Sawyer v. Legislative Council
| Decision Date | 06 June 2005 |
| Docket Number | KEN CV-04-97 |
| Parties | W. TOM SAWYER, JR., ROBERT A. DAIGLE, ALBION D. GOODWIN and GARY E. SUKEFORTH, Plaintiffs v. THE LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL, BEVERLY C. DAGGETT, PATRICK COLWELL, and DAVID E. BOULTER, Defendants |
| Court | Maine Superior Court |
This matter is before the court on cross-motions for summary judgment pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 56. The present dispute involves a claim by the Plaintiffs, former Maine Legislators that they are due compensation for service during the Second Special Session of the 121st Maine Legislature. Maine legislators are elected to serve for two-year terms, and the Legislature holds sessions during each of these years. The so-called First Regular Session begins on the first Wednesday of December following the November general election. See Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1. The statutory deadline for the end of the First Regular Session is the third Wednesday in June. See 3 M.R.S.A. § 2 (2004). The so-called Second Regular Session begins on the first Wednesday after the first Tuesday in January of the following year. See Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1. The statutory deadline for the end of the Second Regular Session is the third Wednesday in April. See 3 M.R.S.A. § 2 (2004). Although the Maine Constitution does not limit the type of business that may be conducted during the First Regular Session, the Constitution limits the business of the Second Regular Session to budgetary and other specifically enumerated matters. See Me. Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 1. Because legislators generally work five days a week when the legislature is in session, a First Regular Session involves approximately 120 days of work in Augusta and a Second Regular Session involves approximately 80 days of work in Augusta.
Article IV, Part 3, § 7 of the Maine Constitution states that legislators shall receive such compensation "as shall be established by law". Current law provides legislators with compensation of approximately $19,000.00 for the two-year term. See 3 M.R.S.A. § 2 (2004).
In addition to the First and Second Regular Sessions, the Legislature may call itself, or be called by the Governor into "special session." At the time of the Second Special Session of the 121st Maine Legislature, 3 M.R.S.A. § 2 provided that "[i]n addition to the salary paid for the first and second regular sessions of the Legislature when a special session is called, the members of the Senate and House of Representatives shall each be compensated $100 for every day's attendance."
The 121st Legislature's First Regular Session commenced on December 4, 2002, and adjourned on June 14, 2003. When legislators returned in January of 2004 for the Second Regular Session, it was generally understood by the Plaintiffs that the session would likely last until the middle or end of April due to the volume of work to be accomplished. One of the tasks facing legislators when they returned for the Second Regular Session was to enact a supplemental budget. The supplemental budget must take effect by the end of the fiscal year, which occurs annually on June 30.
The Maine Constitution mandates that legislation does not take effect until ninety days after the adjournment of the legislative session in which it was enacted. See Me Const. art. IV, pt. 3, § 16. The State Constitution, however also contains a limited exception that applies in the case of an emergency. Under this exception, if a bill contains a preamble stating the facts constituting the emergency, and the bill passes both houses by a 2/3 majority, the bill may take effect immediately upon signing by the Governor. See Id. Hence, in years past, the Legislature typically ensured that the budget took effect before the end of the fiscal year by passing budgets as emergency measures by a 2/3 majority.
During the 121st Legislature's Second Regular Session, however efforts to pass the supplemental budget by a 2/3 majority were unsuccessful, and instead, the budget received the approval of only a simple majority of the members. Therefore, to ensure that the supplemental budget took effect by June 30, a majority of the Legislature voted to adjourn the Second Regular Session on January 30, thereby beginning the running of the 90-day period. This action, however, meant that the Legislature had adjourned without addressing numerous other pending matters. Thus, before adjourning on January 30, and apparently realizing that a special session would be required to complete this unfinished business, the Legislature twice attempted to block the statutory $100 per day payments that might otherwise be forthcoming. First, an Emergency Resolve was introduced and failed. The second measure introduced, however, a Joint Order, managed to pass both houses by a simple majority. The Joint Order did not purport to change the existing law, but rather, it stated that current law already provided for legislative compensation through April 21, 2004, the statutory adjournment date for the Second Regular Session.
Subsequent to the passage of the Joint Order, several senators asked the Attorney General to give an opinion as to the Order's effectiveness. The Attorney General concluded that the Joint Order was likely not effective to eliminate the special session payments because the State Constitution requires legislative pay to be "established by law". This requires that an act or resolve pass both houses of the Legislature and then be signed by the Governor. The Attorney General did, however, suggest that the special session payments could possibly be eliminated by amending the legislative pay statute and by making the amendment retroactive to January 30, 2004.
Thus, during the Second Special Session, a bill was introduced to eliminate special session payments retroactive to January 30, 2004, just as the Attorney General suggested. Both the House and Senate passed the bill, which was signed by the Governor on May 6, 2004. The Act amended 3 M.R.S.A. § 2 to specify that special session payments would not be made for any special session called during the time period specified for regular sessions. See P.L. 2003, ch. 691, §§ 1, 2. Because the bill was not an emergency measure, it did not take effect until July 30, 2004, ninety days after the Second Special Session adjourned.
Each of the Plaintiffs to the present action, W. Tom Sawyer, Jr., Robert A. Daigle, Albion D. Goodwin, and Gary E. Sukeforth (hereinafter "the Plaintiffs" or "the Legislators") served as members of the Maine Legislature during the Second Special Session of the 121st Maine Legislature, which began on February 3, 2004, and ended on April 30, 2004. On or before May 3, 2004, each of these individuals requested payment from Defendant David Boulter, Executive Director of the Legislative Council, of $100 for each day of their attendance at the Second Special Session. Each of these requests was denied[1].
The Plaintiffs filed their complaint on May 12, 2004, filed their amended complaint[2] on May 13, 2004, and filed their motion for summary judgment on August 24, 2004. All submissions relevant to Plaintiffs' motion were timely filed. The
Defendants filed their motion for summary judgment on September 28, 2004. All Submissions relevant to Defendants' motion were also timely filed.
Curtis v. Porter, 2001 ME 158, ¶ 7, 784 A.2d 18, 21-22. Summary judgment is proper if the citations to the record found in the parties' Rule 56(h) statements demonstrate that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Dickinson v. Clark, 2001 ME 49, ¶ 4, 767 A.2d 303, 305. "A fact is material if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case under governing law." Levine v. R.B.K. Caly Corp., 2001 ME 77, ¶ 4, n.3, 770 A.2d 653, 655, n.3 (citing Burdzel v. Sobus, 2000 ME 84, ¶ 6, 750 A.2d 573, 575). Searles v. Trustees of St. Joseph's College, 1997 ME 128, ¶ 6, 695 A.2d 1206, 1209 (quoting Tallwood Land & Dev. Co. v. Botka, 352 A.2d 753, 755 (Me. 1976)). To avoid a judgment as a matter of law for a defendant, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case for each element of her cause of action. See Fleming v. Gardner, 658 A.2d 1074, 1076 (Me. 1995).
In their brief, the Defendants first assert that the present action, which is essentially a dispute within the Legislature regarding the budget process, presents a nonjusticiable political question. The Defendants note that the Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit in an effort to shape the budgetary process in the future because they were unhappy that the majority did not make more concessions to achieve a 2/3 majority on the supplemental budget. In the Defendants' view, this is a purely political question within a coordinate branch of state government and the Court should permit the Legislature to deal with the issue on its own.
In support of their position, the Defendants first set forth the most commonly cited statement of the political question...
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