Schaffer v. Board of Trustees of Franklin County Veterans Memorial
| Decision Date | 13 July 1960 |
| Docket Number | No. 36395,36395 |
| Parties | , 12 O.O.2d 343 SCHAFFER, Appellee, v. BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF THE FRANKLIN COUNTY VETERANS MEMORIAL et al., Appellants, et al. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
In the absence of statutory authorization therefor, a county or its agencies are immune from suit for negligence.
Earl W. Allison, Pros. Attorney, George Ruble, Jr., and Arthur M. Sebastian, Columbus, for appellants.
Charles V. Schwenker, Columbus, for appellee.
This action arose by plaintiff's filing of a petition in the Court of Common Pleas to recover damages for injuries sustained by her when a step and handrail on the stairway leading to her apartment gave way and she was precipitated to the ground.
According to the allegations of the petition, the building, in which the apartment was located, was owned by the Board of Trustees of the Franklin County Veterans Memorial and had been acquired by it as part of the site for the erection of the memorial building.
Plaintiff joined in her action, in addition to the board of trustees, its members and secretary, two contracting firms which were engaged in the removal of buildings on the site.
The Court of Common Pleas sustained a motion of defendants for judgment on the pleadings and entered judgment accordingly.
Upon appeal to the Court of Appeals, such court affirmed that part of the judgment of the trial court in favor of the contractors but reversed that part of such judgment rendered on the pleadings in favor of the board of trustees and remanded the cause to the Court of Common Pleas for further proceedings according to law.
The Court of Appeals determined that its judgment is in conflict with the judgment of the Court of Appeals for Hamilton County in the case of Tinsley v. City of Cincinnati, No. 8302, and certified the record of the cause to this court for review.
The single question raised by this appeal is whether a board of trustees of a veterans memorial appointed by county commissioners is liable in tort for damages resulting from injuries sustained by a tenant living in a building acquired by the board as part of the site for the memorial.
Although the traditional sovereign immunity from suit arose as a result of judicial decision, such immunity is now constitutionally recognized in the Ohio Constitution by Section 16 of Article I, which reads in part as follows:
'Suits may be brought against the state, in such courts and in such manner, as may be provided by law.'
By recognizing the necessity of a constitutional provision to enable the passage of laws for actions against the state, the framers of the Constitution clearly recognized that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is a part of the substantive laws of our state and made the abrogation of such immunity primarily a legislative function.
Although such provision is now in our Constitution, it is not self-executing but requires the passage of legislation to activate it. Wolf v. Ohio State University Hospital, 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475.
Therefore, in the absence of statutory authorization, the state and its instrumentalities are completely immune from suit.
This brings us to the question as to whether such immunity extends to a county.
The sovereign immunity of counties was early recognized in Board of Com'rs of Hamilton County v. Mighels, 7 Ohio St. 109, 110, wherein the syllabus states:
'The board of commissioners of a county are not liable, in their quasi corporate capacity, either by statute or at common law, to an action for damages for injury resulting to a private party by their negligence in the discharge of their official functions.'
Plaintiff urges that a county stands in the same position and is liable to the same extent as a municipal corporation. In this regard, plaintiff fails to recognize that a county is a subdivision of the state, organized for judicial and political purposes. It is not a legal person or a separate political entity. A municipal corporation, on the other hand, is a corporation invested with certain powers of a private or proprietary nature. These distinctions were well expressed by Judge Brinkerhoff in Board of Com'rs of Hamilton County v. Mighels, supra, 7 Ohio St. 118, 119, which expressions were quoted as follows and approved by Turner, J., in State ex rel. Ranz v. City of Youngstown, 140 Ohio St. 477, 483, 45 N.E.2d 767, 771:
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Smith v. Grady
...is not regarded as a body corporate like a municipality but rather a political subdivision of the state.”); Schaffer v. Bd. of Trs., 171 Ohio St. 228, 230, 168 N.E.2d 547 (1960) (stating that a county is “not a body corporate but rather a subordinate political subdivision,” and “[a] county ......
-
Thacker v. Board of Trustees of Ohio State University
...in Wolf v. Ohio State University Hospital (1959), 170 Ohio St. 49, 162 N.E.2d 475, and Schaffer v. Bd. of Trustees of Franklin County Veterans Memorial (1960), 171 Ohio St. 228, 168 N.E.2d 547. Plaintiffs appealed to the Court of Appeals, setting forth the following single assignment of err......
-
Hamilton County Bd. of Mental Retardation and Developmental Disabilities v. Professionals Guild of Ohio
...not a body corporate but rather a subordinate political division * * *." (Emphasis added.) In Schaffer v. Board of Trustees (1960), 171 Ohio St. 228, 230, 12 O.O.2d 343, 344, 168 N.E.2d 547, 549, the court said that " * * * a county is a subdivision of the state, organized for judicial and ......
-
Greene v. Cuyahoga Cnty., 95790.
...county in Ohio has historically been regarded as a political subdivision of the state. See Schaffer v. Bd. of Trustees of Franklin Cty. Veterans Memorial (1960), 171 Ohio St. 228, 230, 168 N.E.2d 547; R.C. 2744.01. Article X of the Ohio Constitution provides for the organization of the coun......