Scarff v. Metcalf

• Decision Date: 18 October 1887
• Citation: 107 N.Y. 211,13 N.E. 796
• Parties: SCARFF v. METCALF and another.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

107 N.Y. 211

13 N.E. 796

SCARFF

v.METCALF and another.¹

Court of Appeals of New York.

October 18, 1887.

Joseph A. Shoudy, for appellant.

Wm. Sullivan, for respondent.

FINCH, J.

The verdict of the jury requires us to adopt the plaintiff's version of the facts, since the judgment was in his favor, and the negligence of the master thereby established. If that judgment was against him alone, very little question would arise; but it involves another owner, not on board the vessel, but remaining at home, and so situated in his relation to the facts as to make necessary their careful consideration. The barkentine upon which plaintiff was injured while employed as mate was owned by Yates and Metcalf. She was sailed by Yates as master, on shares, by virtue of an agreement with Metcalf to that effect. The agreement was not in writing, and is detailed solely by the two owners, each of whom testified to its existence. The vessel started on a voyage to Sagua la Grande in Cuba, and, when some distance at sea, the plaintiff received an injury in the performance of his duty which developed into an aneurism of the popliteal artery, causing him great pain, and largely incapacitating him for active service. The vessel was provided with a proper medicine chest, and no complaint is made that, before arriving at the port of destination, the master treated his mate otherwise than with kindness and care, and with such means as his limited knowledge and opportunity enabled him to use. But, on reaching port and consulting a physician, it was made apparent to the master that surgery, and not medicine, was needed to cure the injury. At this point of the case the contradictions become plentiful, but we must assume, in support of the verdict, that the doctor consulted disclosed the true nature of the disease; that he advised the removal of the injured man to the hospital, about 15 miles distant, or at least to a suitable place on shore; that he pronounced it dangerous to carry the mate back to New York without an operation, if a delay exceeding 12 days was involved; that the plaintiff requested a removal to the hospital or to the shore, with the provision usual in such cases and necessary to his support; but that the master refused these requests, and kept him on board till the home voyage was begun and ended, and, more than 20 days after the doctor's warning, landed the mate in New York, and placed him in a hospital, where amputation became necessary because of the long delay and destructive progress of the disease. It is of little consequence to the liability of Yates whether he be regarded as master or owner, for in either character the negligence was his, and drew with it a personal responsibility.

The maritime law is sensitive to the rights of seamen, and sedulous for their protection. When sick or injured, they are entitled to be cared for and cured at the expense of the ship, and not to be turned adrift in strange lands without adequate provision. They are exposed to hardship, confronted with dangers, and grow occasionally reckless by their very familiarity with peril. The master's authority is quite despotic, and sometimes roughly exercised, and the conveniences of a ship out upon the ocean are necessarily narrow and limited. That which on land would be contributory negligence, the maritime law scarcely recognizes, and readily excuses, ( The City of Alexandria, 17 Fed. Rep. 395,) and in many ways throws its protection around the seaman. When he falls sick or suffers injury, the owners owe to him the duty of rendering such care and medical aid as circumstances permit, and in the performance of that duty the master stands as the agent and representative of the owners, and his negligence is theirs. Petersen v. Swan, 50 N. Y. Super. Ct. 47; The City of Alexandria, supra; Reed v. Canfield, 1 Sum. 195; Harden v. Gordon, 2 Mason, 543.

The last cited case considers the effect of the act of congress requiring the ship to be supplied with a suitable medicine chest, and holds that such requirement does not subvert the general duty imposed upon the owners by the maritime law, but merely regulates a single detail of its exercise. This duty the owners who remain at home, and do not sail upon the ship, can only perform, beyond supplying the medicine chest, through the master, who becomes their agent for its performance. The mate, although an officer, is a seaman. Holt v. Cummings, 102 Pa. St. 212; The Ocean Spray, 4 Sawy. 105;The Minna, 11 Fed. Rep. 759. While both he and the master are servants of the owner, and so fellow-servants, they are not such in respect to the owner's duty to the seamen which the master performs in their behalf, and as their representative, and the contention in this case that the master's neglect was that of a fellow-servant cannot prevail.

Where the duty of the owner to the seaman is performed, the cost of nursing and medical attendance falls upon the ship, (The North America, 5 Ben. 486,) and that has been ruled even where the patient had been removed to his own house, ( Holt v. Cummings, supra.) But where that duty is not performed, and the seaman suffers injury from the neglect, the ship in a proceeding in rem, and the owners in a suit against them, are liable for the damages suffered. Couch v. Steel, 77 E. C. L. 402; Brown v. Overton, 1 Spr. 463;Mosely v. Scott, 14 Amer. Law Reg. 599; Tomlinson v. Hewett, 2 Sawy. 278;Petersen v. Swan, supra. These principles settle the liability of Metcalf, unless he is discharged by force of his arrangement with the master, to which attention must now be directed.

There is very much of authority for the doctrine that, where there is a charter of the vessel which strips the owner of all authority, possession, and control, the charterer becomes owner pro hac vice, and the general owner ceases to be liable for the contracts or torts of the master, except for the wages of seamen. There seem to be...