Scarborough, In re, 245
Decision Date | 08 April 1964 |
Docket Number | No. 245,245 |
Citation | 261 N.C. 565,135 S.E.2d 529 |
Parties | In the Matter of W. H. SCARBOROUGH, Ancillary Administrator of the Estate of Velma Z. Rotta, Deceased. |
Court | North Carolina Supreme Court |
Craighill, Rendleman & Clarkson, Charlotte, for respondent appellant.
Carpenter, Webb & Golding, Charlotte, for petitioner appellee.
This is the factual situation on which the parties relied to support their respective positions: Rotta died at a motel in Laurens, South Carolina. She was on a journey from her home in Michigan to Florida. She had never resided in North Carolina, and had no heirs or next of kin in this State. Domiciliary administration was in Michigan. Jack Long was appointed as Ancillary Administrator in South Carolina. Scarborough asserts Rotta's death was the result of Martin's negligence. The asserted right of action, accruing because of Martin's tort, is the only asset with a situs in this State.
Long, the South Carolina Administrator, instituted an action in that State against John Hall, Supreme Propane Gas Company, Inc., and Federated Mutual Hardware Insurance Company, a liability insurer, to recover damages because of their alleged negligence which caused Rotta's death. Defendants Gas and Insurance Companies paid Long, as Administrator, $12,567.50. In consideration of this payment, Long executed a writing entitled, 'Covenant Not to Sue.'
Martin is an Alabama corporation. It has no plant or sales offices in North Carolina. It does have a salesman who lives in Charlotte. He devotes approximately 60 per cent of his time to making sales in North Carolina, and about 40 per cent of his time to making sales in South Carolina.
The authority to appoint an administrator in this State is vested in the Clerk of the Superior Court. G.S. § 28-1. He cannot appoint unless the facts on which the applicant relies meet the test of one of the five subsections of the statute. The validity of Scarborough's appointment depends on the proper interpretation of G.S. § 28-1(3) which reads: 'Where the decedent, not being domiciled in this State, died out of the State, leaving assets in the county of such clerk, or assets of such decedent thereafter come into the county of such clerk.'
Does the quoted language authorize the appointment of an administrator when deceased was not a resident of this State, did not die in this State, and had no assets in this State, other than a right of action for wrongful death occurring outside the State but which can be enforced in the State because of the presence of the tort-feasor?
Liability for negligence resulting in personal injury or death is determined by the law of the state where the tort is committed. Shaw v. Lee, 258 N.C. 609, 129 S.E.2d 288. Under the laws of South Carolina, one whose negligence causes the death of another is liable for the resulting damage. The action must be brought by the personal representative of the deceased. S.C.C.ode § 10-1951, 1952; Evans v. Morrow, 234 N.C. 600, 68 S.E.2d 258; Bailes v. Southern Railway, et al., 227 S.C. 176, 87 S.E.2d 481.
The right of action which accrues because of injury or death resulting from the negligence of another is transitory. Fulcher v. Smith, 249 N.C. 645, 107 S.E.2d 68; Howle v. Twin States Express, Inc., 237 N.C. 667, 75 S.E.2d 732; Rodwell v. Camel City Coach Company, 205 N.C. 292, 171 S.E. 100; Ledford v. Western Union Telegraph Company, 179 N.C. 63, 101 S.E. 533; Harrill v. South Carolina & Georgia Extension R. R., 132 N.C. 655, 44 S.E. 109; 14 Am.Jur. 425.
While the right of action is transitory, it can only be maintained by an administrator appointed by our courts. Brauff v. Commissioner of Revenue, 251 N.C. 452, 111 S.E.2d 620; Cannon v. Cannon, 228 N.C. 211, 45 S.E.2d 34; Monfils v. Hazlewood, 218 N.C. 215, 10 S.E.2d 673.
This court held in Vance v. Southern R. R. Co., 138 N.C. 460, 50 S.E. 860, that where death occurred as a result of a tort committed here the cause of action given by our statutes was an asset within the meaning of G.S. § 28-2. The conclusion then reached was reiterated a few years later in Fann v. North Carolina R. R., 155 N.C. 136, 71 S.E. 81. Hoke, J. (later C. J.) there said, (Emphasis supplied.) This statement of the law is recognized as correct elsewhere. Van Dusen v. Sturm, 257 App.Div. 914, 12 N.Y.S.2d 133; Lund v. City of Seattle, 163 Wash. 254, 1 P.2d 301; Darrah v. Foster, Mo., 355 S.W. 2d 24; McCarron v. New York Cent. R. R. Co., 239 Mass. 64, 131 N.E. 478, Annotation: Ann.Cas.1917C 1217.
Appellee points out that our statute not only requires the existence of assets but the existence of assets in the county of the clerk making the appointment. Hence it argues that there were no assets in Mecklenburg County which would invest the clerk of that county with the authority to appoint an administrator. This contention overlooks the fact that Martin was doing business in North Carolina. Its agent resided in Mecklenburg County. Denny, J. (now C. J.), speaking with respect to the situs of intangible assets, said in Cannon v. Cannon, supra,
The asset (right of action for wrongful death) has a situs in the county in which personal service can be had on the tort-feasor. Morefield v. Harris, 126 N.C. 626, 36 S.E. 125; Shields v. Union Cent. Life Insurance Company, 119 N.C. 380, 25 S.E. 951.
The rule is aptly stated by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas in Lancaster & Wallace v. Sexton, 245 S.W. 958, an action for damages for wrongful death. The Court said: ...
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