Sayles v. Thompson, 59032

• Decision Date: 01 December 1983
• Docket Number: No. 59032,59032
• Citation: 457 N.E.2d 440,99 Ill.2d 122,75 Ill.Dec. 446
• Parties: , 75 Ill.Dec. 446 James SAYLES et al., Appellees, v. James THOMPSON, Governor, et al., Appellants.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

Page 440

457 N.E.2d 440

99 Ill.2d 122, 75 Ill.Dec. 446

James SAYLES et al., Appellees, v. James THOMPSON, Governor, et al., Appellants.

No. 59032.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

Dec. 1, 1983.

Neil F. Hartigan, Atty. Gen., State of Ill., Chicago, for appellants; Patricia Rosen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Chicago, of counsel.

Charles Hoffman, Jan Susler, Shelley A. Bannister, Margaret Byrne, Chicago, for appellees.

UNDERWOOD, Justice:

The representative plaintiffs in this class action are three prisoners heretofore committed to the custody of the Illinois Department of Corrections and presently confined in Illinois prisons. They brought this action in the circuit court of Cook County on behalf of all Illinois prisoners subject to the Interstate Corrections Compact (Ill.Rev.Stat.1981, ch. 38, par. 1003-4-4) seeking a declaration that transfers of inmates to out-of-State prisons pursuant to that compact would violate the transportation clause of our constitution (Ill.Const.1970, art. I, sec. 11). The Governor and the Director of the Department of Corrections were named as defendants, and plaintiffs prayed that enforcement of the statute be enjoined.

The circuit court denied a motion by defendants to dismiss and granted plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment, ruling that the statute was unconstitutional and enjoining its enforcement. Defendants appealed directly to this court pursuant to our Rule 302(a) (87 Ill.2d R. 302(a)).

The sole issue on appeal is whether transfers of inmates pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact violate the transportation clause of our constitution. This inquiry necessitates a determination of the meaning, purpose and scope of the transportation clause.

There is, as this court has frequently emphasized, a strong presumption that legislative enactments are constitutional (People v. Greene (1983), 96 Ill.2d 334, 338, 70 Ill.Dec. 856, 450 N.E.2d 329; Cronin v. Lindberg (1976), 66 Ill.2d 47, 58, 4 Ill.Dec. 424, 360 N.E.2d 360), and one who asserts otherwise has the burden of clearly establishing the constitutional violation (Polyvend, Inc. v. Puckorius (1979), 77 Ill.2d 287, 303, 32 Ill.Dec. 872, 395 N.E.2d 1376; People v. Dale (1950), 406 Ill. 238, 244, 92 N.E.2d 761). "A statute should be interpreted so as avoid a construction which would raise doubts as to its validity. (Morton Grove Park District v. American National Bank & Trust Co. (1980), 78 Ill.2d 353, 363, 35 Ill.Dec. 767, 399 N.E.2d 1295.) It is our duty to construe acts of the legislature so as to affirm their constitutionality and validity, if it can be reasonably done, and further if their construction is doubtful, the doubt will be decided in favor of the validity of the law challenged. Continental Illinois National Bank & Trust Co. v. Illinois State Toll Highway Com. (1969), 42 Ill.2d 385, 389 ; Illinois Crime Investigating Com. v. Buccieri (1967), 36 Ill.2d 556, 561 ." People v. Davis (1982), 93 Ill.2d 155, 161-62, 66 Ill.Dec. 294, 442 N.E.2d 855.

The meaning of a statute or constitutional provision depends upon the intent of the drafters at the time of its adoption, and it is a long-standing principle of statutory construction that it is the court's duty to ascertain and effectuate that intent. (In re Griffin (1982), 92 Ill.2d 48, 52, 64 Ill.Dec. 948, 440 N.E.2d 852; People ex rel. Hanrahan v. White (1972), 52 Ill.2d 70, 73, 285 N.E.2d 129; People ex rel. Cason v. Ring (1968), 41 Ill.2d 305, 310, 242 N.E.2d 267.) The ordinary meaning of the language employed by the drafters in the questioned constitutional or statutory clause provides the best evidence of the drafters' intent. (People v. Brown (1982), 92 Ill.2d 248, 255, 65 Ill.Dec. 825, 442 N.E.2d 136; People v. Robinson (1982), 89 Ill.2d 469, 475-76, 60 Ill.Dec. 632, 433 N.E.2d 674; People v. Haron (1981), 85 Ill.2d 261, 266, 52 Ill.Dec. 625, 422 N.E.2d 627.) The transportation clause provides:

"No person shall be transported out of the State for an offense committed within the State." (Emphasis added.) (Ill. Const.1970, art. I, sec. 11.)

