Saye v. St. Vrain Valley School Dist.

• Citation: 650 F. Supp. 716
• Decision Date: 24 December 1986
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 82-K-1120.
• Parties: Dianne M. SAYE, Plaintiff, v. ST. VRAIN VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Vicki Ploussard, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Colorado

650 F. Supp. 716

Dianne M. SAYE, Plaintiff, v. ST. VRAIN VALLEY SCHOOL DISTRICT and Vicki Ploussard, Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 82-K-1120.

United States District Court, D. Colorado.

December 24, 1986.

Larry F. Hobbs, William P. Bethke, Denver, Colo., for plaintiff.

Daniel Bernard, Richard Lyons, Longmont, Colo., for defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

KANE, District Judge.

I.

Dianne Saye brought this action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against Saint Vrain Valley School District and Vicki Ploussard, the principal of Frederick Elementary School in the District. Saye taught special education classes at Frederick for three years as a probationary employee. Ploussard was Saye's supervisor for the last year-and-a-half of her employment. Saye alleges her First and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when the district followed Ploussard's "recommendation" not to renew Saye's teaching contract because Ploussard's decision was in retaliation for Saye's exercise of her rights to free speech and association. After Saye had presented her case to the jury, I granted defendants' motion for a directed verdict. On appeal, the decision was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. Saye v. St. Vrain School District RE-IJ, 785 F.2d 862 (10th Cir.1986).

The part of the decision which was affirmed related to Saye's First Amendment claim. I held that to the extent a particular issue raised by Saye (the "student aid time" issue) was a matter of public concern and not her own private concern, the manner in which she raised the issue was so disruptive that her speech was not constitutionally protected. I also found no merit to the claim based on Saye's union activity because she had intentionally absented herself from a special meeting to discuss certain issues (including Ploussard's performance as a principal) with a Craig Russell, who provided education association services to local associations and who coordinated and led local union activities. The Tenth Circuit reversed, however, and concluded a factual issue exists on whether Saye's constitutionally protected union activities were a motivating factor in the nonrenewal decision by the board. The Tenth Circuit remanded to me in order to send the motivating factor issue to a jury.

II. DEFENDANT SCHOOL DISTRICT'S MOTION TO DISMISS

Defendant school district has submitted a motion to dismiss it from this litigation on the grounds that Saye has failed to state a claim against the school district as an entity. The school district's argument is based primarily upon its interpretation of two Supreme Court cases which purportedly are controlling and overrule the Tenth Circuit's ruling and assumptions in this case concerning the legal liability of a school district under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district argues the Supreme Court has pronounced that a district, as an entity, is not legally liable under § 1983 despite any line of factual causation unless it discriminates as a broad policy. Thus, the district argues the "motivating factor" issue should not go to a jury because a school district cannot be held liable anyway. Accordingly, defendants challenge the portion of the Tenth Circuit opinion which states:

There was testimony that Superintendent Blue was told about Saye's actions as faculty representative and about the possibility that she had been subjected to harrassment and retaliation by Ploussard.... School Board members stated by deposition that they had relied completely on the recommendations of the administration (Superintendent Blue, who relied on Ploussard's recommendation) in voting not to renew Saye. "Where this line of causation exists, and the principal or superintendent predicated their sic recommendations on constitutionally impermissible reasons, these reasons become the basis of the decision by the Board members." (citations omitted) (emphasis added).

Saye v. St. Vrain School District, supra, at 867.

Saye argues, first of all, the "law of the case" rule ordinarily precludes a court from re-examining an issue previously decided by the same court, or a higher appellate court. Moore v. Jas. H. Mathews & Co., 682 F.2d 830 (9th Cir.1982). Thus, in the interest of finality and orderly resolution of the case, Saye suggests this issue should not be re-examined since it has already been decided by the Tenth Circuit opinion under Monell v. New York Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978).

