Scheerer v. Rose State College
Decision Date | 04 December 1991 |
Docket Number | No. 91-6180,91-6180 |
Citation | 950 F.2d 661 |
Parties | 57 Fair Empl.Prac.Cas. (BNA) 729, 57 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 41,107, 71 Ed. Law Rep. 994 W.M. SCHEERER, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ROSE STATE COLLEGE; Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Donald Burris, and Evan Kemp, Defendants-Appellees. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Tenth Circuit |
W.M. Scheerer, pro se.
Sherry Blankenship and Ted N. Pool, Pool, Thompson, Coldiron Blankenship & Vincent, Oklahoma City, Okl., for defendant-appellee Rose State College.
Donald R. Livingston, Acting Gen. Counsel, Gwendolyn Young Reams, Associate Gen. Counsel, Vincent J. Blackwood, Asst. Gen. Counsel, and Lamont N. White, Atty., E.E.O.C., Washington, D.C., for defendants-appellees Equal Employment Opportunity Com'n, Donald Burris and Evan J. Kemp, Jr.
Before ANDERSON, BARRETT and BRORBY, Circuit Judges.
Plaintiff appeals 1 from an adverse judgment of the district court, 774 F.Supp. 620, which in three separate orders granted a Motion to Dismiss filed by Defendant Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC), another such motion filed by Defendants Donald Burris and Evan Kemp (individual EEOC Defendants), and a Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Defendant Rose State College (RSC). Plaintiff brought this action under various civil rights statutes to redress an alleged discriminatory hiring practice by RSC and an alleged discriminatory failure by EEOC properly to investigate and pursue her claim against RSC.
In its Motion to Dismiss, EEOC argued that Congress has not authorized, either expressly or impliedly, a cause of action directly against the EEOC for misprocessing of claims asserted against third-party employers. R.Vol. I, docs. 4 and 5. This motion was renewed when Plaintiff, then represented by counsel, amended her complaint. R.Vol. I, doc. 13. Plaintiff never responded to the motion. Consequently, the district court did not reach the merits of the motion, but rather granted it on the basis of W.D.Okla.R. 14(A), pursuant to which an unanswered motion may be deemed confessed. R.Vol. I, doc. 14 (Order granting EEOC's Motion to Dismiss); see also R.Vol. I, doc. 19 (Order denying Plaintiff's Motion to Reconsider Dismissal of EEOC).
In light of the circumstances surrounding the timing, service, and reassertion of EEOC's motion, 2 see R.Vol. I, doc. 16 (Plaintiff's Memorandum Brief in Support of Motion to Reconsider dismissal of EEOC), there is a serious question whether the district court's purely procedural disposition could be upheld in view of several recent opinions of this circuit reversing similar rulings in roughly comparable settings as unduly drastic. See, e.g., Miller v. Department of Treasury, 934 F.2d 1161, 1162 (10th Cir.1991); Hancock v. City of Okla. City, 857 F.2d 1394, 1396 (10th Cir.1988); Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1519-22 (10th Cir.1988). We need not resolve the matter, however, as we conclude that dismissal of Plaintiff's claim is appropriate on the substantive legal basis asserted in EEOC's motion. See generally Griess v. Colorado, 841 F.2d 1042, 1047 (10th Cir.1988) ( )(quoting Alfaro Motors, Inc. v. Ward, 814 F.2d 883, 887 (2d Cir.1987)).
"The circuits which have addressed the issue have uniformly held that no cause of action against the EEOC exists for challenges to its processing of a claim." Peavey v. Polytechnic Inst., 749 F.Supp. 58, 58 (E.D.N.Y.1990), aff'd, 940 F.2d 648 (2d Cir.1991); see, e.g., McCottrell v. EEOC, 726 F.2d 350, 351 (7th Cir.1984); Ward v. EEOC, 719 F.2d 311, 313 (9th Cir.1983), cert. denied, 466 U.S. 953, 104 S.Ct. 2159, 80 L.Ed.2d 544 (1984); Francis-Sobel v. University of Me., 597 F.2d 15, 17-18 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 949, 100 S.Ct. 421, 62 L.Ed.2d 319 (1979); Georator Corp. v. EEOC, 592 F.2d 765, 767-69 (4th Cir.1979); Gibson v. Missouri Pac. R.R., 579 F.2d 890, 891 (5th Cir.1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 921, 99 S.Ct. 1245, 59 L.Ed.2d 473 (1979). Following this established line of authority, we hold that Plaintiff's claim for compensatory and punitive damages against EEOC under the cited statutory authority should have been dismissed pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 12(b)(6), as originally argued by EEOC below.