Plaintiffs describe this language as clear, explicit and unambiguous, and maintain that the language imposes a blanket ban without regard to the method, form or purpose of transportation. Plaintiffs' characterization, however, clearly overstates the breadth of the clause. If the drafters had intended to unilaterally preclude the transportation of prisoners under all circumstances and for any reason they would surely have stated so. The language of the clause is not unqualified, for it prohibits prisoner transportation only when such transportation is for the commission of an offense.

Defendants contend that the transportation clause was intended to prohibit transportation as a form of punishment for the commission of an offense since this was regarded by the drafters as particularly cruel and unusual. In support of their position defendants rely primarily on the records of the 1970 constitutional convention. They also examine the history of banishment and exile generally, emphasizing that transportation clauses in earlier Illinois constitutions were adopted for the specific purpose of protecting against these archaic forms of punishment.

In England, prior to this century, banishment from the King's dominion was a common form of punishment. (G. Dues, A History of Penal Methods: Criminals, Witches, Lunatics (1914).) English prisoners were frequently transported to the American colonies under a contract of indentured service (Crais, The Compulsion of Subjects to Leave the Realm, 6 L.Q.Rev. 388, 398 (1890).) Once our independence was secured, many States enacted constitutional safeguards against this form of punishment. (See G. Braden & R. Cohn, Illinois Constitution: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 53 (1969).) Indeed, a prohibition against punishment by transportation has existed in every Illinois constitution and the language of each has been virtually identical. (See Ill. Const.1818, art. VIII, sec. 17; Ill. Const.1848, art. XIII, sec. 18; Ill. Const.1870, art. II, sec. 11.) The precursor to the present transportation clause was the 1870 clause, which provided:

"[N]or shall any person be transported out of the State for any offense committed within the same." (Ill.Const.1870, art. II, sec. 11.)

Braden and Cohn explain that the purpose of this language was to protect against prisoner transportation as a cruel form of punishment:

"Historically, banishment or exile from the realm was an accepted form of punishment. The legislature has heeded the admonition against the imposition of this particularly cruel form of punishment." (G. Braden & R. Cohn, Illinois Constitution: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 53 (1969).)

In Du Bois v. Gibbons (1954), 2 Ill.2d 392, 410, 118 N.E.2d 295, this court acknowledged, in dicta, that the purpose of the transportation clause was to prohibit "banishment from the State as punishment." Since banishment is no longer an acceptable form of punishment Braden and Cohn consider the transportation clause anachronistic and recommend its abolition. Braden & Cohn, Illinois Constitution: An Annotated and Comparative Analysis 54 (1969).

We note, too, that, while not binding upon us, the Attorney General indicated in a 1982 opinion letter to the Director of the Department of Corrections his belief that temporary transfers of Illinois prisoners to Federal penal institutions outside Illinois were not prohibited.

During the 1970 constitutional convention there were several proposals to abolish the transportation clause and adopt instead a clause prohibiting cruel and unusual punishment (7 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 2961-64 (Committee Proposal No. 275), 3043 (Committee Proposal No. 433), 3080 (Committee Proposal No. 526).) It was argued that the transportation clause really had no contemporary significance, since banishment was no longer employed as a form of punishment. Delegate Dvorak explained that the transportation clause was retained despite its out-dated purpose since section 11 of article I was actually tantamount to a prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment:

"The third clause, 'nor shall any person be transported out of the state for any offense committed within the same,' is akin to the second clause, being explanatory once again. It really has no contemporary significance. The historical basis is evidenced in, for instance, the settling of our original colonies where English prisoners were brought over to do the mundane work necessary for settlement. This has been interpreted in very ancient cases as being so particularly cruel that there is no absolutely decisive case law on this section alone.

Approximately one-third of our states now retain this section in their bill of rights. As indicated in our committee report, this section passed with a seven-to-five vote, and I think this is not indicative of the intent to retain this language. The five votes dissenting on retention were broken down between proponents of some akin matters--for instance, proponents of inclusion of the federal language of 'cruel and unusual punishment.' We felt, I believe as a committee, that while we could either include or substitute that language for the existing language, we would be making no substantive changes and, therefore, we preferred not to do it." (Emphasis added.) 3 Record of Proceedings, Sixth Illinois Constitutional Convention 1380.

In view of these remarks, and Illinois' historical animosity towards prisoner transportation as a cruel form of punishment, we conclude that the transportation clause is violated only if and when the transportation of prisoners constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. With this premise in mind we turn to the question of whether prisoner transportation pursuant to the Interstate Corrections Compact can be characterized as cruel and unusual.

The express objective of the compact is to serve the best interests of...