Schaghticoke Powder Co. v. Greenwich & J. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 15 December 1905
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: SCHAGHTICOKE POWDER CO. et al. v. GREENWICH & J. RY. CO. et al.

183 N.Y. 306

76 N.E. 153

SCHAGHTICOKE POWDER CO. et al.

v.GREENWICH & J. RY. CO. et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

Dec. 15, 1905.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Action by the Schaghticoke Powder Company and others against the Greenwich & Johnsonville Railway Company and others. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (89 N. Y. Supp. 1115,96 App. Div. 631), affirming a judgment dismissing the complaint, plaintiffs appeal. Reversed.

Haight, J., dissenting.

George W. Curry, for appellants.

Clarence W. McKay, for respondents.

WERNER, J.

The respondent Ludington entered into a contract with the defendant railroad company to construct an extension of its line between the villages of Greenwich and Schuylerville, in this state, and, among other things, agreed to save the railroad company harmless from and against all valid liens that might be filed for work done under the contract. With the consent of the railroad company Ludington sublet a portion of the work, including the grading, to the defendants Inman & Fox, who purchased of the plaintiff the Schaghticoke Powder Company a quantity of dynamite for use in breaking up frozen earth, so that it could be handled by means of a steam shovel that was employed by the subcontractors in the grading and building of the roadbed. The dynamite thus furnished was actually used by the subcontractors for the purpose mentioned, and the trial court found that it was furnished and used with the knowledge and consent of the defendants the railroad company and Ludington that no part of the same had been paid for, and that the powder company had filed the usual notice of lien in compliance with the terms of the statute. The trial court further found ‘that the said materials so furnished by the plaintiff the Schaghticoke Powder Company were not materials used for the improvement of real property within the language or intent of the lien law, but the same were used merely as explosives, principally to break up frozen earth so that it could be handled.’ Upon this finding a judgment was entered dismissing the complaint as to the plaintiff powder company, and upon appeal to the Appellate Division that judgment has been unanimously affirmed.

Two questions are presented for our consideration upon this appeal: (1) Are the materials furnished by the appellant herein such as are contemplated by the provisions of the lien law? (2) Can a lien be acquired against a railroad company for materials furnished and used in the construction of its road? It is obvious that we must look to the lien law for the answer to these questions. Section 3 of that law (Laws 1897, p. 516, c. 418; Gen. Laws, c. 49), relating to mechanics' liens, provides that ‘A contractor, subcontractor, laborer or materialman, who performs labor or furnishes materials for the improvement of real property with the consent or at the request of the owner thereof, or of his agent, contractor or subcontractor, shall have a lien. * * *’ The railroad company, through its indemnitor, Ludington, has thus far sucessfully contended that the dynamite furnished by the appellant does not come within the definition of materials furnished as those terms are used in the statute. The argument is that no lien can be acquired under this law for materials that do not go directly into and form a permanent part of some building or structure upon real estate, and that explosives used in blasting rock or breaking up earth are not such ‘materials' within the purview of the statute. The position of the appellant is that the explosives used by the subcontractor in breaking up earth which must be excavated or removed in the construction of the roadbed are ‘materials' used in the improvement of real estate, within the fair and reasonable interpretation of the language of the statute, and are as much a part of the work of improvement as the manual labor that goes into it. The question thus presented is not free from difficulty, but after a careful consideration of the statute we feel constrained to hold that the position taken by the appellant is more logical and more in consonance with the evident purpose of the legislature than that taken by the respondent.

As bearing upon the construction of the statute, the history of legislation upon the subject of mechanics' liens and the report of the commissioners, whose revision resulted in the present lien law, are both interesting and instructive. In their report to the Legislature the commissioners of revision said: ‘The underlying principle of all legislation of this character is that a person who, at the request or with the consent of the owner of real property, enhances its value by furnishing materials or performing labor for the improvement thereof, should be deemed to have acquired an interest in such property to the extent of the value of such materials or labor. This principle should be applicable generally to improvements of real property. It is not necessary, therefore, to detail the particular kinds of improvements for which the lien will exist, as has been done in the act of 1885. By defining the terms ‘improvement,’ ‘owner,’ ‘real property,’ etc., in a broad and comprehensive manner, it will be possible, by the use of such terms, to omit superfluous words and expressions formerly used to apply generally the principle above enunciated. * * * The article relating to mechanics' liens has been made so general in its scope as to include every case where labor is performed or material furnished for the permanent improvement of real property.' Beginning with the statute of 1869 (Laws 1869. p. 1355, c. 558), which amended the earlier act of 1854, we observe that it gave a lien for the value of any labor and material performed and furnished in erecting, altering, or repairing any house, building, or the appurtenance to any house or building, and upon the land upon which the same shall stand. Passing without comment the various local statutes of limited scope and effect enacted from time to time thereafter, we come to the general lien law of 1885 (Laws 1885, p. 585, c. 342), which created liens for labor or services performed or materials furnished and used, or to be used, in erecting, altering, or repairing any house, wharf, pier, bulkhead, bridge, vault, building, or appurtenance to any house, building, or building lot, including fences, sidewalks, paving, fountains, fish ponds, and fruit and ornamental trees.

When these statutes are read in connection with the report of the commissioners of revision made in presenting the lien law now in force to the Legislature, it becomes obvious that, while the law of 1885 was much broader in scope than any of its predecessors, it was not considered liberal enough to cover all the cases in which labor performed or materials furnished resulted in the improvement of real property, and thus contributed to the permanent enhancement of its value. It would be difficult to suggest anything more comprehensive than the language used in the present statute. Any ‘contractor, subcontractor, laborer or materialman who performs labor or furnishes materials for the improvement of real property’ shall be entitled to a lien. When this language is contrasted with the specific and restricted phrases of the former statutes, it is plain that the Legislature intended to bring all labor performed or materials furnished in the improvement of real estate, no matter by what name they may be called or by what description they may be designated, within the liberal and beneficient purposes of the statute. In this view of the statute we do not see why the materials furnished by the appellant are not comprehended within its terms. It may be admitted that dynamite used in blasting rock or breaking up earth does not, in a narrow and technical sense, enter into and remain a part of the permanent structure which contributes to the improvement of real estate. The same thing may be said of the labor performed upon it....