Scheffer v. National Life Ins. Co.

• Decision Date: 17 March 1879
• Parties: ALBERT SCHEFFER and others, Executors, <I>vs.</I> NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE UNITED STATES.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 534

25 Minn. 534

ALBERT SCHEFFER and others, Executors, vs. NATIONAL LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE UNITED STATES.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 17, 1879.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court for Ramsey county, Wilkin, J., presiding, refusing a new trial.

Allis & Allis, for appellant.

Palmer & Bell, for respondent.

GILFILLAN, C. J.

When this cause was called for trial in the court below, but before any other act was done toward a trial, the defendant objected to the court proceeding further in the cause, on the ground that it having executed and filed the proper papers for a removal of the cause to the circuit court of the United States, the state court had lost jurisdiction. If the record in the cause showed a loss of jurisdiction, it was error in the court to proceed further. No order for removal was necessary. St. Anthony Falls Water-Power Co. v. King Bridge Co., 23 Minn. 186. The only ground upon which the right of removal is claimed is that the defendant derives its corporate character under an act of congress which declares that the corporation shall be capable "of suing and being sued, pleading and being impleaded, in the district and circuit courts of the United States, either in law or in equity," in the district of Columbia, or elsewhere. It is claimed that this provision, if it does not give to the courts of the United States exclusive jurisdiction in all actions to which the corporation is a party, at least gives to the corporation the privilege of electing to have its rights adjudged in the federal instead of the state courts. The act certainly gives to the corporation the character necessary to authorize jurisdiction in the federal courts, so far as that jurisdiction may depend on the character of litigants. But we do not think the act intended to authorize jurisdiction in the federal courts in all cases, without regard to the nature of, or amount involved in, the litigation. The interpretation which would lead to that result would also authorize all actions by or against the corporation to be brought in the district courts instead of the circuit courts of the United States; and that the act intended to enlarge the jurisdiction of the district courts, or of the circuit courts, so as to embrace, so far as affects this corporation, a class of actions of which those courts had not jurisdiction before, is hardly possible. The most that we can make of the provision is that the corporation may sue or be sued in the circuit or in the district court, in cases where such court may have jurisdiction of the subject-matter; and that the right of removal from a state to a federal court depends on the same consideration; that is, that no objection can be made to the right of removal so far as relates to the character of the corporation, provided the nature of the controversy is such as to authorize the removal.

Our attention is called to the act of March 3, 1875, (18 St. at Large, 470,) regulating removals. But that act does not include the case of a corporation created by or under the laws of the United States. Such cases are controlled by U. S. Rev. St. § 640, in which such a corporation is required to state, in its petition for removal, that it has a defence arising under or by virtue of the constitution of the United States, or any treaty or law of the United States. The petition in this case had no such statement, and it was therefore insufficient.

The action was upon a policy of life insurance upon the life of Charles Scheffer. It contained two conditions under which defence is made: First. That in case "of the insured dying by his own hand," the policy should be void. Second. That the statements and declarations made in the application for the policy were in all respects true, and without any suppression of any fact relating to the health, habits or circumstances of the insured, affecting the interests of the company.

Upon the defence under the first of these conditions, the evidence was complete that the insured died by suicide, and there was also evidence covering a period of several months prior to his death, commencing with a very serious injury suffered by him, tending to prove insanity. We think there was enough of this evidence to justify a finding that he was insane at the time of the suicide. The defendant claims that the jury were not at liberty to draw any inferences whatever relative to the mental condition of the insured, from the act of self-destruction itself. The court below charged the jury that the mere fact of the commission of suicide is not evidence of insanity. Without expressing any opinion on the question whether suicide, where there is no other evidence showing the mental condition, is evidence of insanity, we think that where there is other evidence tending to show an insane condition, the fact of suicide may be considered in connection with that evidence.

The charge of the court below, upon the question whether death by suicide, committed by reason of insanity, avoids such a policy as that in suit, is very tersely and clearly expressed; and as though the court feared the jury might misapprehend, it is several times repeated, always to the same effect, and in carefully chosen language. The charge was that "if his (Scheffer's) reason was so far overthrown that he had not the power or capacity to exercise it upon the act he was about to commit; if he did not understand, or if he did understand and appreciate the effect of the act, but was driven to it by an uncontrollable impulse caused by insanity, then it is not to be considered as the act of his own hand, within the meaning of the policy."

This charge presented a point that has been repeatedly passed on by the supreme court of the United States, and the courts of last resort in many of the states, which courts have generally, with the exception of that in Massachusetts, given...