Scheiber Ranch Props. v. City of Lincoln

• Decision Date: 02 November 2022
• Docket Number: C092083
• Parties: SCHEIBER RANCH PROPERTIES, LP, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LINCOLN, Defendant and Respondent; RICHLAND DEVELOPERS, INC., Real Party in Interest and Appellant.
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

SCHEIBER RANCH PROPERTIES, LP, et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LINCOLN, Defendant and Respondent;

RICHLAND DEVELOPERS, INC., Real Party in Interest and Appellant.

C092083

California Court of Appeals, Third District, Placer

November 2, 2022

NOT TO BE PUBLISHED

Super Ct. No. SCV0040629

MAURO Acting P. J.

Scheiber Ranch Properties, LP and Albert Scheiber (collectively Scheiber Ranch) filed a petition for writ of mandate challenging the decision of the City of Lincoln (Lincoln) to certify an environmental impact report (EIR) under the California Environmental Quality Act (Pub. Resources Code § 21000 et seq.) (CEQA) and to issue land use approvals for the Village 5 project by Richland Developers, Inc. (Richland).^[1]Scheiber Ranch subsequently amended its writ petition to add a complaint for deprivation of substantive due process and uncompensated taking against Lincoln.

The trial court granted the writ petition as to the EIR discussion for the Village 5 Specific Plan (the Specific Plan) relating to transit impacts and mitigation measures that relied on compliance with the Placer County Conservation Program (the Conservation Program). It denied the writ petition as to the remainder of Scheiber Ranch's claims. The trial court sustained without leave to amend a demurrer to the causes of action for deprivation of substantive due process and uncompensated taking.

Scheiber Ranch now contends (1) the EIR fails to adequately disclose agricultural resource impacts and fails to mitigate to the extent feasible, referencing mitigation measure 3.2-1, (2) the EIR does not adequately inform on water supply, (3) the EIR fails to provide adequate information about its fair-share mitigation to determine effectiveness, (4) the EIR impermissibly defers analysis and mitigation regarding impacts to biological resources, i.e., mitigation measure 3.4-2(b) is inadequate, (5) the trial court erred in ordering only partial decertification of the EIR and declining to vacate the project pending Lincoln's additional CEQA review, (6) Scheiber Ranch asserted a cognizable substantive due process claim, and (7) the trial court erred in sustaining without leave to amend the demurrer to the uncompensated taking cause of action.

In its cross-appeal, Richland contends (8) the Scheiber Ranch challenge to mitigation measure 3.2-1 is moot, (9) the trial court erred in concluding that certain mitigation measures were improperly deferred, and (10) the trial court erred in ruling that the EIR's analysis of transit impacts violated CEQA.

We conclude Scheiber Ranch fails to demonstrate that the EIR's discussion of impacts on agricultural resources and mitigation, water supply, or fair-share mitigation is deficient. However, mitigation measure 3.4-2(b) improperly deferred the formulation of mitigation measures for potentially significant adverse impacts on the habitat of specialstatus species.

We further conclude that a trial court may order a partial decertification of an EIR and suspend only those parts of the project that do not comply with CEQA upon making requisite severance findings; that Scheiber Ranch has not established error in the trial court's demurrer rulings and that the approval of the final Conservation Program did not moot Scheiber Ranch's claims.

But we agree with the trial court that the EIR's discussion of mitigation measures requiring compliance with the Conservation Program is inadequate. And Richland fails to demonstrate that the EIR's discussion of transit impacts complied with CEQA.

We will reverse the judgment with regard to mitigation measure 3.4-2(b) and direct the trial court to enter a judgment and issue a writ of mandate consistent with this opinion. We will affirm the judgment in all other respects.

BACKGROUND

The Specific Plan contemplated the annexation of approximately 4,787 acres into Lincoln and the development of that property to create approximately 8,200 residential dwelling units, 4.6 million square feet of commercial space, and public/semipublic facilities, including a high school, a junior high school, three elementary schools, parks, and open space. It was anticipated that development would occur over a 15- to 25-year period. The Specific Plan area would be developed separately and at different times because it was owned by different landowners. Richland owned and/or controlled about 1,541 acres of the Specific Plan area. The EIR provided a project-level analysis for Area A of the Specific Plan area and a program-level analysis for Areas B through J.

