Schadler v. Zoning Hearing Board of Weisenberg Township

• Decision Date: 14 May 2004
• Citation: 850 A.2d 619,578 Pa. 177
• Parties: Timothy J. SCHADLER, Appellant v. ZONING HEARING BOARD OF WEISENBERG TOWNSHIP, Appellee. Weisenberg Township (Board of Supervisors), Intervenor.
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

850 A.2d 619

578 Pa. 177

Timothy J. SCHADLER, Appellant v. ZONING HEARING BOARD OF WEISENBERG TOWNSHIP, Appellee.

Weisenberg Township (Board of Supervisors), Intervenor.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued December 4, 2003.

Decided May 14, 2004.

Jon A. Swartz, Charles E. Zaleski, for Timothy J. Schadler.

John Edward Roberts, Allentown, for Weisenberg Township Board of Supervisors.

Maria C. Mullane, Allentown, for Zoning Hearing Bd. of Weisenberg Tp.

Before: CAPPY, C.J., and CASTILLE, NIGRO, NEWMAN, SAYLOR, EAKIN and LAMB, JJ.

OPINION

Justice NIGRO.

We granted allowance of appeal in this zoning case to determine whether the Commonwealth Court erred in finding that a challenge to the validity of a zoning ordinance based on procedural defects in the ordinance's enactment was time-barred because it was filed more than thirty days after the ordinance's nominal effective date. For the following reasons, we hold that the court did err and we therefore reverse.

Appellant Timothy J. Schadler is the owner of approximately 41 acres of land in a rural-residential zoning district in Weisenberg Township, Lehigh County (the "Township"). In August 1997, Schadler, seeking permission to build a mobile home park on his property, filed a curative amendment with the Township's Zoning Hearing Board (the "ZHB"), alleging that the zoning ordinances then in effect in the Township placed unreasonable restrictions on mobile home parks and were therefore invalid.

In 1999, while Schadler's curative amendment was still pending, the Township Supervisors (the "Supervisors") began taking steps to enact a new zoning ordinance entitled "Proposed Ordinance 99-4 Mobile Home Parks" (the "Ordinance"), which would comprehensively regulate the construction, use, and maintenance of mobile home parks in the Township. The Supervisors held at least three separate meetings to discuss the proposed Ordinance and accept public comments, advertising each meeting in a local newspaper, the East Penn Press, as follows:

(1) A notice on July 28, 1999 that they would "conduct Hearings in the Municipal Building, 2175 Seipstown Road, Fogelsville, Pa. 18051, for the following considerations ... Oct. 4, 1999-7 p.m.—Proposed Ord. 99-4, Mobile Home Parks."

(2) A notice on October 13, 1999, which read: "The following special meetings are scheduled for Weisenberg Township, Lehigh County, Pa. to be held at 2175 Seipstown Road, Fogelsville, Pa. 18051... Nov. 1, 1999-7:15 p.m.—Public hearing on proposed Mobile Home Park Ordinance."

(3) A notice on February 2, 2000 that they would "conduct a Public Hearing on a Mobile Home Park Ordinance proposal on Monday, February 7, 2000 at 7:00 P.M. in the Municipal Building, 2175 Seipstown Road, Fogelsville, Pa. 18051."

At the close of the third such meeting, on February 7, 2000, the Supervisors voted to adopt the Ordinance and declared that it would take effect six days later, on February 13, 2000.

On August 31, 2000, two hundred days after the Ordinance's stated effective date, Schadler filed a challenge with the ZHB, claiming that the Ordinance was invalid due to the Supervisors' failure to comply with certain statutory requirements governing the procedure for enacting municipal ordinances. Specifically, Schadler contended that the Supervisors' enactment of the Ordinance violated section 506 of the Municipalities Planning Code (the "MPC"), 53 P.S. § 10506, and section 1601 of the Second Class Township Code (the "SCTC"), 53 P.S. § 66601, each of which mandate, inter alia, that a municipality enacting a new ordinance must first either (a) publish the full text of the proposed ordinance in a newspaper of general circulation; or (b) publish a notice containing the title and a brief summary of the ordinance in a newspaper of general circulation, while also providing the newspaper with a copy of the full text and filing an attested copy of the full text in the county law library or other designated county office.¹ In addition, the two statutes require the municipality to publish newspaper notices designating a place where the public can examine the Ordinance's text. Significantly, the Township conceded that the Supervisors failed to follow these requirements, as none of their three notices included either the full text of the Ordinance or a brief summary of the Ordinance, and as none of the notices designated a place where the public could examine the full text.² Nevertheless, the ZHB dismissed Schadler's claim, concluding that it was untimely under section 909.1(a)(2) of the MPC, 53 P.S. § 10909.1(a)(2),³ and section 5571(c)(5) of the Judicial Code, 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(c)(5),⁴ each of which requires procedural challenges to the validity of a land use ordinance to be raised within thirty days of the ordinance's effective date.

