Schartz v. Unified School Dist. No. 512

• Decision Date: 16 January 1997
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 95-2491-EEO.
• Citation: 953 F.Supp. 1208
• Parties: John Clark SCHARTZ, Plaintiff, v. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 512, and Blanche Banks, Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

953 F.Supp. 1208

John Clark SCHARTZ, Plaintiff, v. UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 512, and Blanche Banks, Defendants.

Civil Action No. 95-2491-EEO.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

January 16, 1997.

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Kurt D. Tilton, Brian L. Smith, Smith & Tilton, P.C., Kansas City, MO, for plaintiff.

Patricia A. Bennett, Bennett, Lytle, Wetzler, Martin & Pishny, L.C., Prairie Village, KS, for defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

EARL E. O'CONNOR, Senior District Judge.

This matter is before the court on defendant's motion for summary judgment (Doc. # 58) and defendant's motion to strike (Doc. # 76). For the reasons set forth below, defendant's motion for summary judgment on counts I, III, IV, V, and VI will be granted, defendant's motion for summary judgment on count II will be denied, count II will be dismissed without prejudice, and defendant's motion to strike will be denied in part as moot and granted in part.

Factual Background

Plaintiff has brought this action claiming that defendants forced him to retire from his teaching position. Plaintiff's Amended Complaint includes claims of age discrimination, breach of contract, and wrongful termination against the Shawnee Mission School District, Unified School District No. 512 (the "District"). Plaintiff's Amended Complaint also includes claims of intentional interference with contract or business expectancy and intentional infliction of emotional distress against Blanche Banks, who has been principal of Shawnee Mission North High School ("North") since 1985.

For purposes of this opinion, the following is a brief summary of the material facts that are uncontroverted or deemed admitted, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56 and District of Kansas Rule 56.1.¹

Plaintiff John Clark Schartz worked as a teacher for the District for twenty-nine years. Mr. Schartz taught Biology and Environmental Education. From 1981 through 1987, there were at least six documented complaints of plaintiff's classroom conduct. These complaints ranged from plaintiff's alleged use of profanity in class to alleged inappropriate sexual conduct and statements.

From Spring 1994 through Spring 1995, several students raised complaints to Ms. Banks about plaintiff's conduct. In April 1994, a female student alleged (1) that plaintiff, in response to the student's comment, stated "Reproduce, Reproduce! Do you go up to your mom and say `I reproduce'? Do you have sex? Do you go up to your mom and say, `Hey Mom, I have sex'? Just lie and say `no,' because we all know you really do."; (2) that she felt humiliated because plaintiff also insisted on discussing her sex life in front of class after she requested to discuss the issue after class; (3) that plaintiff told a male student in class, "Don't worry, we all know you are sterile."; and (4) that she was offended because plaintiff would use women's bodies as analogies to the cells they would look at under the microscope. Ms. Banks and plaintiff met to discuss the student's complaints. Plaintiff denied making any inappropriate remarks. Although plaintiff could not remember what he said in class, he contended that his remarks were taken out of context. Ms. Banks and the associate principal advised plaintiff that the student wanted to be transferred from his class and that further incidents could result in discipline including termination.

On September 30, 1994, a female student complained that plaintiff said "I'll bet you're sweet 16 and never been kissed." The student claimed to be embarrassed and uncomfortable by these and other remarks and requested to transfer from plaintiff's class. Plaintiff concedes that he made the statement, but he claims that the statement is a common phrase and was not intended to embarrass the student. Plaintiff also claims he was denied the opportunity to participate in meetings with the student and her parents.

On October 20, 1994, a student complained that plaintiff had been sarcastic and used loud, inappropriate language. After the student failed to answer certain questions and another student correctly answered, plaintiff turned to the student and said "Why can't you say that?" Plaintiff also was angry at the student because of her use of a recorder and told her he would "break that damned machine." Ms. Banks and plaintiff met to discuss the student's complaint. Ms. Banks documented the student's complaint and plaintiff's response, but she did not formally reprimand plaintiff at the time. Ms. Banks advised plaintiff that further actions of this sort could lead to discipline up to and including termination.

