Schaer v. Brandeis University

• Decision Date: 01 May 2000
• Citation: 735 NE 2d 373,432 Mass. 474
• Parties: DAVID ARLEN SCHAER v. BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY.
• Court: United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court

432 Mass. 474

735 NE 2d 373

DAVID ARLEN SCHAER v. BRANDEIS UNIVERSITY.

Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, Middlesex.

May 1, 2000.

September 25, 2000.

Present: (Sitting at Worcester): MARSHALL, C.J., ABRAMS, GREANEY, IRELAND, & COWIN, JJ.

Alan D. Rose (Alan D. Rose, Jr., with him) for the defendant.

David M. Lipton for the plaintiff.

The following submitted briefs for amici curiae:

Harvey A. Silverglate, William C. Newman, & John Reinstein for American Civil Liberties Union of Massachusetts & another.

Robert E. Sullivan, Margaret Wood Hassan, Andrea C. Kramer, & Nina R. Mishkin for Babson College & others.

ABRAMS, J.

The plaintiff, David Arlen Schaer, a student at Brandeis University (Brandeis), filed a seven-count complaint in the Superior Court against Brandeis, seeking injunctive relief and compensatory damages.¹ One Superior Court judge denied injunctive relief and another dismissed the entire complaint for failing to state a claim for which relief can be granted. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6), 365 Mass. 755 (1974). Schaer appealed from the dismissal of his complaint. The Appeals Court affirmed for the most part, but reversed on count three of the complaint, which alleged breach of contract. Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., 48 Mass. App. Ct. 23 (1999). We granted Brandeis's application for further appellate review.² We conclude that Schaer has failed to state a claim on which relief may be granted. We affirm the judgment of the Superior Court.

1. Facts and procedural history. On March 25, 1996, a female student (complainant) filed a report with the Brandeis student judicial system. In the report, she stated that Schaer came to her dormitory room during the early hours of February 14, after she had spoken with him on the telephone. The complainant alleged that, after they kissed, she told Schaer that she "did not want to have sex." She further alleged that she later awoke from sleep to find Schaer having intercourse with her.

After a hearing on April 24, the university board on student conduct (board) found Schaer to have (1) engaged in unwanted sexual activity and (2) created a hostile environment. The board suspended Schaer for approximately four months³ and placed him on disciplinary probation for his remaining time at Brandeis.⁴ Schaer requested a new hearing before the university appeals board on student conduct (appeals board). The appeals board denied his request on May 13.

On June 4, Schaer filed his complaint in the Superior Court, alleging that he had been unfairly disciplined. He sought injunctive relief and compensatory damages. A Superior Court judge held a hearing and denied Schaer's request for an injunction. Brandeis then moved to dismiss Schaer's complaint for failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted. See Mass. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6). A second Superior Court judge granted Brandeis's motion, and Schaer appealed.

The Appeals Court upheld the Superior Court judge's judgment of dismissal except with respect to Schaer's breach of contract count.⁵ We agree with the Appeals Court that only the breach of contract claim needs to be analyzed. As to this claim, the Appeals Court reversed the Superior Court, concluding that "Schaer's complaint, indulgently read, Federico v. Brockton Credit Union, 39 Mass. App. Ct. 57, 61 (1995), states a claim that Brandeis did not substantially conform its disciplinary process in Schaer's case to the [contract]." Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., supra at 29. The Appeals Court based its conclusion on Schaer's allegations that Brandeis failed to follow certain procedures outlined in "Rights and Responsibilities" (contract), which is contained within Brandeis's student handbook. Id. at 28-29. The Appeals Court concluded that Brandeis failed to follow its own procedures in five respects.⁶Id. at 29-30.

2. As a threshold matter, we note that the judge could have dismissed Schaer's complaint for failure to state "a short and plain statement of the claim." Mass. R. Civ. P. 8 (a) (1), 365 Mass. 749 (1974). See Garrity v. Garrity, 399 Mass. 367, 369 (1987). The complaint, including attachments, is more than 115 pages and includes 125 separately numbered paragraphs. See Schaer v. Brandeis Univ., supra at 25 ("Schaer's complaint is anything but a `short and plain statement of the claim.' Mass. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(1) .... It sends 125 paragraphs sprawling over thirty-four pages"). Each of the seven counts incorporates paragraphs one through 108 in their entirety. In short, the complaint fails adequately to inform Brandeis "`of the nature of [each] claim and the grounds on which [Schaer] relies.' Druker v. Roland Wm. Jutras Assocs., 370 Mass. 383, 385 (1976)." Garrity v. Garrity, supra.

