Sawyer v. Perry
| Decision Date | 28 May 1895 |
| Citation | 33 A. 660,88 Me. 42 |
| Parties | SAWYER v. PERRY et al. |
| Court | Maine Supreme Court |
(Official.)
Exceptions from supreme Judicial court, Knox county.
Action by Sarah A. Sawyer, administratrix of Ralph S. Sawyer, deceased, against Jarvis C. Perry and others. To the sustaining of a demurrer to the amended declaration, plaintiff excepts. Overruled.
The declaration, as amended, was based on Laws 1891, c. 124, permitting a recovery for death by wrongful act in the names of the personal representatives of the deceased person, and providing that the amount recovered shall be for the exclusive benefit of decedent's widow and children.
True P. Pierce, for plaintiff.
A. A. Strout, C. A. Hight, and J. W. Symonds, for defendants.
This is an action to recover damages for negligently causing the death of a person. The declaration alleges that Ralph S. Sawyer, while at work in the defendant's lime quarry, was killed by a stone which was negligently allowed to fall upon him.
The declaration avers that the decedent survived his injuries about an hour; and the suit, in its original form, was simply a common-law action, based on the alleged negligence of the defendants. But by leave of court the writ has been amended by inserting an allegation that the action is brought for the benefit of the widow of the deceased. This was an important amendment. It changed the character of the action. In its original form, the damages, if any had been recovered, would have belonged to the estate of the deceased. In its present form, the damages, if any are recovered, will belong to the widow of the deceased, and the amendment changes the rule by which the damages are to be assessed. The amendment, therefore, was important, and not a mere matter of form.
To this amended declaration the defendants demurred. The object of the demurrer appears to have been to obtain a construction of the statute of 1891, c. 124, entitled "An act to give a right of action for injuries causing death."
The question argued is whether the remedies provided by this statute (Act 1891, c. 124) must not be limited to cases where the persons injured die immediately. It is the opinion of the court that they must. A similar statute has been so construed, and no reason is perceived why this statute should not receive the same construction.
In State v. Maine Cent. R. Co., 60 Me. 490, the court held that a statute giving a right of action by indictment against railroad corporations for negligently causing the death of a person, and declaring that the amount recovered should be for the benefit of the widow and children of the decedent, must be limited in its application to cases of immediate death; and this decision was affirmed in State v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 61 Me. 114.
The court could not believe that the legislature intended to give two remedies for a single injury. It had become settled law in this state that if a person was injured through the negligence of another person, or a corporation, and afterwards died of his injuries, redress could be obtained by his personal representative. But it had been held in Massachusetts (and the law was assumed to be the same in this state) that, if the person injured died immediately, no redress could be had. And it was believed that it was the intention of the legislature to remedy this defect,—not to give a new right of action where ample means of redress already existed, but to supplement the existing law, and give a new right of action in a class of cases where no means of redress before existed. And it was believed that full effect would be given to the legislative intention by limiting the new right of action to cases where the persons injured died immediately.
So, in this case, we cannot believe that the legislature intended by the act of 1891, c. 124, to give two actions for a single injury, —one for the benefit of...
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Smith v. Whitaker
...by sufficient proof."). While death rarely may be instantaneous in fact, instantaneous death can occur. As indicated in Sawyer v. Perry, 88 Me. 42, 33 A. 660 (1895), electrocution may be an example of instantaneous death in fact: Very few injuries cause instantaneous death. "Instantaneous" ......
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Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Cassin
... ... suit against the same party, as the act was not intended to ... "give two actions for a single injury." Sawyer ... v. Perry (Me.) 33 A. 660. Some of these decisions had ... been rendered before our act of 1887, and are fairly to be ... presumed to have ... ...
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St. Louis, Iron Mountain & Southern Railway Company v. Craft
...The survival act in many States applies only to cases where death was not instantaneous and the death act to cases of instantaneous death. 88 Me. 42; 15 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1003; 128 Mich. 444; 3 S.D. 369; 117 Mich. 329; 43 L. R. A. 574; 106 Ill. 131; 119 Id. 586; 34 L. R. A. 797; 18 Kan. 46; ......
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O'Brien v. Wise & Upson Co., Inc.
...and elastic than instantaneously, there could be no recovery where the death occurred about an hour after the injury. Sawyer v. Perry, 88 Me. 42, 33 A. 660. But the same court in a later case allowed a recovery where total unconsciousness followed immediately upon the accident and continued......
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Survival and Wrongful Death Claims in Maine
...69 A. 105, 109 (Me. 1907). 7. See id. 8. See Farrington, 115 F.2d at 101. 9. See State v. Grand Trunk Ry. Co., 61 Me. 114; Sawyer v. Perry, 33 A. 660, 661 (Me. 1895). 10. See id. at 100. 11. Farrington, 115 F.2d at 98. 12. Farrington, 115 F.2d at 102. 13. Houge v. Roberge, 47 A.2d 727, 729 ......