Sayre v. Potts

• Decision Date: 08 January 1999
• Docket Number: No. CIV.A. 6:98-1120.,CIV.A. 6:98-1120.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: Charlotte Judy SAYRE and Stewart Sayre, Plaintiffs, v. Brian POTTS and Cherrington Scrap Metals, Inc., an Ohio corporation, Defendants.

32 F.Supp.2d 881

Charlotte Judy SAYRE and Stewart Sayre, Plaintiffs, v. Brian POTTS and Cherrington Scrap Metals, Inc., an Ohio corporation, Defendants.

No. CIV.A. 6:98-1120.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Parkersburg Division.

January 8, 1999.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Todd S. Wiseman, Goldenberg, Goldenberg & Stealey, Parkersburg, WV, for plaintiff.

Tanya M. Kesner, J. Robert Leslie and Brent K. Kesner, Kesner, Kesner & Bramble, Charleston, WV, for defendant.

ORDER

GOODWIN, District Judge.

Pending before the Court is the plaintiffs' motion to remand this action to the Circuit Court of Wood County, West Virginia. The plaintiffs, Charlotte Judy Sayre and Stewart Sayre, contend that because the amount in controversy does not exceed $75,000, the Court does not have subject matter jurisdiction over the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1332, 1441(a). The defendants, Cherrington Scrap Metals, Inc. (Cherrington) and Brian K. Potts(Potts), have filed a response to the plaintiffs' motion in which they claim that the case satisfies the jurisdictional requirement. After reviewing the legal memoranda and evidence submitted by the parties, the Court concludes that the amount placed into controversy by Mrs. Sayre's claim exceeded $75,000 when the case was removed and that the Court therefore has jurisdiction over Mrs. Sayre's claim. The Court further concludes that it has supplemental jurisdiction over Mr. Sayre's claim pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Based upon these conclusions, the Court DENIES the plaintiffs' motion to remand.

I. Statement of the Case

This action arises from an automobile accident that occurred on November 18, 1996 in Parkersburg, West Virginia. At the time of the accident, Potts was driving his truck in the course and scope of his employment for Cherrington. (Compl. ¶ 6.) The Sayres claim that Potts operated his truck negligently, in that Potts ran a red light and collided with Mrs. Sayre's vehicle. (Id. ¶ 4.) As a result of the accident, Mrs. Sayre alleges that she suffered the following:

serious and permanent injuries and damages, past present and future, including, but not limited to the following: temporary and permanent physical injuries; medical and related expenses, amounting to approximately $5,270.00 to date; physical pain and suffering; mental anguish; loss of income, earnings and business profits; loss of earning capacity; loss of enjoyment of life; other intangible damages; other damages and expenses.

(Id. ¶ 13.) Mr. Sayre seeks damages based on his "loss of the comfort, companionship, society and consortium of his wife, the plaintiff, Charlotte Judy Sayre." (Id. ¶ 15.) The ad damnum clause of the complaint does not state a dollar amount. (Id. at 4.)

The defendants removed this case from state court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a), which allows defendants to remove cases to federal court if the court would have had original jurisdiction over the matter. The defendants base federal jurisdiction upon diversity jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. Under that statutory provision, federal district courts have original jurisdiction over a case if the case involves citizens of different states and the amount in controversy exceeds $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs. Without question, diversity of citizenship exists in this case: the plaintiffs are residents of Jackson County, West Virginia; Potts is a resident of Ohio; and Cherrington is an Ohio corporation with its principle place of business in Jackson, Ohio. The key issue is whether the $75,000 jurisdictional amount is satisfied as to each plaintiff.¹

II. Standard of Review

The party seeking to remove a case to federal court has the burden of establishing federal jurisdiction. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chem. Co., Inc., 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir.1994). Thus, in a removal action in which federal jurisdiction is premised upon 28 U.S.C. § 1332, the defendant bears the burden of proving that each plaintiff's claim exceeds the jurisdictional amount. Landmark Corp. v. Apogee Coal Co., 945 F.Supp. 932, 935 (S.D.W.Va.1996). This burden is often resolved without debate because a plaintiff's good-faith claim for specific monetary damages in the complaint binds the defendant. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 288, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938); see also Horton v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 367 U.S. 348, 353, 81 S.Ct. 1570, 6 L.Ed.2d 890 (1961) (stating that general federal rule is that complaint determines the amount in controversy and, consequently, federal jurisdiction). However, in cases in which the complaint's ad damnum clause does not specifically state the amount in controversy, a more difficult question arises.

