Scarsdale Supply Co. v. Village of Scarsdale

• Decision Date: 21 October 1960
• Citation: 8 N.Y.2d 325,206 N.Y.S.2d 773,170 N.E.2d 198
• Parties: , 170 N.E.2d 198 SCARSDALE SUPPLY COMPANY, Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF SCARSDALE, Respondent.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

Page 773

206 N.Y.S.2d 773

8 N.Y.2d 325, 170 N.E.2d 198

SCARSDALE SUPPLY COMPANY, Appellant, v. VILLAGE OF SCARSDALE, Respondent.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Oct. 21, 1960.

Arthur F. Driscoll and John Drew, New York City, for appellant.

Richard A. Tilden, New York City, for respondent.

BURKE, Judge.

The controversy hereby remanded for a determination of the material issues arises out of, and questions the validity of, the rezoning of real property owned by the plaintiff in the Village of Scarsdale. Plaintiff has, since 1922, continually occupied and used the premises (an interior plot of 3.4 acres) as a building supply yard in a business zone district of the Heathcote section of Scarsdale. However, in October of 1955, despite plaintiff's written protest, the Board of Trustees of the village, via an amendment to the building zone ordinance, placed plaintiff's entire tract in a unique and newly established Residence B District.

Plaintiff urges that the board's enactment (in June of 1955, prior to the adoption of the zoning ordinance) of Local Law No. 4 was void and unconstitutional. We agree with the courts below that, at the time of the commencement of the action herein, this error was effectively cured, and the question rendered moot (Strauss v. University of State of New York, 2 N.Y.2d 464, 161 N.Y.S.2d 97), because of the unanimous adoption, by the Board of Trustees, of the new Scarsdale Village Code, which expressly repealed the former ordinances, but retained the same zoning restrictions by a re-enactment. (See ch. 1, art. 1, § 1-1-2; and ch. 12.)

On the trial plaintiff produced evidence which, it contends, demonstrates that the limitation and conditions imposed by the new zoning were intended to eliminate and impair the use and value of the property for any purpose whatever, other than its present nonconforming use. Plaintiff sought a declaratory judgment, therefore, that the rezoning of its property was overburdensome, unreasonable and confiscatory, and, therefore, unconstitutional.

The trial court, although finding that plaintiff produced evidence which might be sufficient to prove that the property could not be practically or profitably used for residential purposes, dismissed the complaint stating, inter alia, that, because of the existence of a nonconforming use, there is no deprivation of property or justiciable controversy (citing Headley v. City of Rochester, 272 N.Y. 197, 5 N.E.2d 198).

It is our opinion that the trial court erred in failing to decide whether the alleged deliberate confiscation and alleged resulting depreciation in the value of plaintiff's property, regardless of the existence of a nonconforming use, constitutes a present invasion on plaintiff's property rights. If it does so, the existence and maintenance of the ordinance and the threat to continue it under these circumstances would entitle plaintiff to equitable relief. Dowsey v. Village of Kensington, 257 N.Y. 221, 229, 177 N.E. 427, 430, 89 A.L.R. 642, Village of Euclid, Ohio v. Ambler Co., 272 U.S. 365, 386, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 303. The plaintiff, having asserted an invasion of his property rights, must be allowed (although a nonconforming business use exists) to try to prove that the property is so situated that it has no possibility for residential and zoned uses, and is most readily adapted to a use now precluded under the zoning ordinance. Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, 307 N.Y. 493, 499, 121 N.E.2d 517, 519.

The Headley case (supra), upon which the court below unduly relied, is quite distinguishable. In addition to the fact that it was not a zoning case, it was submitted on an agreed statement of facts which in no way indicated that the present value was diminished or that plaintiff was at all damaged. In that case, plaintiff brought an action to declare unconstitutional a street-widening ordinance, which, in order to alleviate future condemnation expenses, amended the official maps of the City of Rochester and thereby imposed a 25-foot setback on plaintiff's lawn. This court affirmed the dismissal of the complaint upon a finding that plaintiff was not a party aggrieved. As explained in Vangellow v. City of Rochester, 190 Misc. 128, 132-134, 71 N.Y.S.2d 672, 676-678, followed in S. S. Kresge Co. v. City of New York, 275 App.Div. 1036, 92 N.Y.S.2d 414, in the Headley situation no condition could be imposed requiring plaintiff to surrender the right to just compensation if and when the city should condemn the property. 'Therefore, when the Court of Appeals held that he was not an aggrieved party, it could not have meant that he was not affected, but rather that he was not damaged, for the reason, as the opinion indicates, that inability to build in that strip did not depreciate the...