Schentur v. U.S.

• Decision Date: 30 August 1993
• Docket Number: No. 92-3605,92-3605
• Citation: 1993 WL 330640,4 F.3d 994
• Parties: NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit. Raymond SCHENTUR and Jo Ann Schentur, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Sixth Circuit

Page 994

4 F.3d 994

NOTICE: Sixth Circuit Rule 24(c) states that citation of unpublished dispositions is disfavored except for establishing res judicata, estoppel, or the law of the case and requires service of copies of cited unpublished dispositions of the Sixth Circuit.

Raymond SCHENTUR and Jo Ann Schentur, Plaintiffs-Appellants v. UNITED STATES of America, Defendant-Appellee.

No. 92-3605.

United States Court of Appeals, Sixth Circuit.

Aug. 30, 1993.

Before NELSON and NORRIS, Circuit Judges, and FRIEDMAN, District Judge. ^*

PER CURIAM.

This is an appeal from an order granting defendant's motion for summary judgment. Plaintiffs brought an action seeking refunds for income tax overpayments for the years 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that plaintiffs were barred from obtaining refunds by the three-year statute of limitations, as set forth in 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6511(b)(2)(A). The district court granted the motion, finding no genuine issue of material fact as to when the tax returns were filed. The district court also granted summary judgment on plaintiffs' claim that 26 U.S.C. Secs. 6502 and 6511 are unconstitutional. ¹ After a de novo review, we affirm.

I.

Plaintiffs Raymond and Jo Ann Schentur are taxpayers who filed joint income tax returns for the years 1981, 1982, 1983 and 1984. They overpaid their income taxes for 1981, 1982 and 1983 by $9,345, $4,921 and $5,933, respectively, and claim that they are entitled to refunds for these amounts. Plaintiffs also claim that they are entitled to $11,072 on their 1984 return as a credit for overpayment made in 1983. ² Plaintiffs requested refunds of these overpayments from the Internal Revenue Service. The IRS denied the requests on the grounds that the claims were untimely.

Generally, a claim for credit or refund of an overpayment of any tax must be filed within three years from the time the return was filed or two years from the time the tax was paid, whichever is later. 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6511(a). The filing of a federal income tax return may be treated as a claim for refund. 26 C.F.R. Sec. 301.6402-3(a)(5). However, even when a claim for overpayment is timely made, a taxpayer is not necessarily entitled to a refund. Section 6511(b)(2)(A) limits the amount that a taxpayer may recover to overpayments made within the three years prior to the request for the refund, plus additional time for any extensions that were granted. Payments of estimated tax and payments of taxes withheld from wages are deemed made on the due date of the return for that year, without regard to extensions; i.e., April 15 of the following year. 26 U.S.C. Sec. 6513(b). Thus, for plaintiffs to be entitled to refunds, they were required to file their returns within three years of the original April 15 due dates, plus extensions. Because the returns for 1981, 1982 and 1983 were received on February 28, 1989, defendant argues that they were untimely.

Both parties agree that for the 1981 tax year, plaintiffs overpaid their taxes by $9,345, as a result of estimated taxes and wage withholdings. For 1981, plaintiffs obtained a sixty-one-day extension for filing their return, making it due June 15, 1982. Plaintiffs concede that they did not meet this deadline, but claim that they filed their 1981 return by April 15, 1985, within the three-year statute of limitations. Because of the sixty-one-day extension, the statute of limitations deadline was actually June 15, 1985. The return was date-stamped as received by the IRS on February 28, 1989. Plaintiffs did not date the return themselves, and the envelope was not saved by the IRS, so the postmark was not available as evidence. The IRS denied plaintiffs' refund request as untimely in a letter dated May 16, 1989.

As for tax year 1982, the parties agree that plaintiffs overpaid by $4,921. That year, plaintiffs obtained an extension for filing their tax return, making it due on August 15, 1983. Plaintiffs did not file their return by this extended deadline, but claim that they did file it by April 15, 1986, within the three-year statute of limitations. Because of the extension, the statute of limitations for filing actually did not expire until August 15, 1986. Again, the IRS date-stamp indicates that this return was received on February 28, 1989. However, the envelope was not saved by the IRS, so the postmark was not available as evidence. Contrary to their current contention that the return was filed by April 15, 1986, plaintiffs dated their own return "4/10/87." The IRS denied plaintiffs' refund request as untimely in a letter dated May 11, 1989.