Neither the Supreme Court nor the Fourth Circuit has adopted a specific standard against which a defendant's attempt to prove the required amount in controversy for a removal motion will be weighed when the plaintiff does not provide a specific damage amount in his complaint.² In the Southern District of West Virginia, a difference of opinion exists among the various judges over the appropriate standard in such cases. One district judge stated that the defendant must prove to a "legal certainty" that the amount in controversy meets the jurisdictional requirement. See White v. J.C. Penney Life Ins. Co., 861 F.Supp. 25, 27 (S.D.W.Va.1994) (Faber, J.) ("When the amount of damages a plaintiff seeks is unclear, the courts often require the defendant to prove to a legal certainty that plaintiff's claim meets the requisite jurisdictional amount."); Mullins v. Harry's Mobile Homes, Inc., 861 F.Supp. 22, 24 (S.D.W.Va.1994) (Faber, J.) (same); cf. 14A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3725 at 212 (Supp.1997) (noting that one potential standard requires defendant to show to legal certainty that amount exceeds jurisdictional amount).³ Others have required that the defendant show by a "preponderance of the evidence" that the disputed amount exceeds the jurisdictional minimum. See Landmark Corp., 945 F.Supp. at 935 (Copenhaver, J.) ("A defendant that removes a case from state court in which damages sought are unspecified, asserting the existence of federal diversity jurisdiction, must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the value of the matter in controversy exceeds the jurisdictional amount."); Whitney v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., No. 3:98-0241 at 3 (S.D.W. Va. June 29, 1998) (Chambers, J.) (employing preponderance of the evidence test); cf. Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403-04 (9th Cir.1996) (applying preponderance of the evidence standard); Tapscott v. MS Dealer Serv. Corp., 77 F.3d 1353, 1356-57 (11th Cir.1996) (same); Gafford v. General Elec. Co., 997 F.2d 150, 158 (6th Cir.1993) (same); Garza v. Bettcher Indus., Inc., 752 F.Supp. 753, 763 (E.D.Mich. 1990) (same). Another district judge appears to employ the "reverse legal certainty" test in which a defendant must demonstrate that it is not a legal certainty that the claim is for less than the jurisdictional amount.⁴ Cline v. Matney, 20 F.Supp.2d 977, 979 (S.D.W.Va.1998) (Haden, J.) (denying motion to remand because "the amount in controversy has not been established to a legal certainty to be less than the jurisdictional minimum"); Adkins v. Gibson, 906 F.Supp. 345, 348 (S.D.W.Va.1995) (Haden, J.) (remanding case because "the Court finds and concludes the amount in controversy has been established to a legal certainty to be less than the jurisdictional minimum."); cf. Atkins v. Harcros Chems., Inc., 761 F.Supp. 444, 446 (E.D.La.1991) (requiring defendant to show that it does not appear to legal certainty that plaintiff's claim is for less than jurisdictional amount); Locklear v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 742 F.Supp. 679, 680 (S.D.Ga.1989) (same); Kennedy v. Commercial Carriers, Inc., 739 F.Supp. 406, 410 (N.D.Ill.1990) (same); Partlow v. Jones Motor Co., Inc., 736 F.Supp. 744, 746 (E.D.Mich.1990) (same).

After carefully considering the well-reasoned opinions of the district judges within this district, this Court adopts the preponderance of the evidence standard as the appropriate measure of whether the defendant has proven that the jurisdictional limit has been met in removal cases in which the original complaint does not state a specific damages amount. First, the legal certainty test that the United States Supreme Court formulated in St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co. is inappropriate for remand actions when the complaint does not contain a dollar value for claimed damages. In St. Paul Mercury, the Supreme Court stated that

The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal court is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify dismissal.

. . . . .

A different situation is presented in the case of a suit instituted in a state court and thence removed. There is a strong presumption that the plaintiff has not claimed a large amount in order to confer jurisdiction on a federal court or that the parties have colluded to that end. For if such was the purpose suit would not have been instituted in the first instance in the state but in the federal court.

St. Paul Mercury, 303 U.S. at 288-89, 290-91, 58 S.Ct. 586. From this language, it is apparent that the application of the St. Paul Mercury legal certainty test is limited to two situations: (1) cases brought in federal court in which the plaintiff alleges damages in excess of the jurisdictional limit, and (2) cases brought in state court in which the plaintiff alleges damages in excess of the required federal jurisdiction minimum. Sanchez, 102 F.3d at 402; Gafford, 997 F.2d at 157. The case at bar clearly does not fit into either...