Schara v. TLIC Worldwide, Inc.

• Decision Date: 13 February 2023
• Docket Number: C. A. 20-CV-423-JJM-PAS
• Parties: NICOLE SCHARA, Plaintiff, v. TLIC WORLDWIDE, INC., Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island

NICOLE SCHARA, Plaintiff, v. TLIC WORLDWIDE, INC., Defendant.

C. A. No. 20-CV-423-JJM-PAS

United States District Court, D. Rhode Island

February 13, 2023

ORDER

John J. McConnell, Jr. Chief United States District Judge

Before the Court is Defendant TLIC Worldwide, Inc.'s (“TLIC”) Motion for a New Trial on Damages or in the Alternative a Remittitur under Rule 59 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (“Rule 59”). ECF No. 32. TLIC generally argues that the jury award “shock[s] the conscience” because it was not based on the evidence introduced at trial.^[1] Id. at 2. Plaintiff Nicole Schara disagrees, arguing that she “provid[ed] detailed testimony regarding □ the consequences of Defendant's wrongful actions with regard to her financial losses, her subsequent jobs, her attempts at gainful employment commensurate with the position that she held at the Defendant corporation, and the continuing emotional havoc wrought upon her.” ECF No. 36 at 5. Based on its considerations of each party's arguments and a thorough review of the record, the Court finds that the jury's award of damages was “supported by the evidence reasonable inferences from that evidence, and the jury's common sense, as opposed to speculation or conjecture.” Rodriguez-Valentin v. Doctors' Ctr. Hosp. (Manati) Inc., 27 F.4th 14, 22 (1st Cir. 2022) (citations omitted). Accordingly, the Court DENIES TLIC's Motion for a New Trial or Remittitur. ECF No. 32.

I. BACKGROUND

Nicole Schara was employed as an Inside Sales Account Manager by TLIC for a little over three years when TLIC fired her. Trial Tr. Day 1; Trial Tr. Day 2. Ms. Schara alleged that TLIC fired her because of her sex and as retaliation for reporting sexual harassment. ECF No. 1. After a three-day trial, a jury returned a verdict for Ms. Schara against TLIC on state-law claims^[2] for hostile work environment, retaliation, whistleblower protection violation, and negligent training and supervision. ECF No. 29. Specifically, Ms. Schara alleged violations of the Rhode Island Civil Rights Act (“RICRA”); Rhode Island Fair Employment Practices Act (“FEPA”); Rhode Island Whistleblowers' Protection Act (“WBPA”); and common law negligence. ECF No. 1 at 9-15, 17'19. The jury returned a verdict for Ms. Schara and awarded her total damages of $491,500: back pay of $237,500; future pay of $94,000; emotional damages of $60,000; and punitive damages of $100,000. ECF No. 29 at 12.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Rule 59 provides that “[t]he [C]ourt may, on motion, grant a new trial on all or some of the issues-and to any party- * * * for any reason for which a new trial has heretofore been granted in an action at law in federal court.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 59. “A district court may grant a new trial ‘only if the verdict is against the law, against the weight of the credible evidence, or tantamount to a miscarriage of justice.'” Burnett v. Ocean Props., Ltd., 987 F.3d 57, 72 (1st Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citing, inter alia, Sanchez v. Foley, 972 F.3d 1, 16 (1st Cir. 2020)). The Court reviews the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. Newell P.R., Ltd. v. Rubbermaid Inc., 20 F.3d 15, 18 (1st Cir. 1994) (citation omitted). A court may remit a jury's damage award only if it “exceeds any rational appraisal or estimate of the damages that could be based upon the evidence before it.” Casco, Inc. v. John Deere Construction and Forestry Co., 990 F.3d 1, 13 (1st Cir. 2021) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Trainor v. HEI Hosp., LLC, 699 F.3d 19, 29 (1st Cir. 2012)).

Under Rhode Island Law, “[w]hen ruling on a motion for a new trial [in a civil case tried to a jury], the trial [judge] acts as a ‘superjuror' and ‘should review the evidence and exercise his or her independent judgment in passing upon the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.'” Hough v. McKiernan, 101 A.3d 853, 856 (R.I. 2014) (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted). The Rhode Island Supreme Court has held that “[t]he trial [judge] need not engage in an exhaustive review and analysis of the evidence and testimony presented at trial * * * [but] need only make reference to such facts disclosed by the testimony as have motivated his or her conclusion.” Id. (cleaned up). “A trial [judge] may set aside a verdict ‘when [her] judgment tells [her] that it is wrong because it fails to respond truly to the merits of the controversy and to administer substantial justice and is against the fair preponderance of the evidence.'” Id. (cleaned up). “In the alternative, a remittitur may be accomplished if the trial [judge] concludes, after passing upon the evidence, that the plaintiff is not entitled to such an award or that the award is unreasonable in light of the evidence presented at trial.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (citations omitted).