Scheiber Ranch Properties, LP owned and operated agricultural land within the Specific Plan area. Albert Scheiber was a general partner of Scheiber Ranch Properties, LP. Scheiber Ranch filed a petition for writ of mandate pursuant to CEQA to set aside Lincoln's certification of the EIR for the Specific Plan. It subsequently filed a second amended petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, adding causes of action for deprivation of substantive due process and uncompensated taking.

Following a hearing, the trial court granted the second amended writ petition in part and denied it in part. It sustained without leave to amend the demurrer to the deprivation of substantive due process and uncompensated taking causes of action. In addition, the trial court made findings pursuant to section 21168.9, subdivision (b) and concluded that the portions of the EIR that did not comply with CEQA -- i.e., the discussion of impacts on transit and reliance on the Conservation Program as mitigation for impacts to biological and agricultural resources -- were severable from the remaining Specific Plan approvals. Accordingly, it issued a peremptory writ of mandate requiring Lincoln to decertify those portions of the EIR that addressed reliance on the Conservation Program as mitigation and impacts on transit and to suspend the same parts of the Findings of Fact and Statement of Overriding Considerations. The writ required Lincoln to bring the EIR into compliance with CEQA and precluded Lincoln from issuing grading permits, allowing construction to start, or allowing any Specific Plan activity to occur that could result in an adverse change to the environment until it had complied with the writ.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The standard of review in a CEQA case is abuse of discretion. (Sierra Club v. County of Fresno (2018) 6 Cal.5th 502, 512 (Sierra Club).) But we determine de novo whether the EIR's discussion of environmental impacts, alternatives, or other required information is adequate, that is, whether the discussion is" '" 'sufficient to enable those who did not participate in its preparation to understand and to consider meaningfully the issues raised by the proposed project.'" '" (Id. at p. 516, see id. at pp. 513-516.) In doing so, we keep in mind that our role is to determine whether the EIR is sufficient as an informational document, not whether the agency's conclusions are correct. (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 392 (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn.).) And we review the agency's factual determinations -- e.g., challenges to the scope of the EIR's analysis of a topic, the methodology used for studying an impact, and the reliability or accuracy of the data upon which the EIR relied -- for substantial evidence. (Sierra Club, at p. 516; Vineyard Area Citizens for Responsible Growth, Inc. v. City of Rancho Cordova (2007) 40 Cal.4th 412, 435 (Vineyard); Habitat &Watershed Caretakers v. City of Santa Cruz (2013) 213 Cal.App.4th 1277, 1296 (Habitat &Watershed Caretakers).) Under that standard, we accord deference to Lincoln's substantive factual conclusions, we do not set aside its determination on the ground that an opposite conclusion would have been equally or more reasonable, we do not reweigh conflicting evidence, and we resolve reasonable doubts in favor of Lincoln's findings and decision. (Sierra Club, at p. 512; Berkeley Keep Jets Over the Bay Committee v. Board of Port Commissioner (2001) 91 Cal.App.4th 1344, 1356.) We presume the challenged EIR is adequate, and the party challenging the EIR bears the burden of proving it is inadequate or that insufficient evidence supports one or more of its conclusions. (Rialto Citizens for Responsible Growth v. City of Rialto (2012) 208 Cal.App.4th 899, 924-925 (Rialto).)

DISCUSSION

SCHEIBER RANCH'S APPEAL

I

Scheiber Ranch contends the EIR fails to adequately disclose agricultural resource impacts and fails to mitigate to the extent feasible, referencing mitigation measure 3.2-1.

A

Scheiber Ranch challenges the EIR's discussion of the Specific Plan's impacts on land subject to Williamson Act contracts. It contends the urban land uses contemplated under the Specific Plan were not allowed under Williamson Act contracts, but the EIR dismissed such impact.

To preserve agricultural and open space land and discourage premature urban development, the California Land Conservation Act of 1965 (Gov. Code, § 51200 et seq.), also known as the Williamson Act, authorizes local governments to establish agricultural preserves and enter into contracts with landowners to limit land within a designated preserve to agricultural and compatible uses for the duration of the contract. (County of Humboldt v. McKee (2008) 165 Cal.App.4th 1476, 1487-1488.) In return," 'the landowner is guaranteed a relatively stable tax base, founded on the value of the land for open space use only and unaffected by its development potential.'" (Id. at p. 1488.) Each contract between the landowner and local government has an initial term of at least 10 years and provides for automatic annual renewals thereafter unless notice of nonrenewal is given as...