Saxonia Min. & Reduction Co. v. Cook

• Decision Date: 31 October 1884
• Parties: SAXONIA MINING & REDUCTION CO. v. COOK.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

4 P. 1111

7 Colo. 569

SAXONIA MINING & REDUCTION CO. v. COOK.

Supreme Court of Colorado

October 31, 1884

Appeal from the district court of Arapahoe county.

Decker & Yonley, for appellant.

Ingersoll & Crater, Leander H. Long, and Sanford C. Hinsdale, for appellee.

STONE J.

The only question we need to consider in this case is whether the complaint is sufficient to support the judgment. The complaint contains two counts, the second of which is wholly insufficient for any purpose and cuts no figure in the case. The first count is as follows, viz.:

'The said plaintiff, complaining of the said defendant complains and alleges: That on the twenty-seventh day of May A. D. 1880, the said defendant entered into a certain agreement with the plaintiff in and by which the said defendant hired and employed the said plaintiff for the term and period of one year from the fifteenth day of April, 1880 to do and perform certain service and labor, and promised and agreed then and thereby to pay the said plaintiff the sum of one hundred and twenty-five dollars per month for the first three months of said term, and the sum of one hundred and fifty dollars per month for the remaining months of said term; that the said plaintiff then and there, in pursuance thereof, entered into the employment of said company and performed the service required, and is still able and willing to comply with the terms of said agreement upon his part to be kept and performed; that the said defendant neglects and refuses to keep and perform its said agreement, to the damage of this plaintiff of the sum of one thousand and ninety dollars: that no part thereof has been paid.'

The answer of the defendant company below is a specific denial of each and every of the allegations of the complaint as above set forth, and, further, 'denies that it is indebted to the plaintiff upon any contract whatsoever, or for work and labor performed by the plaintiff for the defendant; but says that whatever labor has been performed by plaintiff for the defendant has been paid for by the defendant, and received by the plaintiff in full satisfaction and discharge of said work and labor.'

The facts established by the evidence on trial are that the plaintiff was engaged by the defendant to perform services of work and labor as refiner in the smelting works of the defendant company for the term of one year from April 15, 1880, upon the terms as to wages the same as alleged in the complaint; that, in accordance with this engagement, plaintiff entered upon said work, and performed the same in a satisfactory manner up to the seventh of August, 1880; that he was paid for the same, from time to time, at the rate aforesaid; that on the said seventh of August he was paid in full for services up to that date, when the works were closed by the defendant, and plaintiff, with the other employes of the works, was discharged, the only reason for such discharge being that the defendant chose to shut down the works on account of alleged dissatisfaction with the superintendent of the company; that thereafter the plaintiff remained at the locality of the defendant's works, where he had been employed, until the spring of the next year, 1881, without engaging on other work; that from November 1, 1880, until March 1, 1881, he had the keys of said smelting works, and during that time did some work without being specially re-engaged by defendant, and without having been paid anything therefor; that the keys were given him by the same superintendent who engaged him on behalf of the company, in the first place, and that this latter work was done by direction of said superintendent; that he did no work after the twenty-fifth of February, 1881, for the reason that no more work was provided by defendant for him to do.

The only matters of defense set up by defendant on the trial were-- First, that the said superintendent was not authorized to employ plaintiff or any other employe except on condition that such employe might be discharged at the pleasure of the president of the company, (who resided outside the state of Colorado,) or upon one day's notice; but with this condition said superintendent had 'full and complete power from the defendant company to hire, employ, and discharge any and all workmen or employes of said company;' and, second, that the plaintiff was discharged and paid in full on the seventh of August, 1880, and that, therefore, defendant was not liable to plaintiff for anything after that date. Plaintiff admitted payment in full to said date for services rendered up to that time, but testified that he did not understand that he was discharged under the contract. The suit was brought before the expiration of the year for which plaintiff claims he was engaged, to-wit, October 22, 1880. The trial was held in December, 1881. Where one is employed to serve for a definite term, as for a year, and is discharged before the expiration of the term, without fault on his part, he has a right of recovery, either for the balance of wages due or damages for the loss he may have suffered by reason of the wrongful discharge.

'A person employing another for a definite term is bound to provide him with labor for the whole term, and cannot deduct from the wages of the servant for time that he was not at work, when the failure results from his own fault. The fact that the business proves unprofitable is no excuse. If the master chooses to go out of the business he can do so, but must pay the servant his actual damages for not employing him for the stipulated term.' Wood, Mast. & Serv. § 97, and cases cited.

When a servant is discharged, without a sufficient legal excuse before the expiration of his term, he has his choice of two remedies: He may treat the contract as rescinded, and at once bring an action for the value of the services rendered; or he may treat the contract as continuing, and sue for a breach thereof, and recover his probable damages occasioned by the breach; or, in some cases, he may defer suit until the end of the term, and sue for the actual damage he has sustained, which, however, can in no case exceed the wages for the entire term. Id. § 125, and authorities...