Scammon v. the City of Chicago.

Decision Date30 April 1867
Citation1867 WL 5143,44 Ill. 269
PartiesJ. YOUNG SCAMMON et al.v.THE CITY OF CHICAGO.
CourtIllinois Supreme Court

OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE

APPEAL from the Superior Court of Chicago.

The facts in this case are fully stated in the opinion.

Messrs. HOYNE, FORSYTH & HORTON, and Messrs. BARKER & TULEY and Mr. D. L. SHOREY, for the appellants.

Mr. S. A. IRVIN, for the appellee. Mr. JUSTICE BREESE delivered the opinion of the Court:

This record is brought here by appeal from the Superior Court of Chicago. It shows a proceeding before that court, at its February Term, 1867, by the collector of the city of Chicago, to obtain judgment against the several lots and parcels of land owned by appellants, on which the municipal taxes remained due and unpaid for the previous year, as appeared upon the general tax warrant in the hands of that officer.

Notwithstanding the multitude of objections, diverse in their character, urged upon that court, a judgment was rendered against the appellants, severally, for the amount of delinquent taxes due from them respectively, the court, through its chief justice, delivering an elaborate opinion in favor thereof, which the counsel for the city has adopted as the basis of his argument, and which is now before us.

That court entered into a close and critical examination of the local law deemed to be applicable to the case, and we have gained much valuable information from an examination of that opinion, and with which, in the main, we fully concur. Without particularizing the several objections raised, it will be sufficient if we direct our attention to that one which is considered by all the parties as the principal objection, and gives character to the case, and to understand it in its full extent it will be necessary to examine with some particularity--for it is a question of chartered power--some of the provisions of the charter, which the appellee contends affords full warrant for all that has been done.

The objection is, that raising the valuation of the property in the south division of the city, by the board of assessors, when in joint meeting, after the valuation had been fixed and return made thereof by the assessor specially appointed for that division, was ultra vires, and consequently void.

It will not be denied by this court, having so often considered and decided the point, that municipal, and other authorities, claiming powers under legislative grant, can exercise such powers only as have been expressly granted, or such as are necessary to carry into effect the granted powers, and this by no strained or forced construction. The point of the objection is, that the assessors of the three divisions, when assembled in counsel, took into their consideration the whole of the real estate in the south division en masse, and without determining the value of the separate parcels, undertook by a majority vote to direct, and did direct, the city clerk, to add forty per cent to the value of this real estate, and to extend the tax at that rate on his books, against the same,--all which was done.

Premising that the taxing power is one of the most necessary powers that can be conferred on the legislature, and by that body on subordinate organizations, it must at the same time be remembered it must be executed with reasonable strictness. Taxes, in some form, must be levied in every State, county and city, and their levy must be enforced upon property if not paid in money.

The power to assess the property of the city of Chicago for purposes of taxation, has been conferred by its charter on certain persons denominated a board of assessors. Rev. Charter of 1863. They are municipal officers, and are required to take and subscribe the oath of office prescribed by the Constitution of the State. This board consists of three persons, who must be freeholders in the city, and one of them taken from each of the three divisions of the city. The appointment is made annually, by nomination of the mayor of the city, with the advice and consent of the common council. This board of assessors are required to perform all the duties in regard to the assessment of property for taxation, for the purpose of levying such taxes as may be imposed by the common council, and in the performance of their duties they have the same powers as are bestowed upon county or town assessors, and are subject to the same liabilities. Private Acts of 1865.

In the charter concerning assessments, it is provided by the first section, that the assessors, immediately after their appointment, shall examine and determine the valuation of the taxable real and personal estate in their respective divisions.

By the term “divisions,” as here used, and elsewhere in the charter, we understand those natural divisions produced by the Chicago river and its north and south branches, so called; the territory south of the main stream, and east of the south branch, being known as the south division; that north of the same, and east of the north branch, as the north division; and the remaining territory, lying, as it does, west, both of the north and south branch, as the west division.

To aid these assessors, the city clerk is required to furnish each of them with schedules or lists of all the taxable real estate in the several divisions, on which they are required to enter, opposite the land or lot, their valuation. These are made, in each division, by the division assessor, he examining and determining for himself, in the first instance, the value of the taxable property in his division. When these assessments are completed, which must be by the first Monday of August in each year, unless further time is granted by the common council, they are to be filed in the office of the city clerk, and a day is fixed by the assessors on which they will meet and hear objections to the assessments, of which notice is to be given by the city clerk, by six days' publication in the corporation newspaper. The object of this notice is plain. It is simply to enable any individual dissatisfied with the value placed on his property by the division assessor, to procure the judgment of the three assessors, sitting as a board, on the question. It is, in effect, giving to a property owner an appeal from the judgment of one assessor to three assessors constituting a board of assessors, and pro hac vice, a quasi court of appeal.

The powers and duties of these assessors, when thus assembled, are defined by the second section, and on the construction to be placed on this, hinges this controversy.

That section is as follows: “The said assessors shall meet at the time and place designated, to revise and correct their assessments. They shall hear and consider all objections which may be made, and shall have power to supply omissions in their assessments, and for the purpose of equalizing the same, to alter, add to, take from, and otherwise correct and revise the same.”

It is said, by one of the counsel for appellants, that the city reads this section as if the legislature had said, or used the words--“And also alter, add to, or change and determine the valuation of all taxable real estate in the respective divisions, as returned and appraised by the respective assessors of said divisions.” Counsel insists, such is not the proper reading; that the assessors, individually, charged with the performance of a specific duty within his particular division, cannot, when meeting together, overthrow or supersede the work of each other, by ordering different appraisal lists to be made up without notice to the tax payers, and substitute an entire change of all the valuations, producing, thereby, entirely new and different results.

This leads directly to the consideration of the question, what powers are conferred by this second section, and what duties imposed?

At the time and place appointed to hear objections, the assessment of each division assessor is subjected to the scrutiny of all the assessors. They are to revise each one of the assessments, with a view to their correction; and this without any motion for such purpose, and independent of any objection made to them, and in the absence of objections. This power to revise, as defined by lexicographers, is the power to review, re-examine, and look through their pages and columns, in order, if need be, that proper corrections be made. To correct an assessment, means the same as to rectify it,--to amend it, by bringing it to a line of right and justice, from which the division assessors may have departed. The Constitution of this State, by section 5 of article 9, provides that the corporate authorities of counties, school districts, cities, towns and villages, may be vested with power to...

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    ...192; State ex rel. v. Railroad, 101 Mo. 120; State ex rel. Dalton v. Baker, 170 Mo. 383; Hammond v. Winder, 100 Ohio St. 433; Scammon v. Chicago, 44 Ill. 269; ex rel. Bracher v. Orvis, 301 Ill. 350; Hubbard v. Goss, 157 Ind. 485; People ex rel. Colorado Tax Comm. v. Pitcher, 61 Colo. 149, 1......
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