Because neither the Superior Court nor the Appeals Court dismissed Schaer's complaint on this basis, we turn to the substance of the motion to dismiss.

A motion to dismiss under rule 12 (b) (6) should be allowed if Schaer has "fail[ed] to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." In evaluating a rule 12 (b) (6) motion, we take into consideration "the allegations in the complaint, although matters of public record, orders, items appearing in the record of the case, and exhibits attached to the complaint, also may be taken into account." 5A C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, Federal Practice and Procedure § 1357, at 299 (1990). We also accept Schaer's factual allegations as true. Warner-Lambert Co. v. Execuquest Corp., 427 Mass. 46, 47 (1998). However, we do not accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual allegations. "The rule that we accept [Schaer's] well-pleaded factual averments and indulge every reasonable inference hospitable to [his] case `does not entitle [him] to rest on "subjective characterizations" or conclusory descriptions of a "general scenario which could be dominated by unpleaded facts."` " Judge v. Lowell, 160 F.3d 67, 77 (1st Cir. 1998), quoting Correa-Martinez v. Arrillaga-Belendez, 903 F.2d 49, 53 (1st Cir. 1990). See generally 5A C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, supra at 315-318 nn. 16-21, and cases cited.

Because the parties do not dispute the fact that a contractual relationship exists between Schaer and Brandeis, we assume, without deciding, that such a contractual relationship exists. Thus, we employ "the standard of `reasonable expectation — what meaning the party making the manifestation, the university, should reasonably expect the other party to give it.'" Cloud v. Trustees of Boston Univ., 720 F.2d 721, 724 (1st Cir. 1983), citing Lyons v. Salve Regina College, 565 F.2d 200, 202 (1st Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 971 (1978). We therefore review each factual allegation to determine whether Schaer has asserted facts which establish that Brandeis failed to meet his reasonable expectations, thereby violating its contract with Schaer.⁷

a. Failure to investigate in accordance with procedures established by §§ 16.5 and 17 of the contract. Schaer contends that Brandeis violated §§ 16.5 and 17 of the contract by failing to investigate the complaint. Schaer asserts that at the time of the investigation, he was not asked to give a statement, to offer evidence, or to provide witnesses. As the Superior Court judge noted, Schaer has failed to state a claim under § 16.5 because that section does not apply to investigations of student misconduct.⁸

Section 17 provides, in relevant part: "[T]he available facts shall be gathered from the [complainant] and a careful evaluation of these facts, as well as the credibility of the person reporting them, shall be made. If corroboration of the information presented is deemed necessary, further inquiry and investigation shall be undertaken." Nothing in this section requires university officials to obtain an interview from the accused student, to seek evidence from the accused student, or to grant the accused student an opportunity to provide witnesses at the investigatory stage in the proceedings. Thus, Schaer could not assign to the contract the meaning he now claims it has. On the facts alleged, Schaer has not stated a claim for which relief may be granted on the ground that Brandeis violated §§ 16.5 or 17 of the contract.

b. Failure to employ the standard of proof required by § 19.13. Schaer alleges that Brandeis violated § 19.13, which requires that the board must base its finding "only upon clear and convincing evidence." His contention that the board failed to use the appropriate standard is a legal conclusion, not a factual allegation. "It is only when ... conclusions are logically compelled, or at least supported, by the stated facts, that is, when the suggested inference rises to what experience indicates is an acceptable level of probability, that `conclusions' become `facts' for pleading purposes." The Dartmouth Review v. Dartmouth College, 889 F.2d 13, 16 (1st Cir. 1989). See generally 5A C.A. Wright & A.R. Miller, supra. Schaer has not set forth facts specifically supporting this allegation. In the absence of such facts, we conclude that Schaer has not stated a claim for which relief may be granted.⁹

c. Failure to use evidence in accordance with the procedures outlined in § 19.13. Schaer contends that the board violated its contract by excluding testimony from an expert (Schaer's sister¹⁰) as to the difference between rape and "regretted sex." Instead of admitting this testimony, Schaer asserts, the board used its own experience to reach its finding. Schaer concludes that this violated § 19.13, which provides, in relevant part: "Decisions shall be based solely upon evidence and testimony introduced at the hearing." As the Superior Court judge noted: "This claim does not state a violation of [§] 19.13. While that rule prohibits the board from evaluating evidence not introduced at the hearing, it does not preclude members of the [board] from using their own common sense and expertise." Schaer has not stated a claim for a violation of § 19.13.¹¹

d. Failure to make a record, as required by §...