On December 22, 1994, an African American female student and her mother complained (1) that the student was uncomfortable when plaintiff told the class he knew a "negro girl" who had a relative born with both a penis and vagina, and (2) that plaintiff made a comment in class implying that the student would be receiving a failing grade. Plaintiff admits that he made these comments but contends that he had no racial intent by using the word "negro" and that the comment about the student's grade was in response to the student's failure to come to class several times and failure to pay attention to directions. Ms. Banks, the student, the student's mother, and plaintiff met to discuss the complaints. A plan was devised during the meeting for plaintiff to work with the student, and plaintiff thought the problem was worked out. The student attended only one more class at North. On approximately January 6, 1995, Ms. Banks prepared a letter of reprimand to plaintiff stating that his conduct was inappropriate and unprofessional.

On January 26, 1995, a female student voiced a number of allegations involving plaintiff. First, she alleged that plaintiff had asked the students in his environmental education class to write letters of support for him and post-date the letters. When the student approached plaintiff about his request, plaintiff responded that he could not understand why she would not write a letter for him. Plaintiff also asked the student if she believed the allegations of sexual harassment. Next, the student alleges that during a discussion of whether a woman could have one breast larger than the other breast, plaintiff told the students that they could measure breast size by water displacement. Plaintiff lifted two buckets of water and told the student to lift her blouse. Further, the student claims that plaintiff touched her across her mid-section, stood too close when he talked to her, and gave her a "creepy" feeling. Finally, the student's mother complained that plaintiff allowed the student to leave campus without permission. Plaintiff, Ms. Banks, and Dr. David Stewart, Associate Superintendent of the District, met to discuss these complaints. Plaintiff denied the above actions. Dr. Stewart advised plaintiff that he would need to investigate the allegations.

On February 16, 1995, Mr. Steve Martin, counsel for the District, sent plaintiff's counsel a letter explaining that plaintiff's upcoming meeting with Mr. Robert DiPierro, Deputy Superintendent of the District, would be his final opportunity to present his position. This letter also explained plaintiff's options to appeal should the District suspend, terminate, or not renew plaintiff's contract.

On or about February 28, 1995, Mr. DiPierro and other District representatives met with plaintiff, his attorney, and plaintiff's representative from the KNEA. At the beginning of the meeting, Mr. Martin, counsel for the District, announced that the hearing was a "pre-termination" hearing. After the meeting, plaintiff's representative from the KNEA told him that, based on the District's actions at the meeting and her experience, she thought the District would fire plaintiff or not renew his contract. Shortly after the meeting, counsel for the District advised plaintiff's counsel that the District was seriously contemplating termination. The parties dispute whether plaintiff relied on this statement in deciding to retire. On or about March 3, 1995, plaintiff chose to retire in order to protect his health insurance benefits for his wife. Plaintiff was 57 years of age when he retired.

Summary Judgment Standards

Summary judgment is appropriate "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c); accord Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2509-10, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986); Vitkus v. Beatrice Co., 11 F.3d 1535, 1538-39 (10th Cir.1993). A factual dispute is "material" only if it "might affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

The moving party bears the initial burden of showing that there is an absence of any genuine issue of material fact. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986); Hicks v. City of Watonga, 942 F.2d 737, 743 (10th Cir.1991). Essentially, the inquiry as to whether an issue is genuine is "whether the evidence presents a sufficient disagreement to require submission to the jury or whether it is so one-sided that one party must prevail as a matter of law." Anderson, 477 U.S. at 251-52, 106 S.Ct. at 2512. An issue of fact is genuine if the evidence is sufficient for a reasonable jury to return a verdict for the nonmoving party. Id. at 248, 106 S.Ct. at 2510. This inquiry necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at trial. Id. at 252, 106 S.Ct. at 2510.

Once the moving party meets its burden, the burden shifts to the nonmoving party to demonstrate that genuine issues remain for trial "as to those dispositive matters for which it carries the burden of proof." Applied Genetics Int'l, Inc. v....