III. DISCUSSION

TLIC essentially makes two core arguments in support of its motion. See ECF No. 32 at 1-2, 5-9. First, TLIC argues that Ms. Schara failed to make a good faith effort to mitigate her damages through alternative employment. Id. at 6-7. Second, TLIC argues that the jury award was excessive and lacked any reasonable evidentiary basis given the evidence that the parties presented at trial. Id. at 1'2.

A. Failure to Mitigate

TLIC claims that there was no evidence that Ms. Schara tried to mitigate her damages as required under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Id. at 6-7. This argument fails for two reasons. First, the Court granted TLIC judgment as a matter of law on all Title VII claims before the jury deliberated. Therefore, Title Vil's duty to mitigate is irrelevant to the jury's award. Second, even considering a duty to mitigate under state law,^[3] Ms. Schara did testify that she tried to find alternative employment. See Trial Tr. Day 2 (reflecting Ms. Schara's testimony about applying to jobs after her termination from TLIC). And although it was brief, Ms. Schara did actually obtain employment after her termination from TLIC. See id. Moreover, Ms. Schara specifically testified to the difficulty that she experienced during her job search given the circumstance under which she left her previous employment at TLIC. See, e.g., id. (explaining that an interview went well until she had to explain her termination from TLIC). The Court thus finds that the evidence reasonably reflects that Ms. Schara discharged any duty to mitigate.

B. Evidentiary Basis and Reasonableness of Damages

With respect to the reasonableness of the award, TLIC argues that there were several specific deficiencies. ECF No. 32 at 5-6. First, TLIC argues that the awards of back pay and front pay were excessive and not based on the evidence that the parties presented at trial. Id. at 1-2, 5'6. TLIC also specifically contends that Ms. Schara needed to introduce further evidence, such as life tables, to establish future earnings more concretely. Id. at 6. Second, TLIC argues that Ms. Schara did not introduce any medical evidence of treatment for emotional suffering that she claims to have endured. Id. at 1-2, 7'9. Third, TLIC argues that the punitive damages were not reasonable given the evidence that the parties presented at trial. Id.

The Court instructed the jury that their award had to be based on a preponderance of the evidence and that they could not speculate! that any award had to be fair, adequate, and just! and that the specific amount was solely up to the jury. Jury Instructions at 15-16. There were no relevant objections to the jury instructions on this issue. The Court's instructions on damages were as follows:

Damages are defined in law as that amount of money which will compensate an injured party for the harm or loss that she has sustained. The rationale behind compensatory damages is to restore a person to the position that she was in prior to the harm or loss. Compensatory damages, then, are the amount of money that will replace as near as possible the loss or harm caused to Ms. Schara.

You may not speculate in awarding damages. If you find in Ms Schara's favor, then you should consider awarding her such a sum as you find by the preponderance of the evidence will fairly and justly compensate her for any damages you find she sustained as a direct result of TLIC Worldwide's conduct. You may consider the value of her back pay, including benefits and bonuses, which she would have received from the date of her termination on February 9, 2018, until the present date. You may also consider future wages, also called front pay, that Ms. Schara would have earned if she had remained in the employ of TLIC Worldwide.

You must also reduce any award to its present value by considering the interest that Ms. Schara could earn on the amount of the award if she made a relatively risk-free investment. The reason you must make this reduction is because an award of an amount representing future loss of earnings is more valuable to Ms. Schara if she receives it today than if it were received at the time in the future when it would have been earned. It is more valuable because Ms. Schara can earn interest on it for the period of time between the date of the award and the date she would have earned the money. Thus, you should decrease the amount of any award for loss of future earnings by the amount of interest that Ms. Schara can earn on that amount in the future.

You may also award Ms. Schara emotional damages for any pain and suffering she experienced as a result of TLIC Worldwide's conduct. Distress arising from this lawsuit, or legal expenses incurred in this lawsuit must not be included in these damages. Any amount you award for emotional damages should be based upon your consideration of the nature, extent, and duration of her pain and suffering. You may

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