Schaschlo v. Taishoff
| Citation | 2 N.Y.2d 408,141 N.E.2d 562,161 N.Y.S.2d 48 |
| Parties | , 141 N.E.2d 562 Lydia SCHASCHLO, Respondent, v. Jerome TAISHOFF, Appellant. |
| Decision Date | 08 March 1957 |
| Court | New York Court of Appeals |
John McKim Minton and Rudolph Stand, New York City, for appellant.
David P. Siegel, New York City, for respondent.
The question presented on this appeal pertains to a construction of the New York City Criminal Courts Act, art. V, § 61, subd. 4, relevant to the amount of support which may be decreed in filiation proceedings.
Section 69 of that act requires that, if paternity be established, 'the court shall make an order of filiation * * * and shall order support'.
Since no question is raised as to paternity, we are occupied only with the disputed construction of the particular section of the act defining 'support'.
By virtue of subdivision 4 of section 61, 'The word 'support' as used in this article may include (a) the necessary support and education of the child either prior or subsequent to the order of filiation, according to the age of the child and the station in life of its mother and the financial ability of the parents'.
On the trial, defendant's attorney stipulated that the defendant was capable of paying any award that the court would make within the limitations of the New York City Criminal Courts Act, art. V, § 61, subd. 4, as construed by Fowler v. Rizzuto, 205 Misc. 1088, 132 N.Y.S.2d 29. The Court of Special Sessions in reliance on the Fowler case did not inquire into the financial means of the father but limited its inquiry to the station in life of the child's mother and fixed the support award accordingly.
We agree with the decision and opinion of the Appellate Division insofar as it rejects the construction of the statute adopted by the Court of Special Sessions and requires that consideration be given the financial ability of the father to provide support.
The sole purpose of the first bastardy law was to indemnify the community against the possibility that a natural mother or a child born of an illicit relationship might become a public charge. Hence, support awards were considered adequate if they prevented this eventuality by providing an amount sufficient to afford the bare necessities otherwise required to be supplied by the community. This, however, no longer reflects the social philosophy present in the laws of this State. When the Legislature in 1925, L. 1925, ch. 255, enacted article VIII of the Domestic Relations Law, Consol. Laws, c. 14 (), it recognized more fully the moral obligation of the natural parents toward the offspring of their union. The new law, although providing for indemnification of the community, is chiefly concerned with the welfare of the child (see N.Y.Legis.Doc., 1925, No. 106, pp. 13-18).
Consonant with this general purport, the statute under review should be liberally construed. This the sessions court failed to do. The omission to inquire more fully into the father's means violated both the letter and spirit of the act.
In delegating to the court the task of effectuating the statutory intent to provide for the welfare of illegitimate children, the Legislature did so in terms broad enough to deny a narrow definition. The determination was left to the discretion of the court. The only mandate contained in the statute is that the support is to be 'necessary' according to the 'age of the child and the station in life of its mother and the financial ability of the parents' N. Y. City Crim. Courts Act, art. V, § 61, subd. 4. As we read these terms the statute requires that in exercising its discretion the court should bring to bear upon the paternity case before it each of these criteria, keeping in mind at all times the statute's primary purpose. We find nothing to indicate, as appellant contends, that the 'station in life of its mother' was intended to serve as a fixed and invariable maximum, rendering immaterial the father's means except insofar as they suffice to meet this maximum. If such were the case it would mean that an illegitimate child born to an impoverished woman or one of obviously low station would have to suffer the added misfortune of a meager support award, sufficient only to provide for his needs at that...
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