Schall et al. v. The Williams Valley Railroad Company
| Decision Date | 01 January 1860 |
| Citation | 35 Pa. 191 |
| Parties | Schall et al. versus The Williams Valley Railroad Company. |
| Court | Pennsylvania Supreme Court |
All the material facts of this case lie within a narrow compass. The plaintiffs showed a perfect paper title to the land in controversy, from John Lesher, the original warrantee of the Commonwealth. Deriving their title through Schwartz and Snavely, they showed that when the latter purchased there was no inconsistent title on record, and no possession to give notice of an adverse right. Daubert, who was on the ground at the time, was a mere intruder, and claimed under neither title that is in question here. The plaintiffs claimed, therefore, to be bonâ fide purchasers, without notice of the title of the defendants.
The defendants claimed under the statute of limitations. They showed a possession commenced in 1805, and continued down to about 1833, when the tenants of the then owners deserted the premises, and George Daubert entered as an intruder. This title, transferred several times, and twice by public sales, was duly vested in the defendants. As the case is presented on the record, we are obliged to consider every fact necessary to complete a title under the statute, so proved, that the jury would have found it had it been submitted. In other words, we assume that the plaintiffs have a perfect paper title, and the defendants a perfect title under the statute of limitations — but that when Snavely bought the title under which the plaintiffs claim, the defendants had lost the possession, though the statutory period of twenty-one years had run out in favour of their right long before.
The learned judge declined to affirm the main position assumed by the defendants, that a title once perfected by twenty-one years' possession, cannot be lost by neglecting to keep up the possession after that period, and that nothing short of twenty-one years adverse possession will bar it.
An unrecorded paper title does not affect a purchaser without actual notice, and the learned judge pronounced a title by the statute of limitations, if unaccompanied by a continued possession, as no more than an unrecorded paper title. If this be sound doctrine, then the claimant under the statute, however he may have perfected his right, must keep his flag flying for ever, and the statute ceases to be a statute of limitations.
The first observation we have to make on this ruling is, that titles matured under the statute of limitations, are not within the recording acts. However expedient it might be to require some public record of such titles to be kept, and however inconvenient it may be to purchasers to ascertain what titles of that sort are outstanding, still we have not as yet any legislation on the subject, and it is not competent for judicial decision to force upon them consequences drawn from the recording acts. Those acts relate exclusively to written titles. Possessory titles have always been favourites of Pennsylvania legislation, and it would ill become the judiciary to clog them with conditions and disabilities, which the law-making power has not prescribed, nor even suggested.
Our next remark is, that the ruling below mistook the true nature of titles under the statute of limitations. The elements of all titles to land are possession, the right of possession, and the right of property, which Blackstone denominates the jus merum. The instance he puts to illustrate both the absolute right of possession and the mere right of property, is that of a person disseised, or turned out of the possession of his estate, neglecting to pursue his remedy within the time limited by law. The disseisor in such case unites the absolute right of possession with the actual possession, leaving to the disseisee the mere right of property, which is for all practical purposes a barren sceptre.
In the great case of Atkyns v. Horde, 1 Burr. 119, Lord MANSFIELD expounded the effect of the statute of limitations in these words: —
In Stokes v. Berry, 2 Salk. 421, this positive title was held not only sufficient to support a defence, but one upon which...
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... ... 289, 102 N.W. 734; Wilson v ... Williams, 52 Miss. 487; Warfield v. Lindle, 38 ... Mo. 561; ... 381; Sherman v. Kane, 86 N.Y ... 57; Schall v. Williams Valley R. Co., 35 Pa. 191; ... Erhard v ... (1 R. C. L. 796.) ... Lands of a railroad company may be acquired by adverse ... possession. (2 C ... ...
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