road."

The presiding justice ruled, that it was incumbent on the plaintiff to satisfy the jury that he had given the notice required by the act of March 3, 1874; and defined the requirements of the notice as to its contents in a manner to which no exceptions were taken; but ruled against the defendants' objection that such notice proved by parol testimony was sufficient, and further that it was sufficient if given to one municipal officer or selectman.

The verdict was for the plaintiff for $1750; and the defendants moved to set it aside as against evidence, and alleged exceptions.

N. S. Littlefield, for the defendants.

S. C. Strout & H. W. Gage, for the plaintiff.

APPLETON C. J.

This is an action against the defendant corporation to recover damages for an injury occasioned by a defect in a highway which it was bound to keep in repair. It comes before us upon exceptions to the ruling of the presiding justice and upon a motion for a new trial.

By R. S., c. 18, § 65, persons injured by defects or want of repair, etc., may recover damages against the towns or cities responsible for such defects or want of repair. This section was amended by c. 215 of the acts of 1874, which provides that " any person who sustains any injury or damage as aforesaid, shall notify the county commissioners of such county or the municipal officers of such town, within sixty days thereafter by letter or otherwise, setting forth his claim for damages and specifying the nature of his injuries."

The presiding justice ruled that notice proved by parol testimony was sufficient. To this ruling the defendants excepted.

The object of the notice is to enable the town seasonably to investigate claims for injury before the proof of the facts shall become unattainable from lapse of time or loss of life or memory. It is for the benefit of the town. Notifying the town of an injury received enables its officers to proceed to ascertain the facts and contest or settle with the party claiming damages as they may deem expedient.

The notice is by " letter or otherwise." If by letter it is in writing. If " " otherwise," it may be in writing or verbal. " Otherwise" includes all modes of notice except by letter....