Mullins v. Harry's Mobile Homes, Inc.

• Decision Date: 23 August 1994
• Docket Number: Civ. A. No. 1:94-0346.
• Citation: 861 F. Supp. 22
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of West Virginia
• Parties: Samuel MULLINS and Florence Mullins, Plaintiffs, v. HARRY'S MOBILE HOMES, INC., and Fleetwood Homes of Virginia, Inc., Defendants.

861 F. Supp. 22

Samuel MULLINS and Florence Mullins, Plaintiffs, v. HARRY'S MOBILE HOMES, INC., and Fleetwood Homes of Virginia, Inc., Defendants.

Civ. A. No. 1:94-0346.

United States District Court, S.D. West Virginia, Bluefield Division.

August 23, 1994.

David C. Smith, Princeton, WV, for plaintiffs.

Kermit J. Moore, Bluefield, WV, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

FABER, District Judge.

Pending before the court is plaintiffs' Motion to Remand which requests that this case be returned to the Circuit Court of McDowell County, West Virginia, where it was originally filed. Plaintiffs contend that the amount in controversy is less than the $50,000 threshold necessary to support federal jurisdiction. The court's resolution of this issue is complicated somewhat by the fact that the ad damnum clause in the Complaint does not seek judgment in a specific dollar amount.

The defendant removed this case from state court alleging that citizenship of the parties is diverse and the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. The basis for federal jurisdiction is diversity of citizenship. The only issue before the court on the present motion is the disagreement as to the amount in controversy.

In October of 1992, plaintiffs purchased from the defendant Harry's Mobile Home Sales ("Harry's") a 1993 Fleetwood Wingate home which had been manufactured by defendant Fleetwood Homes of Virginia ("Fleetwood"). The contract price was $17,995. Harry's transported, delivered and erected the mobile home. Plaintiffs contend they have had numerous problems with the mobile home. They charge the defendants with breach of contract and several torts, including fraud. They seek compensatory damages for loss of the benefit of their bargain in the amount of $17,995, finance charges incurred and "aggravation, annoyance and inconvenience." Plaintiffs also request an award of punitive damages. Except for the contract price of $17,995, which is only part of the claimed damages, plaintiffs' Complaint places no dollar values upon the respective items of damages claimed. The plaintiffs assert that they made a settlement offer of $45,000. Defendant rejected this offer, which plaintiffs contend is evidence that the $50,000 amount in controversy, necessary for this court to have jurisdiction, is absent.

The fountainhead case on the determination of amount in controversy for purposes of federal jurisdiction is St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 58 S.Ct. 586, 82 L.Ed. 845 (1938). In that case, the Supreme Court said:

The rule governing dismissal for want of jurisdiction in cases brought in the federal courts is that, unless the law gives a different rule, the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls if the claim is apparently made in good faith. It must appear to a legal certainty that the claim is really for less than the jurisdictional amount to justify the dismissal.

Id. at 288-89, 58 S.Ct. at 590.

The defendant may remove a suit to federal court notwithstanding the failure of the plaintiff to plead a specific dollar amount in controversy. Kennard v. Harris Corp., 728 F.Supp. 453 (E.D.Mich.1989). The rule could hardly be otherwise. For if it were, any plaintiff could avoid removal simply by declining, as the plaintiffs have done here, to place a specific dollar value upon their claim.

When the amount of damages a plaintiff seeks is unclear, the courts often require the defendant to prove to a legal certainty that the claim meets the requisite jurisdictional amount. This principle stems from McNutt v. General Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 56 S.Ct. 780, 80 L.Ed. 1135 (1936), and has been applied in recent cases such as Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 564 (9th Cir.1992), and Marler v. Amoco Oil Co., 793 F.Supp. 656 (E.D.N.C.1992). It seems clear, in such circumstances, that the court may look to the entire record before it and make an independent evaluation as to whether or not the jurisdictional amount is in issue. 14A CHARLES A. WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 3725 at 423-24 (1985). Thus, the court may consider, in addition to plaintiffs' Complaint, the removal petition and other relevant matters in the file.

The court is not unmindful of authorities which point out that the removal statute is to be construed strictly against removal, and the defendant, in a case such as this, has the burden of proving facts to support the required jurisdictional amount. These principles are not inconsistent with the "reasonable certainty" rule of the St. Paul Mercury case, supra. The removing defendant always has the burden of demonstrating that the jurisdictional amount is present. Where the plaintiff demands a specific dollar figure in excess of that amount, however, defendant's burden is easily satisfied by the allegations of plaintiff's complaint. Pachinger v. MGM Grand Hotel Las Vegas, Inc., 802 F.2d 362, 363 (9th Cir.1986).

The court, in applying these principles, is not required to leave its common sense behind. In this case, common sense applied to the allegations of the Complaint compels the court to conclude that the amount in controversy exceeds $50,000. We start with the contract price for the mobile home—the specific figure of $17,995. To this figure is added plaintiffs' claim for finance charges, which would at this point be something less than the total of $1,381.44 for such charges which would be paid over the life of the contract.

Additionally, plaintiffs ask to be compensated for "aggravation, annoyance and inconvenience" and they seek punitive damages as well. West Virginia law allows damages for annoyance and inconvenience in cases involving loss of use of property. Ellis v. King, 184 W.Va. 227, 400 S.E.2d 235 (1990); Kirk v. Pineville Mobile Homes, 172 W.Va. 693, 310 S.E.2d 210 (1983); Jarrett v. E.L. Harper & Son, Inc., 160 W.Va. 399, 235 S.E.2d 362 (1977). Furthermore, the law makes clear that a good faith claim for punitive damages may augment compensatory damages in determining the amount in controversy unless it can be said to a legal certainty that plaintiff cannot recover punitive damages in the action. Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Society, 320...