Schadler appealed the ZHB's dismissal to the trial court, which reversed, stating that the Supervisors' failure to follow statutory procedural requirements had rendered the Ordinance void ab initio. As a result, the trial court reasoned that the Ordinance had no effective date at all, and thus, the thirty-day time limit for procedural challenges was not applicable.

The Township appealed to the Commonwealth Court, which heard the matter en banc. On appeal, Schadler argued that the trial court's ruling should be affirmed because it was consistent with this Court's decision in Cranberry Park Assocs. ex rel. Viola v. Cranberry Township Zoning Hearing Bd., 561 Pa. 456, 751 A.2d 165 (2000), in which we held that the thirty-day limitations period in 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(c)(5) did not bar a procedural challenge to a defectively enacted township ordinance, as those procedural infirmities had rendered the ordinance void ab initio. See id. at 165-67. However, a four-judge majority of the en banc panel disagreed, instead finding that Cranberry Park was not controlling because unlike the instant case, which hinged on the interpretation of section 1601 of the SCTC, 53 P.S. § 66601, Cranberry Park was based on section 1741 of the SCTC, 53 P.S. § 65741, a predecessor to section 1601.⁵ Moreover, according to the majority, section 1601, unlike repealed section 1741, mandates that the thirty-day limitations period for procedural challenges always begins ticking on an ordinance's nominal effective date, irrespective of procedural defects in the ordinance's enactment.⁶ Thus, the majority rejected Schadler's argument, reversed the trial court, and upheld the validity of the Ordinance. Schadler v. Zoning Hearing Bd. of Weisenberg Township, 814 A.2d 1265 (Pa.Commw.2003).

President Judge Colins authored a dissent, which Judge Simpson joined.⁷ The dissent argued that the majority had misinterpreted section 1601, which, in the dissent's view, does not provide that procedural defects in an ordinance's enactment can never render the ordinance void ab initio. Rather, according to the dissent, section 1601 only provides that two specific types of procedural defects, namely, a municipality's failure to file an attested copy of a proposed ordinance in its county law library or other designated county office, or its failure to record an ordinance within the allotted time, do not render the ordinance void ab initio. As the enactment of the Ordinance in this case was procedurally defective in many ways outside of these two areas, the dissent maintained that the logic of Cranberry Park remains applicable and that the Ordinance was void ab initio. Accordingly, the dissent concluded that the thirty-day limitations period for challenging the validity of a land use ordinance on procedural grounds did not bar Schadler's claim.

Schadler subsequently appealed the Commonwealth Court's decision to this Court, and we granted allocatur to consider whether the Ordinance was, in fact, void ab initio due to the Supervisors' failure to comply with the relevant statutory requirements for its enactment. For the reasons that follow, we agree with Schadler that the Ordinance was void ab initio and that therefore, the thirty-day limitations period set forth in 53 P.S. § 10909.1(a)(2) and 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(c)(5) never began ticking and does not bar Schadler's procedural challenge.

Township ordinances enjoy a presumption of validity and it is the challenger who bears the burden of proving an ordinance's invalidity. See Commonwealth v. Ashenfelder, 413 Pa. 517, 198 A.2d 514, 515 (1964). Furthermore, under 53 P.S. § 10909.1(a)(2) and 42 Pa.C.S. § 5571(c)(5), any individual who wishes to challenge an ordinance's validity on procedural grounds must raise his claim within thirty days of the ordinance's effective date. Here, it is undisputed that Schadler filed his procedural challenge more than thirty days after the Ordinance's purported effective date, February 13, 2000. Accordingly, whether or not the Commonwealth Court correctly concluded that the challenge was untimely turns entirely on whether the Ordinance actually became law on February 13, 2000 or was void ab initio.

In the last fifteen years, we have found municipal ordinances to be void for procedural defects in two situations involving facts similar to those of the instant case: once in Lower Gwynedd Township v. Gwynedd Props., Inc., 527 Pa. 324, 591 A.2d 285 (1991), and once in Cranberry Park, supra. In Lower Gwynedd, a second-class township purported to enact an ordinance authorizing the condemnation of a local developer's property for use as a conservation area. See591 A.2d at 286. However, although the township published a summary of the ordinance's provisions in a newspaper, it did not publish the full text of the ordinance or file a copy of the ordinance in the county law library or other designated county office. See id. The township subsequently purported to adopt the new ordinance on December 22, 1987, and initiated condemnation proceedings to acquire the property pursuant to the ordinance's authority on December 30, 1987. See id.; Gwynedd Props., Inc. v. Lower Gwynedd Township, 970 F.2d...