Schaefer v. Whitted

• Decision Date: 04 August 2015
• Docket Number: Case No. A–15–CA–163–SS.
• Citation: 121 F.Supp.3d 701
• Parties: John Stephens SCHAEFER, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of John Stanley Schaefer, Deceased, and on Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries, Plaintiff, v. Jonathan WHITTED and the City of Austin, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Texas

121 F.Supp.3d 701

John Stephens SCHAEFER, Individually and as Administrator of the Estate of John Stanley Schaefer, Deceased, and on Behalf of All Wrongful Death Beneficiaries, Plaintiff,

v.Jonathan WHITTED and the City of Austin, Defendants.

Case No. A–15–CA–163–SS.

United States District Court, W.D. Texas, Austin Division.

Signed Aug. 4, 2015.

Filed Aug. 5, 2015.

Jeffrey S. Edwards, Scott Medlock, Edwards Law, Robert C. Alden, Byrd Davis Furman & Alden, Austin, TX, for Plaintiff.

Christine G. Edwards, Assistant City Attorney, Meghan L. Riley, City of Austin Law Department, Austin, TX, for Defendants.

ORDER

SAM SPARKS, District Judge.

BE IT REMEMBERED on this day the Court reviewed the file in the above-styled cause, and specifically Defendants Jonathan Whitted and the City of Austin's Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss and Motion for Rule 7(a) Reply and Rule 12(e) More Definite Statement [# 7], Plaintiff John Stephens Schaefer's Response thereto [# 12], Defendants' Reply in support [# 13], Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint [# 16], Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss [# 17], Plaintiff's Response thereto [# 18], and Defendants' Reply in support [# 19]. Having reviewed the pleadings, the briefing of the parties, the relevant law, and the case file as a whole, the Court now enters the following opinion and orders.

Background

This § 1983 case arises from the death of John Stanley Schaefer, who was shot and killed by Defendant Officer Jonathan Whitted after a confrontation on Schaefer's property. Based on allegations in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint, the fatal events transpired as follows:

On the morning of March 1, 2013, Schaefer was attacked by a neighbor's pit bull while on his own property. First Am. Compl. [# 16] ¶ 8. On multiple occasions, including the day before, Schaefer had called 9–1–1 to report the same aggressive canine to authorities. Id. However, this day Schaeffer took matters into his own hands and shot the dog using a firearm he was licensed to carry by the State of Texas. Id. Schaeffer immediately reported his actions to police. Id. ¶ 9. During the ensuing conversations with 9–1–1 dispatchers, Schaefer was asked to put away his weapon before police arrived to investigate. Id. Schaeffer refused. Id.

Officer Whitted was assigned to handle the call. Id. ¶ 10. Officer Whitted asked the dispatcher to tell Schaefer to put away the weapon, but was advised Schaefer had rebuffed previous requests to stash the gun. Id. On the previous day, when police responded to his call about the errant pit bull, Schaefer had similarly been carrying a holstered weapon without incident. Id. ¶ 14. Based on this encounter, Schaefer did not believe being armed could be construed by an officer as a threat to his or her safety. Id.

When he arrived, Whitted entered Schaeffer's backyard to confirm the existence of the dead pit bull without announcing himself, requesting permission, or obtaining a warrant. Id. ¶ 11. Whitted then called dispatch to ask Schaefer to "step out" of the house and re-positioned himself a few feet from its entrance. Id. ¶¶ 12, 15. Before the dispatcher could reach Schaefer, Schaefer exited the front door with his gun "holstered." Id. ¶ 15. Without identifying himself, and without warning, Whitted immediately grabbed Schaeffer's left arm in an attempt to physically remove the gun from its holster. Id. In response, and in self defense, Schaeffer extended his left arm to repel Officer Whitted's advance while simultaneously securing his gun with his right hand and taking it "out of his waistband." Id. According to Officer Whitted's police report, Schaefer pivoted to face him squarely and then directly pointed his gun so Officer Whitted was "looking down the barrel." Id. At this point, Whitted shot Schaeffer two times in the chest, killing him. Id.

There are conflicting stories in the pleadings concerning whether Schaefer actually pointed his gun at the officer and allegations forensic evidence contradicts Officer Whitted's story. Id ¶ 16. A Citizens Review Panel found Officer Whitted was responsible for creating a deadly situation resulting in Officer Whitted killing Schaefer due to his "inept disarming technique," failing to call for back-up, and not loudly identifying himself as police. Id. ¶ 16.

Plaintiff filed his original Complaint on February 24, 2015. See Compl. [# 1]. On March 16, 2015, Defendants moved to dismiss Plaintiff's Second Amendment claim under Rule 12(b)(6), as well as for a Rule 7(a) Reply and Rule 12(e) More Definite Statement as to Plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claims. See Mot. Dismiss [# 7]. The next month, on April 9, 2015, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a Rule 7(a) Reply but otherwise reserved ruling on Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion concerning the alleged Second Amendment violations. See Order of Apr. 9, 2015[# 14]. In response, Plaintiff filed his First Amended Complaint, the operative pleading for purposes of the instant motions, on April 19, 2015. See First Am. Compl. [# 16].¹

In the First Amended Complaint, Plaintiff asserts claims against Officer Whitted in his individual capacity for (1) a violation of Schaefer's Second Amendment rights, based on Officer Whitted's assault and attempt to confiscate his weapon; (2) unlawful search in violation of Schaefer's Fourth Amendment rights, based on Officer Whitted's warrantless entrance onto the property to investigate;² and (3) excessive force in violation of Schaefer's Fourth Amendment rights, based on Officer Whitted's physical attempt to disarm Schaeffer and the shooting. Id. ¶¶ 33, 34. As to the third claim, Plaintiff alleges Schaefer was "cooperative and non-threatening" and there was "no justifiable basis for attempting to disarm Mr. Schaefer without questioning him first and expressly asking to examine his gun, and no justifiable basis for shooting and killing Mr. Schaefer." Id. at ¶ 20. Moreover, Plaintiff alleges Schaefer was legally entitled to possess the weapon at home and legally entitled to use deadly force in self defense to resist Officer Whitted's assault. Id. ¶¶ 19, 21.

Plaintiff also brings Monell claims against the City of Austin for establishing policies and practices of (1) inadequately supervising and/or training its officers concerning the use of deadly; (2) failing to train officers concerning interactions with individuals legally entitled to possess and carry weapons; (3) failing to train officers about citizens' Second Amendment rights to possess weapons for self-defense in their homes; (4) using excessive deadly force prematurely; and (5) using excessively deadly force. Id. ¶ 37. Plaintiff also seeks to hold the City accountable for ratifying Officer Whitted's conduct. Id. ¶ 39. Plaintiff seeks compensatory damages and attorneys' fees. Id. ¶¶ 43, 44.

Defendants move to dismiss Plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b) (6) for failure to state a claim, and, as to the individual capacity claims against Officer Whitted, on the ground of qualified immunity.

Analysis

I. Legal Standard—Motion to Dismiss Pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6)

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a)(2) requires a complaint to contain "a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief." FED.R.CIV.P. 8(a)(2). A motion under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) asks a court to dismiss a complaint for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." FED.R.CIV.P. 12(b)(6). The plaintiff must plead sufficient facts to state a claim for relief that is facially plausible. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937, 173 L.Ed.2d 868 (2009) ; Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570, 127 S.Ct. 1955, 167 L.Ed.2d 929 (2007). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678, 129 S.Ct. 1937. Although a plaintiff's factual allegations need not establish that the defendant is probably liable, they must establish more than a "sheer possibility" that a defendant has acted unlawfully. Id. Determining plausibility is a "context-specific task," and must be performed in light of a court's "judicial experience and common sense." Id. at 679, 129 S.Ct. 1937.

In deciding a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a court generally accepts as true all factual allegations contained within the complaint. Leatherman v. Tarrant Cnty. Narcotics Intelligence & Coordination Unit, 507 U.S. 163, 164, 113 S.Ct. 1160, 122 L.Ed.2d 517 (1993). However, a court is not bound to accept legal conclusions couched as factual allegations. Papasan v. Allain, 478 U.S. 265, 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 92 L.Ed.2d 209 (1986). Although all reasonable inferences will be resolved in favor of the plaintiff, the plaintiff must plead "specific facts, not mere conclusory allegations." Tuchman v. DSC Commc'ns Corp., 14 F.3d 1061, 1067 (5th Cir.1994). In deciding a motion to dismiss, courts may consider the complaint, as well as other sources such as documents incorporated into the complaint by reference, and matters of which a court may take judicial notice. Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues & Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 322, 127 S.Ct. 2499, 168 L.Ed.2d 179 (2007).

II. Application

A. Claims against Officer Whitted in his Individual Capacity

Officer Whitted moves to dismiss Plaintiff's Second and Fourth Amendment claims against him on the basis of qualified immunity. The doctrine of qualified immunity shields government officials, such as law enforcement officers, performing discretionary functions in the course of their official duties from liability as well as from suit. See Babb v. Dorman, 33 F.3d 472, 477 (5th Cir.1994). "Qualified immunity protects public officials from suit unless their conduct violates a clearly established constitutional right." Brumfield v. Hollins, 551 F.3d 322, 326 (5th Cir.2008) (internal quotation marks omitted). The standard "gives ample room for mistaken...