Sch. Dist. Twp. of Richland in Sac Cnty. v. Hanson
| Decision Date | 17 September 1919 |
| Docket Number | No. 32765.,32765. |
| Citation | 186 Iowa 1314,173 N.W. 873 |
| Parties | SCHOOL DISTRICT TOWNSHIP OF RICHLAND IN SAC COUNTY v. HANSON ET AL. |
| Court | Iowa Supreme Court |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Appeal from District Court, Sac County; E. G. Albert, Judge.
Action by the School District Township of Richland in the County of Sac and State of Iowa against Ada Hanson and another. Defendants appeal from the judgment of the court below, overruling a demurrer to plaintiff's answer to defendants' cross-petition. Affirmed.Malcolm Currie, of Sac City, and Healy & Faville, of Ft. Dodge, for appellants.
W. A. Helsell, of Odebolt, for appellee.
Plaintiff alleges, in its petition and amendments thereto, that it is a school corporation, organized and existing under the laws of the state of Iowa; that it is in possession of a one-acre lot located in the northeast corner of the northeast quarter of section 35, township 87, range 38, Sac county, Iowa, which it purchased from John McAfee, who was the owner of the quarter section above described, on July 10, 1883, for $35, as a schoolhouse site. It is further alleged in said petition that plaintiff ceased to use the premises for school purposes on March 1, 1901, and that since said date it has been in the open, notorious, continuous, adverse possession thereof, under color of title and claim of right, and, basing its claim thereon, asserts title thereto. Plaintiff further alleges that defendants have torn down the fences upon said premises, and are threatening to otherwise destroy or injure the property situated thereon, and asks that they be restrained from in any way interfering with plaintiff's possession or use thereof, and from injuring said improvements.
Separate answer was filed by both defendants, and the defendant Hanson also filed a cross-petition, alleging, in substance, that she is the owner of the northeast quarter above described, and of the lot in controversy; that she has tendered, and is ready, able, and willing to pay, plaintiff $35, the price paid by plaintiff for said lot, together with the value of the improvements thereon, and asking that such value be determined, and that plaintiff be enjoined from keeping her out of possession, and that its officers be required to formally convey the said tract to her.
Plaintiff, for answer to defendant's cross-petition, admits that she is the owner of the northeast quarter of section 35, township 87, range 38, except the one-acre tract in controversy. In count 2 of its answer, plaintiff avers that it entered into possession of the disputed tract July 10, 1883, under the deed above referred to, and thereafter used the same for school purposes until March 1, 1901, when it ceased to use the same therefor; that since said date it has continued in possession thereof, claiming to own the same; that said possession has been open, visible, notorious, and adverse, the said possession “being that its schoolhouse has been located thereon; that it has planted shade trees upon the land, and had outbuildings upon and fences around the same; that during said time, to the filing of the petition in this case, this plaintiff used the aforesaid premises for the purpose of holding school elections, and for the meetings of the board of directors of the plaintiff; and that it held said meetings as late as March in the year 1917”; that more then 10 years elapsed after plaintiff ceased to use the premises for school purposes before defendant's cross-petition was filed; and that she is therefore barred and estopped by the statute of limitations from having or asserting any right, title, claim, or interest in said property adverse to plaintiff.
In count 3 of its answer to plaintiff's cross-petition it further alleges that cross-petitioner has no interest in said lot; that John McAfee died intestate, seized of an inerest therein, and that his heirs on August 8, 1917, sold and conveyed the same to one Wm. F. Boehler, who makes claim thereto.
To each of the above counts of plaintiff's answer, cross-petitioner interposed an equitable demurrer, which the court overruled. She elected to stand upon her demurrer and refused to plead further, whereupon the court dismissed the cross-petition and rendered judgment in favor of plaintiff.
As appears from the foregoing statement, both parties claim that plaintiff ceased to use the lot in controversy for school purposes more than two years prior to the filing of defendant's cross-petition. Cross-petitioner claims the right to the property as the alleged owner thereof under Code, § 2816; whereas plaintiff takes the position that this statute applies only to cases in which the school corporation has acquired an interest therein for school purposes by condemnation proceedings, and that it has no application where title was acquired by deed, although by the terms thereof same would revert to the owner immediately when the corporation ceased to use it for school purposes.
Some contention, based upon certain changes in the statute since the McAfee deed conveying the acre lot to plaintiff was executed, is also made by counsel for plaintiff. The conclusion reached herein makes it unnecessary for the court to consider or pass upon these contentions of counsel. The record does not disclose whether defendant's grantor conveyed the northeast quarter of section 35, township 87, range 38, to her without excepting or reserving the disputed lot; but it is contended by counsel for appellee in argument that same was specifically excepted from the conveyance.
The defenses pleaded by plaintiff in its...
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