Schafer v. Hotel Martin Co.

Decision Date09 April 1958
Docket NumberNo. 49365,49365
Citation249 Iowa 866,89 N.W.2d 373
PartiesJohn D. SCHAFER, Appellant, v. HOTEL MARTIN COMPANY, Appellee.
CourtIowa Supreme Court

Bradshaw, Fowler, Proctor & Fairgrave, Des Moines, for appellant.

Steward, Crouch & Kelly, Des Moines, for appellee.

WENNERSTRUM, Justice.

Plaintiff sought damages by reason of injuries sustained while a guest in defendant's hotel. Upon trial and at the close of plaintiff's evidence a verdict was directed by the trial court in favor of the defendant on the grounds there was no proof of negligence and the plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence. During the presentation of the evidence the court sustained objections to the admission of an ordinance of the City of Des Moines relative to housing regulations. By reason of the rulings made the plaintiff has appealed.

On January 15, 1956, the plaintiff, then approximately 85 years of age, registered as a guest at the Martin Hotel in Des Moines. He was assigned a room on the second floor which did not have toilet facilities. He had previously been a guest in the hotel and had occupied the same room assigned him on the occasion he received his injuries. Sometime during the early morning of January 16, plaintiff had occasion to go to the restroom which adjoined his room. The hallway was lighted. As he went into the restroom plaintiff was dressed only in his pajamas. He wore no slippers. He turned on the light as he entered the room. When he stepped into it he discovered there was water covering the floor. He proceeded further and observed the lid was off the toilet tank and water was running out of it as well as the stool. He walked to the place where the tank and stool were located and endeavored to stop the flow of water which he was unable to do. In his testimony he stated as he started to leave the room he observed the wet ledge of the threshold and that the light from the bathroom shone down on it. Plaintiff slipped and fell at the threshold and received the injuries for which he sought recovery.

I. The trial court, in sustaining the motion for directed verdict, ruled there had been no showing the claimed dangerous condition in the restroom had been brought to the attention of the defendant or had existed for such a length of time as to create an inference the defendant should have known about the existing condition. It is the claim of the plaintiff there is no basis for such a conclusion and ruling.

From the foregoing statement it is apparent the primary question for our determination is what, if any, knowledge the defendant had of the conditions existing in the restroom which it is claimed resulted in the injuries to the plaintiff. He calls our attention to certain facts from which it is claimed the defendant in the exercise of due care should have gained knowledge of the conditions which existed and corrected them. Our attention is called to the fact the plaintiff testified the day before he was hurt he first observed there was no lid on the tank. We are also reminded of the fact the plaintiff testified when he returned to the hotel the evening prior to the accident he heard a pounding sound in the plumbing in the restroom. Concerning the incidents that happened at or immediately following the time the plaintiff fell he testified that after he tried to fix the toilet: 'I turned and went to the door.' The record then discloses the following questions and answers:

'Q. Did you reach the door? A. Yes.

'Q. Did you step down from the rest-room to the floor of the hall? A. Well, I was at the door when I fell. I couldn't say--I was standing on the threshold, I would say.

'Q. At that time do you know whether there was any water on the threshold or just outside the threshold? A. I didn't notice that. I didn't notice any on the outside.

'Q. Do you remember falling? A. Yes.

'Q. What is the first thing you remember after you fell? A. Well, I guess the first thing I remember was laying in water.

'Q. And where were you lying? A. Just in front of the bathroom door.

'Q. And there was water on that floor? A. Yes. The water I believe was running down the stairway. My feet were hanging down the stairway.

'Q. That is the stairway which goes down to the first floor? A. Yes.'

The plaintiff further testified in response to questions, as follows:

'Q. Well, after you fell will you tell us again what is the first thing you remember after that? A. Well, I remember trying to get up, and failed. I tried to get up and I couldn't move.

'Q. Was anyone there at that time with you? A. What is that?

'Q. Was anyone present at that time? A. No, no.

'Q. Did you make any sound? A. I called for help.

'Q. Did help come? A. Just then, I don't know whether he heard me or not, but he came around the corner just at that time.

'Q. Do you know who it was came around the corner? A. No, I don't know who it was.'

It is the further contention of the plaintiff the hotel clerk should have been aware of the water running down the open stairway near his desk and hence should have investigated and discovered the overflowing toilet. In connection with this contention attention should be called to the fact there is no evidence that anyone connected with the hotel observed water running down the open stairway. And there is no evidence to show that any clerk who might have been on duty at that time was in a position to observe any water which may have come down the stairway and onto the lobby floor.

