Schanuel v. Anderson
| Decision Date | 09 September 1982 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 78-4345. |
| Citation | 546 F. Supp. 519 |
| Parties | Larry SCHANUEL, individually, and on behalf of all others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. Joan ANDERSON, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Illinois |
Jack Ver Steegh, Land of Lincoln Legal Asst., East St. Louis, Ill. for plaintiff.
George M. Schafer, Asst. Atty. Gen., Springfield, Ill., for defendants.
Currently before the Court are Cross Motions for Summary Judgment filed by plaintiff on November 6, 1980, and by defendant on January 12, 1981.
The standards applicable to a motion for summary judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 are well established. The purpose of summary judgment is to prevent an unnecessary trial where, on the basis of the pleadings and supporting documents, there remains no material issue of fact to be tried. Kirk v. Home Indemnity Co., 431 F.2d 554, 559 (7th Cir. 1970). Summary judgment is appropriate only if it appears that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Fitzsimmons v. Best, 528 F.2d 692, 694 (7th Cir. 1976); Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). The burden is upon the moving party to show that there is no issue of material fact in dispute. Rose v. Bridgeport Brass Co., 487 F.2d 804, 808 (7th Cir. 1973), and all doubts as to the existence of an issue of material fact must be resolved against the movant. Moutoux v. Gulling Auto Electric, Inc., 295 F.2d 573, 577 (7th Cir. 1961). In passing on a motion for summary judgment, the trial court may only determine whether or not there exists a dispute as to a material issue of fact. It is not permitted to resolve that dispute. Carter v. Williams, 361 F.2d 189, 194 (7th Cir. 1966).
The facts of the case are simple and undisputed and established for purposes of this motion. They are as follows:
1. Plaintiff Larry Schanuel applied for a position as a security guard or investigator with the Allied National Detective Agency, Inc., in Belleville, Illinois, in July 1978.
2. The manager of the Allied National Detective Agency informed plaintiff that under Chapter 111, paragraph 2622 of the Illinois Revised Statutes, plaintiff was ineligible for employment with any detective agency and refused to hire him.
3. Plaintiff in fact had a record of criminal felony conviction which included a plea of guilty to Second Degree Robbery in California on April 18, 1963, and a plea of guilty to a federal charge of Transferring Government Obligations on July 25, 1967. The parole periods for these offenses expired on or about September 1972.
4. Rich Yale, the President of Allied National Detective Agency could not say whether plaintiff would have been hired or performed satisfactorily but for his convictions, but it was his opinion that an individual with a criminal record could perform satisfactorily as an unarmed security guard.
5. Plaintiff has not applied for a detective certificate with the Department of Registration and Education.
6. Defendant Joan Anderson is the Director of the Illinois Department of Registration and Education. Her office is created by Illinois Revised Statutes chapter 127, paragraph 4, and she, together with the Department of Registration and Education, is vested with the sole authority to supervise and regulate detective agencies within the State of Illinois.
Plaintiff filed this class action suit against defendant Anderson in her capacity as Director of the Illinois Department of Registration and Education, alleging that defendant has acted under color of state law to deprive plaintiff and the class he represents of rights secured by the Fifth, Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments to the United States Constitution, all in violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiff alleges that Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter 111, paragraph 2622 violates the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. He seeks to bar enforcement of paragraph 2622 and a declaratory judgment that the statute is unconstitutional on its face. The issues as framed by the Motion for Summary Judgment are (1) whether Illinois Revised Statutes, chapter 111, paragraph 2601, et seq. meets the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and (2) whether the classifications established by the same statute violate the Equal Protection Clause of the same Amendment.
The relevant statute provides:
Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 111, para. 2622 (1980). The note preceding Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 111, paras. 2601 to 2639, titled "An Act to provide for Licensing and Regulating Detectives and Detective Agencies, and to safeguard the interest of the public," provides:
Note, Ill.Rev.Stat., ch. 111, para. 2601 et seq., pocket part (1981). Thus, unless the General Assembly provides otherwise, the contested provisions, inter alia, are destined to expire.
I. Turning to the merits of plaintiffs' motion, they argue that paragraph 2622 violates the Due Process Clause since: (1) it creates an irrebuttable presumption that ex-offenders are unfit for employment as security guards; (2) there is no rational connection between the proscription and the qualities needed for employment as a § 10b license holder's employee; and (3) it denies a § 10b applicant the right to a meaningful hearing.
A. Plaintiff uses the oft-cited Cleveland Board of Education v. Lafleur, 414 U.S. 632, 94 S.Ct. 791, 39 L.Ed.2d 52 (1974) to support the irrebuttable presumption argument. In Lafleur, the Supreme Court ruled unconstitutional rules which required pregnant teachers to leave after their fifth month of pregnancy with no guarantee of reemployment after childbirth. The essential ingredients of the decision were the fact that the decision to bear a child is protected by the Due Process Clause as a matter of personal choice in marriage and family life, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 93 S.Ct. 705, 35 L.Ed.2d 147 (1973); the lack of a rational connection between the reasons offered and the goal desired by the state, and the availability of the alternative of individualized determination. The lynchpin in the analysis is Due Process Clause protection of the activity upon which the governmental regulation infringes. In Lafleur, the activity was childbearing. Presumably, the Court still regards "the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the community," Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41, 36 S.Ct. 7, 10, 60 L.Ed. 131 (1915), as falling within Fourteenth Amendment protection. Yet, in this Court's opinion, the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is no longer available to protect that interest.
In its heyday, the limitless potential of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine to require the government to make individualized decisions on matters affecting a wide range of interests was pointed out only in dissent. See, Vlandis v. Kline, 412 U.S. 441, 93 S.Ct. 2230, 37 L.Ed.2d 63 (1974); Lafleur, supra. Soon, the magnitude of the potential became apparent to majorities, as well as dissenters. Thus, in Trafelet v. Thompson, 594 F.2d 623 (7th Cir. 1979), the Seventh Circuit stated forcefully its doubts regarding the continuing validity of the doctrine and refused to apply it to the challenged statute, based upon the Supreme Court's failure to use the doctrine in the mandatory retirement cases. Massachusetts Bd. of Ret. v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307, 96 S.Ct. 2562, 49 L.Ed.2d 520 (1976); Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 99 S.Ct. 939, 59 L.Ed.2d 171 (1979).
The very dangers feared by critics of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine of possible invalidation of all employment related legislation without any principled reasons for distinguishing between one situation and another are present in this case. For example, under section 2622(1), in addition to the contested requirement, an employee of a certificate holder must be 21 if he will be armed or 18 if unarmed, a citizen of the United States, and never have been denied or had revoked a certificate under this Act. In addition, if the employee is to carry a weapon, he must have at least 30 hours of training under state supervision. (Section 2622(11)). Since each requirement stands between a potential employee of a certificate holder and the job, just as the contested requirement does, each one is subject to constitutional challenge.
Accordingly, the Court declines to invoke the irrebuttable...
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