We need not decide here whether and under what circumstances EEOC employees, as opposed to the agency itself, may be subject to suit for damages for improper conduct in connection with the processing of a discrimination charge. The district court noted that Plaintiff's claim in this regard could be dismissed because "Plaintiff has failed to allege any direct or personal involvement on the part of Defendants Kemp and Burris." R.Vol. I, doc. 31 at 3 ( ). Indeed, although these Defendants are named as parties, not one factual allegation in Plaintiff's First Amended Complaint so much as mentions them. See R.Vol. I, doc. 11. All of the allegations regarding misprocessing of Plaintiff's discrimination charge simply attribute such conduct to the agency itself, without further elaboration. Id. at 6-8. It was proper for the district court to dismiss the individual EEOC Defendants, as no claim was even facially stated against them. 3
Plaintiff relied on several legal bases for her action against RSC, all of which were rejected, for various reasons, by the district court. Plaintiff invoked 20 U.S.C. § 1681 ( ) and § 1684 ( ) without any further elaboration in her Amended Complaint. In its Motion for Summary Judgment, RSC argued that Plaintiff could not establish a prima facie case of sex discrimination under § 1681, which incorporates the same elements of proof required in Title VII cases, see Mabry v. State Bd. of Community Colleges & Occupational Educ., 813 F.2d 311, 316-18 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 849, 108 S.Ct. 148, 98 L.Ed.2d 104 (1987), because the position denied Plaintiff was filled by another woman. 4 See Risher v. Aldridge, 889 F.2d 592, 596 n. 11 (5th Cir.1989) ( ); see also Breneman v. Kennecott Corp., 799 F.2d 470, 474 (9th Cir.1986) (discriminatory discharge); Namenwirth v. Board of Regents, 769 F.2d 1235, 1240 (7th Cir.1985) (, )cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1061, 106 S.Ct. 807, 88 L.Ed.2d 782 (1986). RSC contended that § 1684 "is not applicable to the instant case since the Plaintiff is neither blind nor suffering from severely impaired vision and makes no allegations of such." R.Vol. II at 13. The district court granted RSC's motion as to these sections because Plaintiff wholly failed to substantiate her position in response to the arguments outlined above. Plaintiff has likewise, on appeal, neglected to address directly either the district court's ruling or the merits of RSC's arguments. We affirm the district court on these matters.
The district court concluded that Plaintiff's reliance on 42 U.S.C. § 1981 and § 1982 to redress conduct that occurred some four and a half years prior to suit was precluded by the two-year statute of limitations applicable to personal injury suits in Oklahoma. See Okla.Stat. tit. 12, § 95 (Third). See generally Meade v. Grubbs, 841 F.2d 1512, 1524 (10th Cir.1988). The Supreme Court has held that the forum state's statute of limitations for personal injury actions provides the appropriate limitations period for civil rights claims under § 1981, Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 660-62, 107 S.Ct. 2617, 2620-22, 96 L.Ed.2d 572 (1987), as well as 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 276-80, 105 S.Ct. 1938, 1947-49, 85 L.Ed.2d 254 (1985), but the Court has not yet addressed the issue in connection with § 1982. However, we agree with the district court that the same basic considerations underlying the holdings in Goodman and Wilson apply with respect to Plaintiff's § 1982 claim and, therefore, that section 95 (Third) barred its assertion as well. 5 See Village of Bellwood v. Dwivedi, 895 F.2d 1521, 1528 (7th Cir.1990) ( ); Rodriguez v. Village of Island Park, Inc., No. CV-89-2676, 1991 WL 128568, at *5, 1991 U.S.Dist. LEXIS 9469, at *13-14 (E.D.N.Y. July 2, 1991) ( ); see also Allen v. Gifford, 462 F.2d 615, 615 (4th Cir.) (pre-Wilson decision holding that § 1982 should be governed by same statute of limitations applicable to § 1983), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 876, 93 S.Ct. 128, 34 L.Ed.2d 130 (1972); Waters v. Wisconsin Steel Works of Int'l Harvester Co., 427 F.2d 476, 488 (7th Cir.) (pre-Goodman decision holding that § 1982 should be governed by same statute of limitations applicable to § 1981), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 911, 91 S.Ct. 137, 27 L.Ed.2d 911 (1970); cf. Callwood v. Questel, 883 F.2d 272, 274 (3d Cir.1989) ( ).
Finally, the district court dismissed Plaintiff's Title VII claim of race discrimination as untimely filed under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). The district court recognized that this nonjurisdictional limitations period is subject to equitable tolling, see Gonzalez-Aller Balseyro v. GTE Lenkurt, Inc., 702 F.2d 857,...
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