I choose not to follow this reasoning simply because it "proves too much". Saye is attempting to promulgate a brand of jurisprudence by which subsequent Supreme Court decisions modifying relevant doctrines could never be applied to a case on remand. Summarily disregarding relevant Supreme Court cases, especially later ones modifying the legal standard to be applied in the case at hand, is contrary to established law. The motion to dismiss the district must be considered in light of all existing law, including, of course, later Supreme Court decisions addressing the legal standard in question. The controlling Supreme Court decision I shall apply in this case, Pembaur v. City of Cincinatti, 475 U.S. ___, 106 S.Ct. 1292, 89 L.Ed.2d 452 (1986), was decided some two weeks after the Tenth Circuit issued its opinion in the instant case.

A. THE SUPREME COURT DECISIONS.

The district argues the Tenth Circuit disregarded a Supreme Court decision — City of Oklahoma v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 105 S.Ct. 2427, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985). More importantly, the district argues the Tenth Circuit opinion in this case was written fifteen days before the Supreme Court decided Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, supra, which purportedly states a municipality is not liable for decisions of subordinates who make unconstitutional discretionary decisions.

In Tuttle, the Court had to decide whether a single isolated incident of the use of excessive force by a police officer establishes an official policy or practice of a municipality, as required by the decision in Monell v. New York City Department of Social Services, supra, sufficient to render the municipality liable for damages under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Although the justices were unable to agree on an opinion, defendants argue seven members of the Court agreed that a single isolated incident of the use of excessive force by a police officer cannot establish an official policy or practice of the municipality sufficient to render it liable for damages under § 1983.

Tuttle, however, does not stand for this proposition. Tuttle was explained in Pembaur, supra, in the following manner:

Municipal liability attaches only where the decision maker possesses final authority to establish municipal policy with respect to the action ordered.10 The fact that a particular official — even a policy-making official — has discretion in the exercise of particular functions does not, without more, give rise to municipal liability based on an exercise of that discretion. Tuttle11 (citation omitted).

Id. 106 S.Ct. at 1299.

In a footnote the Court explained that Tuttle does not stand for the proposition that "a policy cannot be said to be `existing' unless similar action has been taken in the past." Id. at n. 11. The Court stated such a reading of Tuttle would be "strained". Thus, a "policy which ordered or authorized an unconstitutional act can be established by a single decision by proper municipal policymakers." (emphasis added) Id., 106 S.Ct. at 1299, n. 11.

Saye is not required, therefore, to demonstrate similar incidents in the past in order to demonstrate the actions of Vicki Ploussard and the superintendent constituted an unconstitutional policy on the part of the district. The key determination is whether "the official is also responsible for establishing final government policy respecting such activity before the municipality can be held liable.12" (emphasis added). Id., 106 S.Ct. at 1299.

In another footnote the Court explained the constituent elements by which to determine who makes "final government policy".

For example, the County Sheriff may have discretion to hire and fire employees without also being the county official responsible for establishing county employment policy. If this were the case, the Sheriff's decision respecting employment would not give rise to municipal liability, although similar decisions with respect to law enforcement practices, over which the Sheriff is the official policymaker, would give rise to municipal liability. Instead, if county employment policy was set by the Board of County Commissioners, only that body's decisions would provide a basis for county liability. This would be true even if the Board left the Sheriff discretion to hire and fire employees and the Sheriff exercised that discretion in an unconstitutional manner; the decision to act unlawfully would not be a decision of the Board. However, if the Board delegated its power to establish final employment policy to the Sheriff, the Sheriff's decisions would represent county policy and could give rise to municipal liability. (emphasis added).

Id. 106 S.Ct. at 1300, n. 12.

At first glance, it would seem the district in this case cannot be held liable since the decision to fire Saye, if unconstitutional, was a discretionary recommendation on the part of Vicki Ploussard and the superintendent, and not a decision of the district. This would comport with the Supreme Court analogy of the county sheriff as explained in Pembaur, supra, 106 S.Ct. at 1300, n. 12.

However, if Vicki Ploussard's decisions about Saye were mere "recommendations" and it was the district that had the final decision as to whether Saye would be hired or fired, then she would not be held liable. She may have made unconstitutional recommendations but if the district acted upon such recommendations "only that body's decisions would provide a basis for municipal liability." Id., 106 S.Ct. at 1300, n. 12. If the district retained all...