The general rule relative to the liability of an owner to an invitee for negligence is set forth in 38 Am.Jur., Negligence, Section 97, page 757, 'The liability of an owner or occupant to an invitee for negligence in failing to render the premises reasonably safe for the invitee, or in failing to warn him of dangers thereon, must be predicated upon a superior knowledge concerning the dangers of the premises to persons going thereon. It is when the perilous instrumentality is known to the owner or occupant and not known to the person injured that a recovery is permitted. The owner is liable to invited persons for injuries 'occasioned by the unsafe condition of the land or its approaches, if such condition was known to him and not to them, and was negligently suffered to exist, without timely notice to the public or to those who were likely to act upon such invitation.''

A further comment concerning the rule of law relative to the necessity of knowledge of a defendant of a defective or dangerous condition to establish liability is set forth in 65 C.J.S. Negligence § 270, page 1204, 1205, as follows: '* * * Where there is no evidence, or insufficient evidence, to charge defendant with knowledge of the defective or dangerous condition, the question of his knowledge of it, or, it has been held, of defendant's liability, should not be submitted to the jury.'

In the case of Parsons v. H. L. Green, 233 Iowa 648, 652, 10 N.W.2d 40, 42, this court gave consideration to the liability of the operator of a store to an invitee where such person was injured by reason of a fall resulting from snow brought in and onto an inside stairway. We there said: '* * * In order that there shall be liability, there must be some evidence of notice of the existing condition, either actual or constructive, and in such time that the defendant in the exercise of ordinary care could have remedied it. Snipps v. Minneapolis & St. L. R. Co., 164 Iowa 530, 146 N.W. 468, and cases cited. No evidence of such knowledge appears in the record.'

The above case was followed in principle in the case of Reuter v. Iowa Trust and Savings Bank, 244 Iowa 939, 942, 943, 57 N.W.2d 225.

Attention is particularly called to our recent case of Atherton v. Hoening's Grocery, Iowa, 86 N.W.2d 252, wherein we commented upon the question here considered.

In the case of Crawford v. Pacific States Savings and Loan Company, 22 Cal.App.2d 448, 71 P.2d 333, that court commented on the liability of a hotel or innkeeper to an invitee who sought damages for an injury resulting from slipping on a quantity of water on a lavatory floor. In the cited case there was no evidence the owner of the hotel had actual knowledge of such condition or that it had existed for such a length of time the defendant should have known of it. Recovery was...

To continue reading

Request your trial
9 cases
  • Bartels v. Cair-Dem, Inc.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • November 12, 1963
    ...240, 243, 26 A.L.R.2d 667; Brown v. Slack, 159 Neb. 142, 65 N.W.2d 382, 385; 5 N.C.C.A.3d 437, and citation. Schafer v. Hotel Martin Co., 249 Iowa 866, 871, 89 N.W.2d 373, 376, and Vollmar v. J. C. Penney Co., supra, at page 1031 of 251 Iowa, page 718 of 103 N.W.2d, recognize this rule as a......
  • Ling v. Hosts Inc.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • January 14, 1969
    ...floor, proof of knowledge is unnecessary; the storekeeper will be presumed to have notice. (citations) * * * Schafer v. Hotel Martin Co., 249 Iowa 866, 871, 89 N.W.2d 373, 376, and Vollmar v. J. C. Penney Co., supra, at page 1031 of 251 Iowa, page 718 of 103 N.W.2d, recognize this rule as a......
  • Smith v. Cedar Rapids Country Club
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • November 12, 1963
    ...in support of defendant's proposition of Vollmar v. J. C. Penney Co., supra, 251 Iowa 1026, 103 N.W.2d 715, and Schafer v. Hotel Martin Co., 249 Iowa 866, 89 N.W.2d 373, are quite different factually. In each of those cases a dangerous situation existed which clearly was not within the actu......
  • Robinson v. Fort Dodge Limestone Co.
    • United States
    • Iowa Supreme Court
    • December 13, 1960
    ...of the existence of the condition for such time as it could be known in the exercise of reasonable care as in Schafer v. Hotel Martin Company, 249 Iowa 866, 89 N.W.2d 373, and In re Estate of Howorth, 250 Iowa 752, 94 N.W.2d 779. The plaintiff also testified he did not know there was frozen......
  • Request a trial to view additional results

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT