Schaper v. Bronx Leb. Hosp. Ctr.

• Decision Date: 30 September 2019
• Docket Number: 1:17-cv-01246 (ALC)
• Citation: 408 F.Supp.3d 379
• Parties: Judith SCHAPER, Plaintiff, v. The BRONX LEBANON HOSPITAL CENTER and Carol Wilson, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Southern District of New York

408 F.Supp.3d 379

Judith SCHAPER, Plaintiff,

v.The BRONX LEBANON HOSPITAL CENTER and Carol Wilson, Defendants.

1:17-cv-01246 (ALC)

United States District Court, S.D. New York.

Signed September 30, 2019

Amit Kumar, William Cafaro, Sr., The Law Offices of William Cafaro, New York, NY, for Plaintiff.

Roy W. Breitenbach, Garfunkel Wild, P.C., Great Neck, NY, for Defendants.

OPINION AND ORDER

ANDREW L. CARTER, JR., United States District Judge:

Plaintiff Judith Schaper ("Plaintiff") brings this action against Defendants the Bronx Lebanon Hospital Center ("BLHC") and Carol Wilson (collectively, the "Defendants"), alleging claims of retaliation and hostile work environment in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 ("Title VII"), the New York State Human Rights Law ("NYSHRL") and the New York City Human Rights Law ("NYCHRL").¹ Compl., ECF No. 1. Before the Court is Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment. ECF No. 62. After careful consideration, Defendants' Motion is hereby DENIED.

BACKGROUND

Plaintiff Judith Schaper is a Hispanic American female of Puerto Rican and Dominican descent. Affidavit of Judith Schaper ("Schaper Aff.") ¶ 7, ECF No. 70. On May 6, 2013, she began working for BLHC as a patient transport aid. Pl's. Resp. to Def.'s R. 56.1 Stmt., ECF No. 73, ¶ 3 [hereinafter "Pl.'s R. 56.1 Stmt."]. On March 7, 2015, Plaintiff was promoted to the position of Patient Care Technician ("PCT"). Schaper Aff. ¶ 5. In this new PCT role, Defendant Wilson, who then served as a Patient Care Manager ("PCM"), directly supervised Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 20; Pl.'s Ex. 4, Schaper Dep., ECF No. 81 at 32–35 [hereinafter "Schaper Dep."]. Defendant Wilson is a Jamaican American female. Compl. ¶ 21; Schaper Aff. ¶ 9.

During the course of Plaintiff's employment as a PCT, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Wilson made numerous comments towards her and other Hispanic employees including: referring to Plaintiff and other Hispanic female employees as "you people;" referring to Hispanics as "always having to dress to show something;" making inappropriate comments about Plaintiff and other Hispanic female employees' bodies and attire; mimicking Plaintiff and other Hispanic employees speaking Spanish; reprimanding Plaintiff and other Hispanic employees for speaking Spanish while on duty; threatening Plaintiff's employment; and on one occasion, physically intimidating Plaintiff. Compl. ¶ 22; Schaper Aff. at ¶¶ 11–29; Schaper Dep. at 53–55. In addition, Plaintiff alleges Defendant Wilson often assigned Hispanic employees, including Plaintiff, to cover multiple one-on-one assignments in violation of hospital policy. Compl. ¶ 22; Schaper Aff. at ¶¶ 11, 13, 15–16. Plaintiff further alleges Defendant Wilson moved Plaintiff and other Hispanic PCTs to other PCTs' assignments, leaving posts initially assigned to Hispanic employees as vacant and consequently placing their employment at risk. Compl. ¶ 22; Schaper Aff. at ¶ 15.

On approximately seven occasions, between March 2015 and July of 2015, Plaintiff complained informally to other hospital supervisors, namely Gagandra Ramgahan and Mairead O'Regan, who at the time Plaintiff was terminated served as the Assistant Director for Nursing and the Director of the Emergency Department respectively. Pl's. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 10–11; Schaper Aff. at ¶¶ 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 26, 27. More specifically, Mr. Ramgahan served as Defendant Wilson's supervisor and Ms. O'Regan served as Mr. Ramgahan's supervisor. Pl's. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 10–11. Plaintiff informed Mr. Ramgahan and Ms. O'Regan about Defendant Wilson assigning her to multiple one-on-one patients alone, making comments about Hispanic women's attire, and reprimanding her for speaking Spanish with patients and or other employees. Schaper Aff. at ¶¶ 12, 14, 16, 18, 20, 26, 27.

On July 7, 2015, a black BLHC patient's daughter asked Plaintiff to change the diaper of her mother, the patient, because she had soiled herself. Id. at ¶ 34. Around the same time, Dr. Mukherjee, an emergency room doctor, asked Plaintiff to urgently assist him with administering an EKG on another patient. Id. at ¶ 33–34. Plaintiff ultimately did not assist with changing the patient's diaper. Id. at ¶ 39. As a result, Defendant Wilson asked the patient's daughter to write a statement about the incident. Pl.'s Ex. 8, Deposition of Carol Wilson at 118 [hereinafter "Wilson Dep."]. Accordingly, that day the patient's daughter filed a formal, written complaint against Plaintiff. Pl.'s R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 22. Defendant Wilson, subsequently, reported the incident to supervisors, Ms. Ramgahan and Ms. O'Regan, and the Director of Labor Relations, Jasen Nhambiu. Id. ¶ 25. On July 31, 2015, Mr. Nhambiu conducted a fact-finding hearing to investigate the incident. Id. ¶ 27. On August 3, 2015, in accordance with the Hospital's Discrimination Complaints Policy, Plaintiff filed a formal written complaint against Defendant Wilson. Pl.'s R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 35. BLHC terminated Plaintiff on August 11, 2015, finding that she violated the hospital's code of conduct. Pl.'s R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 22. One of the violations consisted of insubordination, which carries a potential penalty of termination. Schaper Aff. ¶ 46; Pl.'s R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶ 31. In general, BLHC did not terminate employees for insubordination. Wilson Dep. at 93. Additionally, BLHC had a policy of instituting progressive forms of punishment. Pl.'s Ex. 9, Deposition of Margaret O'Regan at 96.

Following Plaintiff's termination, she asked Dr. Mukherjee to draft a letter of recommendation. Pl.'s Ex. 29; Def's. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 71–79. Subsequently, Dr. Mukherjee drafted said letter, but on October 12, 2019, before sending it to Plaintiff, he emailed his supervisor Mr. John Coffey to request permission. Id. In the email, Dr. Mukherjee indicated the letter was to be sent to Plaintiff's attorney. Pl.'s Ex. 28. Although, Mr. Coffey initially granted permission, he later stated he would like to discuss the matter further, stating he would like to "more fully understand the implications" and that he had previously "skipped the legal twist." Id. Ultimately, Dr. Mukherjee declined to send Plaintiff the letter of recommendation. Pl.'s Ex 12, Deposition of Mukherjee at 47–50; Def's. R. 56.1 Stmt. ¶¶ 71–79. On October 21, 2015 and April 13, 2016, Plaintiff filed charges of discrimination, hostile work environment and retaliation with the United States Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC") against Defendants BLHC and Wilson. Pl.'s Ex. 22.

LEGAL STANDARD

Summary judgment must be granted "if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a) ; see also Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). There is no issue of material fact where the facts are irrelevant to the disposition of the matter. Chartis Seguros Mexico, S.A. de C.V. v. HLI Rail & Rigging, LLC , 967 F. Supp. 2d 756, 761 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) ; see also Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (holding that a fact is material if it would "affect the outcome of the suit under governing law"). An issue is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the non-moving party." Anderson , 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505.

In deciding a summary judgment motion, courts must construe the evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in her favor. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Jones Chemical Inc., 315 F.3d 171, 175 (2d Cir. 2003). Courts may not assess credibility, nor may they decide between conflicting versions of events, because those matters are reserved for the jury. Jeffreys v. City of New York, 426 F.3d 549, 553–54 (2d Cir. 2005). However, "[t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient; there must be evidence on which the jury could reasonably find for the plaintiff." Id. (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505 ). In discrimination cases,

summary judgment may not be granted simply because the court believes that the plaintiff will be unable to meet his or her burden of persuasion at trial....There must either be a lack of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position, ... or the evidence must be so overwhelmingly tilted in one direction that any contrary finding would constitute clear error.

Danzer v. Norden Sys., Inc. , 151 F.3d 50, 54 (2d Cir. 1998) (footnote and citations omitted). See also Risco v. McHugh , 868 F. Supp. 2d 75, 98 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).

DISCUSSION

I. Retaliation

A. Claims Against BLHC

Plaintiff brings claims against Defendant BLHC pursuant to Title VII, NYSHRL and NYCHRL. Under Title VII and NYSHRL, retaliation claims are reviewed under the burden-shifting approach promulgated by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green , 411 U.S. 792, 802–04, 93 S.Ct. 1817, 36 L.Ed.2d 668 (1973). See Zann Kwan v. Andalex Grp. LLC , 737 F.3d 834, 843 (2d Cir. 2013). Under McDonnell Douglas , a plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation by showing: "(1) participation in a protected activity; (2) that the defendant knew of the protected activity; (3) an adverse employment action; and (4) a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse employment action." Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. , 420 F.3d 166, 173 (2d Cir. 2005). "The plaintiff's burden in this regard is ‘de minimis ,’ and ‘the court's role in evaluating a summary judgment request is to determine only whether proffered admissible evidence would be sufficient to permit a rational finder of fact to infer a retaliatory motive.’ " Hicks v. Baines , 593 F.3d 159, 164 (2d Cir. 2010) (quoting Jute v. Hamilton Sundstrand Corp. , 420 F.3d 166 at 173 )).

"Once the plaintiff has established a prima facie showing of retaliation, the burden shifts to the employer to articulate some...