Regarding the 1983 tax year, both parties agree that plaintiffs overpaid by $5,933. For 1983, plaintiffs again obtained an extension for filing their tax return, making it due on August 15, 1984. Plaintiffs did not file their return by this extended deadline, but claim that they did file it by April 15, 1987, within the three-year statute of limitations. Because of the extension, the statute of limitations deadline was actually August 15, 1987. The IRS received two identical copies of the 1983 return. One is date-stamped as received by the IRS on January 30, 1989, the other February 28, 1989. Plaintiffs allege that they gave their 1983 tax information to an accountant, Barry Siegel, and that Siegel mailed the return on April 15, 1987. However, Siegel did not sign or date the 1983 tax returns. Plaintiffs dated their own 1983 tax return by signing the signature line with the date "4/10/87." The envelope was not saved by the IRS, so the postmark was not available as evidence. The IRS denied their refund request as untimely in a letter dated May 11, 1989.

Both parties agree that there was no overpayment for the 1984 tax year. Unlike the other years at issue here, there is no dispute as to the filing date for 1984. Plaintiffs obtained an extension for filing their return, making it due August 15, 1985. This deadline was not met; the return was signed, dated and mailed on April 15, 1988, and received at the IRS on April 18, 1988. This filing was timely since the statute of limitations period did not expire until August 15, 1988. However, plaintiffs argue that the $3,278 penalty they were assessed was improper. They contend that if their 1983 overpayment had been credited to their 1984 tax liability, they would have made an overpayment for the 1984 tax year. The IRS, however, argues that the 1983 overpayment was not credited to the 1984 tax liability because the claim for 1983 was untimely. Thus, the IRS contends that the penalty assessed against plaintiffs for 1984 was proper.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal district court, seeking refunds for each of the years in question. Defendant filed a motion for summary judgment on the grounds that the taxpayers were barred from obtaining refunds by the three-year statute of limitations. The district court granted the motion for summary judgment, and this appeal followed.

At oral argument before this court, defendant argued that the affidavits produced by plaintiffs were insufficient to establish their claim because the only ways to establish delivery to the IRS are a postmark or a certified or registered mail receipt. The court invited supplemental briefs on this issue, and each side has filed a letter brief.

II.

On appeal, plaintiffs argue that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because a genuine issue of material fact remained as to when the returns were filed. Plaintiffs also contend that summary judgment was improper because discovery and oral argument were not permitted by the district court. In addition, plaintiffs argue that 26 U.S.C. Secs. 6502 and 6511 are unconstitutional denials of due process and equal protection because they give the IRS six years to collect taxes due but taxpayers only three years to claim a refund.

A.

Plaintiffs argue that summary judgment was improper because a genuine question of material fact existed as to when the returns were filed. Under Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c), summary judgment is appropriate if:

the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law....

In responding to a properly supported summary judgment motion, the burden is on the non-moving party to "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(e). "[T]he mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine dispute as to any material fact." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986) (emphasis in original). ³ Viewing the evidence "in the light most favorable to the opposing party," Adickes v. S.H. Kress Co., 398 U.S. 144, 157 (1970), summary judgment should be entered if the evidence is such that a reasonable fact-finder could not find for the non-moving party. See, e.g., Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-24 (1986); Street v. J.C. Bradford & Co., 886 F.2d 1472, 1478-80 (6th Cir.1989).

In response to the motion for summary judgment, plaintiffs submitted affidavits from Ronald Schentur, Jo Ann Schentur and Ronald Schentur's secretary, Judith Metzler. The Schenturs both stated that the returns for 1981 through 1984 were mailed before April 15, 1985, April 15, 1986, April 15, 1987, and April 15, 1988, respectively. In addition, Metzler stated that she personally delivered tax documents for 1983 to plaintiffs' accountant, Barry Siegel, for preparation before April 15, 1987, and that Siegel later told her that he had timely filed the return for 1983. Plaintiffs also submitted an affidavit from Siegel. Plaintiffs stated that they intended to offer this affidavit at the motion hearing, but the district...