Scales v. Walters, 83589
| Decision Date | 26 September 1995 |
| Docket Number | No. 83589,No. 1,83589,1 |
| Citation | 905 P.2d 233 |
| Parties | 1995 OK CIV APP 119 James B. SCALES, Appellant, v. David WALTERS, Governor of the State of Oklahoma, Robert B. Sanders, Executive Director of the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board, J.D. Daniels, Deputy Director of the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board, Bob Faulkner, Administrative Officer of the Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board, and R. Michael Cody, Warden, L.C.C., et al., Appellees. Court of Appeals of Oklahoma, Division |
| Court | United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma |
Appeal from the District Court of Cleveland County; Patricia D. Herron, District Judge.
James B. Scales, Lexington, Pro Se.
W.A. Drew Edmondson, Jennifer B. Miller, Oklahoma City, for Appellees.
Appellant was convicted of robbery with firearms and sentenced to imprisonment for 40 years. Initially, Appellant was determined to be first eligible for parole in February, 1996, but Appellant successfully challenged the method by which corrections officials had calculated that date. Appellant was then notified that he would be considered for parole in January, 1994. Appellee Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Board [Board] declined to parole Appellant. Appellant subsequently brought this action against Appellees asserting that he should have been given advance notice of the January, 1994, parole hearing, and that he was entitled to copies of, or at least a summary of, all the information in the Board's possession relating to his case. Ostensibly, Appellant sought that information because he wanted an opportunity to correct any errors or misstatements in the information the Board would rely upon in deciding whether to grant him parole release. Appellant's petition also challenged inaction by Appellees on Appellant's request to be considered for the Preparole Conditional Supervision Program, 57 O.S.Supp.1993 § 365. The trial court denied all requested relief. It held that Appellant had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies, that he had no right to parole and so neither a constitutional nor a statutory right to advance notice of the parole hearing, and no right to receive copies of the information considered by and/or relied upon by the Board in determining whether to grant him parole release. We agree with the trial court, and so affirm its judgment denying the requested relief.
This case involves only discretionary parole, by which a prisoner may be released after serving at least his minimum sentence, and not mandatory parole, which requires a prisoner to be released after he has served the maximum sentence for his crime, less any credits against the sentence allowed by state law. See Greenholtz v. Inmates of Nebraska Penal and Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 4, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 2102, 60 L.Ed.2d 668 (1979). A prisoner has no constitutional or inherent right to be considered for discretionary parole. Id., 442 U.S. at 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2103; Kelly v. Oklahoma Pardon and Parole Bd., 637 P.2d 858, 858 (Okla.Crim.App.1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 923, 102 S.Ct. 1283, 71 L.Ed.2d 465 (1982). Federal and state courts which have considered the issue hold that the discretionary parole process established by Oklahoma statutes does not require the full panoply of due process protection, because a prisoner who has been properly incarcerated does not have a constitutionally protected liberty interest in the possibility of parole release. Phillips v. Williams, 608 P.2d 1131, 1133-34 (Okla.1991); see Board of Pardons v. Allen, 482 U.S. 369, 378, 107 S.Ct. 2415, 2420, 96 L.Ed.2d 303 (1987); Greenholtz, 442 U.S. at 7, 99 S.Ct. at 2103; Shirley v. Chestnut, 603 F.2d 805, 807 (10th Cir.1979).
Clearly, without a protected liberty interest, Appellant cannot invoke due process in aid of his argument that he should have received advance notice of the discretionary parole hearing. Analyzing Appellees' alleged failure to give Appellant notice of discretionary parole consideration according to the standards of due process makes no sense when there is no protectible expectation of liberty associated with such hearing. Thus, it would be anomalous indeed if we were to hold that Appellees violated the requirements of due process by failing to...
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