Schaefer v. Thoeny

• Decision Date: 14 May 1937
• Docket Number: No. 31213.,31213.
• Citation: 273 N.W. 190,199 Minn. 610
• Parties: SCHAEFER et al. v. THOENY et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

273 N.W. 190

199 Minn. 610

SCHAEFER et al. v. THOENY et al.

No. 31213.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

May 14, 1937.

Appeal from District Court, McLeod County; A. B. Gislason, Judge.

Suit by F. W. Schaefer and others against Henry Thoeny, as administrator d. b. n., and others, and the Hutchinson Community Hospital. Judgment for plaintiff, and defendant Hutchinson Community Hospital appeals.

Affirmed.

T. O. Streissguth and S. P. Gislason, both of New Ulm, for appellant.

W. W. Merrill, of Glencoe, and G. P. Smith, of Mankato, for respondents.

JULIUS J. OLSON, Justice.

In this suit for specific performance of a stipulation, defendant Hutchinson Community Hospital alone appeals from the judgment entered in conformity with findings of the court. Henry Thoeny, administrator de bonis non with the will annexed of the estate of Katie Reko, deceased, while a party defendant, raised no issue as to either law or fact and is not a party to the appeal. We shall hereafter refer to appellant as the Hospital.

There is no settled case or bill of exceptions. To pass upon and determine the problems involved on appeal we are necessarily limited in our field of review to the pleadings and the findings of the court. We therefore find it necessary to state rather fully the facts found by the court.

Katie Reko died testate a resident of McLeod county. Her heirs at law are her three brothers, the plaintiffs in this cause, and the children of a deceased brother and a deceased half-sister. In her will testatrix made provision for payment of specific legacies to each plaintiff, to her nephews and nieces, and others, including also the Congregational Church of Hutchinson and the Hospital. To the latter was given $100 as a cash legacy, and it was also named the sole residuary legatee. When the petition for allowance of will came to be heard before the probate court one of plaintiffs, appearing in his own and also in behalf of his brothers, filed written objections to its allowance and admission to probate, claiming that decedent was at the time of the making thereof not possessed of testamentary capacity, and its execution was procured by means of undue and improper influence. The contest was instituted in good faith. Messrs. Joseph P. O'Hara of Glencoe and George F. Gage of Olivia appeared as counsel for all the beneficiaries except the Church and the Hospital, as to each of which Mr. Sam G. Anderson of Hutchinson appeared as counsel. Witnesses were heard, but before the contest had been concluded, counsel for the parties reached an agreement of settlement providing in substance that the objections to the admission of the will should be withdrawn and the contest dismissed, in consideration for which and "in lieu and in stead of the provisions in said will contained" the Hospital was to be paid out of estate funds $1,500 and no more. A stipulation was accordingly executed by counsel for the parties, and this is the instrument upon which this suit is founded.

It was claimed at the trial, in behalf of the Hospital, that Mr. Anderson was not authorized to enter into this settlement. The court, however, found that its officers and the members of its board of directors had knowledge of the will and of its provisions; that they had knowledge of the contest prior to the date of the hearing thereon, and one or more of the directors attended the hearing. Later and at various times the representative of the estate, pursuant to the stipulation of settlement, paid to the Hospital $1,300 as and when the money was available thereto. He later attempted and offered to pay the remaining $200, but this offer was refused by the Hospital. Ever since the settlement of the will contest by reason of the stipulation mentioned, and until the time came for winding up the estate, no one representing the Hospital ever made any claim that the stipulation was not a binding and effective agreement. And the court further found that the agreement as set out in the stipulation had been performed in good faith by and in behalf of plaintiffs and those whom they represent; that the Hospital and its authorized officers have "fully ratified the said agreement by acquiescence therein and their failure to repudiate the same and by acceptance of the benefits therein provided for"; and thereby it became "estopped to deny the validity of said agreement"; that plaintiffs and the heirs at law of decedent "cannot be adequately compensated by money damages and have no adequate remedy at law"; that out of the remaining cash assets of the estate the remaining balance of $200 should be paid to the Hospital, but that the residue of the estate, upon payment of said sum, should go to the plaintiffs and the other lawful heirs at law of decedent. All specific legacies provided for under the terms of the will have been fully paid. There remains some $600 or $800 in cash and other receivables and a residence property in Hutchinson (valued at $3,000) for distribution amongst decedent's heirs. As conclusions of law the court ordered that the Hospital should, upon payment of the remaining $200, quitclaim its interest in the real estate to decedent's heirs at law, and that they be adjudged sole owners of decedent's remaining estate.

1. The scope of our inquiry is, in view of the fact that there is no settled case or bill of exceptions, necessarily limited. The rule in Peach v. Reed, 87 Minn. 375, 380, 92 N.W. 229, is thus stated: "But on an appeal from a judgment in an action tried without a jury, where there is neither a bill of exceptions, nor a settled case, the only question that can be raised is that the findings of fact by the trial judge do not support the judgment. No question as to the sufficiency of the pleadings to support the judgment can be raised. [Citing cases.] The reason for the rule is that error will not be presumed, but, on the contrary, it will be presumed that competent evidence was introduced to sustain the facts found, for the finding is of equal weight with the verdict of a jury. Knoblauch v. Kronschnabel, 18 Minn. 300 (Gel. 272). And further, if the facts found are not within the issues made by the pleadings, it will be presumed, the record not showing to the contrary, that such facts were litigated by consent." In numerous subsequent cases the Reed Case has been cited with approval and followed. A few citations will suffice: State ex rel. Yapp v. Chase, 165 Minn. 268, 206 N.W. 396; Union Central Life Ins. Co. v. Page, 190 Minn. 360, 251 N.W. 911; Elton v. Northwestern Nat. Life Ins. Co., 192 Minn. 116, 255 N.W. 857.

2. Granting defendant's claim that the stipulation when made was ineffective to bind the Hospital for lack of granted authority to Mr. Anderson, who acted as its attorney, the fact remains that, as found by the court, it accepted the benefits of the stipulated agreement to the extent of $1,300 represented by partial payments commencing November 19, 1924, and the last, February 25, 1926. Having accepted the benefits therefrom by virtue of its attorney's agreement, it may not now repudiate his authority. He appeared for it at the time of the will contest. The court found that its acceptance of the payments subsequently made was with full knowledge of the facts, and that it thereby became estopped from asserting invalidity of his acts. To sustain such contention now would be to make of the statute of frauds (Mason's Minn.St. 1927 § 8459) an instrumentality for the frustration of the very purpose of its enactment. Many cases, here and elsewhere, sustain the conclusion reached by the court. Thus, in Slingerland v. Slingerland, 39 Minn. 197, 200, 39 N.W. 146, 148, a...